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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates the role of two marketing practices—returns policies and group-
buying services—in improving channel coordination. The first study (presented in Chapter
Two) focuses on the interaction between two types of returns policies—returns of unwanted
products from consumers to retailers and returns of unsold inventory from retailers to man-
ufacturers. Even without the right to return unsold inventory to the manufacturer, the
retailers may accept returns from consumers; by doing so, they benefit from a less price-
sensitive market demand, an ability to screen for high-valuation consumers, and a compet-
itive advantage (offering a returns policy makes a retailer more attractive to consumers).
From the manufacturer’s perspective, accepting returns may induce the retailers to order
more stock, set lower prices, generate more sales, and therefore, improves the performance
of the channel. However, under some conditions (e.g., when the marginal cost of stock-outs
is relatively high), this study shows that this effect disappears and the manufacturer does
not accept returns from the retailer in equilibrium. The second study (presented in Chap-
ter Three) investigates the rationale for using group-buying services vis-a-vis the traditional
posted-pricing mechanism. It focuses on the behavior of consumers and explores the role
of heterogeneity in their valuation for the product and cost of purchasing via group-buying
in the functioning of group-buying services as a price-discrimination device. Finally, the
role of group-buying services in improving channel coordination under asymmetric informa-
tion is studied in Chapter Four. This analysis shows that the availability of group-buying
services provides an opportunity for the manufacturer to reduce the informational rents of
the retailer arising from its private information about the market condition. Interestingly,
the manufacturer can avoid paying these rents and regains the first-best profitability when
asymmetry in information exists regarding the relative sizes of consumer segments. In other
settings (e.g., when asymmetric information exists regarding consumers’ price sensitivity),
iii
leveraging the group-buying mechanism nevertheless allows the manufacturer to design a
contract that requires lower rents and improves channel coordination to some extent.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Marketing channels play an important role in every business, and many manufacturers rely on
retailers and wholesalers to distribute their products to consumers. Retailers, for instance,
offer a variety of services, such as providing guarantees, taking returns, offering financial
services, etc., that add value to the consumers’ experience. Furthermore, they sometimes
help develop alternative options for consumers to purchase the product; these include on-line
auctions, (e.g., Ebay), name-your-own-price (e.g., Priceline), and an option that has emerged
relatively recently, i.e., group-buying services (e.g., Mobshop).
However, since the distribution channel is often comprised of independent members, each
with its own decision variables and motivations, conflicts tend to arise among the channel’s
members. The importance of understanding how best to manage distribution channels has
been the focus of much research attention in the marketing, economics, and management
fields for a long time (e.g., see Spengler 1950, Jeuland and Shugan 1983, McGuire and Staelin
1986, Desiraju and Moorthy 1997, among others). This immense amount of effort has pro-
vided useful insights on many aspects of the distribution channel. In particular, researchers
have proposed a variety of mechanisms to improve the functioning of the channel. This
work on channel coordination includes contract design (Jeuland and Shugan 1983), implicit
understanding from repeated interaction (Shugan 1985), franchising (Lal 1990), quantity
discounts (Ingene and Parry 1995), performance requirements (Desiraju and Moorthy 1997),
cooperative advertising (Corstjens and Lal 1989), and pull price promotions (Gerstner and
Hess 1995), among others.
Recently, the advent of technological innovations—especially the Internet—creates nu-
merous opportunities for firms to develop creative means to attract and better serve more
customers. Many new distribution arrangements have emerged, and most interestingly, these
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have the potential to improve channel coordination and raise the overall performance of the
entire system. For instance, manufacturers in various industries have added an on-line di-
rect channel to the (traditional) indirect retail channel. In this context, Chiang, Chhajed
and Hess (2003) show that such a dual-channel design induces the traditional retailers to
lower their prices; consequently, the severity of the standard double-marginalization problem
(Spengler 1950, Jeuland and Shugan 1983) is reduced and the channel’s overall profitability
is improved.
In a similar vein, this dissertation extends the literature on channel coordination by
analyzing the role of two marketing practices—returns policies and group-buying services—
in improving the performance of the distribution channel. An overview of each of these is
given below.
The study of the first topic is motivated by the observation that though accepting returns
from consumers is a common practice in the retail industry, not all manufacturers accept
returns of unsold inventory from the retailers. The rationale for accepting returns by the
manufacturers and the retailers (from their respective customers) has been explored in two
non-overlapping streams of research—one deals with the returns from the retailers to the
manufacturers (namely, manufacturer’s returns and denoted MR) and the other with the
returns from the consumers to the retailers (namely, consumer returns and denoted CR,
hereafter).
Consider, for instance, the literature on manufacturer’s returns. It has been shown
that the manufacturer’s returns policy can help share the risk with the retailers, safeguard
the brand name, facilitate the distribution of new product information (Pasternack 1985,
Kandel 1996, and Padmanabhan and Png 1995), and perhaps more interestingly, intensify
retail competition—thereby, raising the manufacturer’s profitability—when market demand
is uncertain (Padmanabhan and Png 1997, 2004, Wang 2004). On the other hand, research
on consumer returns focuses on the retailers’ motivation for accepting returns—accepting
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returns from consumers allows the retailers to share the risk with consumers (therefore,
raising their willingness-to-pay for the product; see Chu et al. 1998), screen for high-valuation
consumers (Che 1996), and signal product quality (Moorthy and Srinivasan 1995).
Even though these two streams of work have laid the foundation for understanding many
aspects of the returns policies, it is unclear how their interaction may impact the marketing
decisions of the channel members. Accordingly, the second chapter of this dissertation ad-
dresses this gap in the literature and examines how a manufacturer’s returns policy affects
the retailers’ prices, ordered stock levels, and consumer-returns policy; consequently, the
analysis identifies conditions when MR and CR may be offered together and in isolation.
Further, this study discusses the impact of other factors, such as the rate of returns from
consumers and the cost of stock-outs to the retailers, on the above relationships.
The analysis of this interaction between MR and CR policies is conducted in a stylized
setting where a manufacturer distributes its product to consumers through two competing
retailers; both the manufacturer and the retailers may choose to accept returns from their
respective customers. If CR is implemented, then it is helpful to distinguish between an
initial demand and a net demand (i.e., net of returns from consumers) since they affect retail
decisions in an important way.
First, consider the retailers’ motivation for accepting returns from consumers in the
absence of MR. By doing so, they can raise their prices due to consumers being less price-
sensitive—consumers are less concerned about the price when having the right to return
unwanted products. CR also allows the retailers to screen for high-valuation consumers.
Moreover, offering CR makes a retailer more attractive to consumers (especially to those
who are concerned about buying a mis-matched product) if the rival retailer does not accept
returns; this allows the retailer to steal some market share from its competitor. However,
accepting returns is costly. Interestingly, depending on their stocking and pricing strategies,
the retailers will incur different types of cost when offering CR: (1) if they choose to order
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stock and set prices according to the initial demand, then they must bear the cost of unsold
inventory (due to returns), and (2) if they base their stocking and pricing decisions on the
net demand, then they will incur the cost of stock-outs1.
Intuitively, if the marginal cost of stock-outs is negligible, then the retailers will accept
returns from consumers—they can enjoy the above-mentioned benefits of the CR policies at
no cost by ordering stock and setting prices according to the net demand. By contrast, if
the marginal stock-out cost is not negligible, then the retailers must consider the trade-off
between the benefit and cost of accepting consumer returns when making this decision.
Suppose that the marginal cost of stock-outs is not too high, then when offering CR,
the retailers prefer bearing the cost of stock-outs to incurring the cost of excess inventory;
consequently, they will order stock and set prices according to the net demand. Notice
that the magnitude of stock-outs reflects the difference between the initial demand and the
net demand, which increases as the rate of returns from consumers increases. Therefore,
if consumers’ rate of returns is low, then the cost of stock-outs will be low and can be
recovered and the retailers will accept returns from consumers. In contrast, if this rate is
high, implying a significant cost of accepting returns, then the wholesale price determines
whether CR is offered or not: (1) if the wholesale price is low, then the retail prices will also
be low; in this case, the retailers have little incentive to screen for high-valuation consumers,
and therefore, CR will not be offered. (2) In contrast, if the wholesale price is high, then
the retailers will be motivated to accept consumer returns since such policy allows them to
screen for high-valuation consumers who can afford paying the high prices.
Finally, if the cost of stock-outs is relatively high, then the retailers will avoid stock-out
problems by ordering stock according to the initial demand. When the product is always
1The stock level following this strategy is lower than the initial demand, resulting in stock-out problems
(i.e., not all consumers, who are willing to purchase, can get the product initially). The retailers will then
resell any returned items to those “rain-check” customers, and eventually, clear stock. Therefore, such
retailers do not incur any costs due to excess inventory, and the only cost they must bear is that due to
stock-outs.
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available, the benefit of CR due to the above-mentioned competition effect is quite strong,
and motivates the retailers to accept returns from consumers despite the cost of excess
inventory.
Keeping the above in mind, now consider the manufacturer’s perspective: For the manu-
facturer, accepting returns is costly since all excess inventory will be returned by the retailers.
However, the manufacturer may nevertheless accept returns if such a policy raises its prof-
itability. This possibility arises when the marginal cost of stock-outs is moderate. In this
setting, by offering MR, the manufacturer induces the retailers to accept consumer returns
and order stock according to the initial demand. By contrast, in the absence of MR, the
retailers may or may not offer CR as discussed above; in both cases, they order less stock.
(In particular, if CR is not offered, then sales are lower due to the demand being more
price-sensitive; therefore, less stock is ordered. If consumer returns are accepted, then the
level of ordered stock is lower due to: (1) the stocking strategy, which is based on the net
demand, and (2) the motivation to reduce the cost of stock-outs2.) This means that the man-
ufacturer’s returns policy can induce the retailers to order more stock. Higher stock level
implies more intense competition between the retailers, lower prices, and higher profitability
to the manufacturer. The trade-off between this benefit and the cost of excess inventory to
the manufacturer (which is the production cost) determines whether MR will be offered—if
the cost is relatively low (high), then the manufacturer will (not) accept returns from the
retailers.
Most interestingly, the analysis shows that when the marginal cost of stock-outs is either
negligible or relatively high, the benefit of accepting returns to the manufacturer completely
disappears. In the latter setting, when the marginal cost of stock-outs is relatively high, the
retailers will avoid this cost by ordering stock according to the initial demand if they choose
2When there is less stock to clear, the retailers can raise their prices; higher prices imply lower initial
demand, and therefore, less consumers experiencing the problem of stock-outs (i.e., less stock-outs and lower
stock-out cost).
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to offer CR. Further, as discussed above, the retailers will accept consumer returns in this
case. Here, even in the absence of MR, CR is still offered and stock is ordered according to
the initial demand. In other words, MR neither changes the retailers’ stocking (and pricing)
strategy nor their consumer-returns policies. In fact, the nature of competition between
the retailers remains unaffected by the manufacturer’s returns policy; the manufacturer has
nothing to gain from its returns policy.
Finally, consider the former setting, i.e, when the marginal cost of stock-outs is negligible.
If MR is not offered, then the level of ordered stock is (solely) affected by the motivation
to avoid excess inventory3—it is ordered according to the net demand. By offering MR, the
manufacturer does induce the retailers to order more stock—they order stock based on the
initial demand—but eventually, this increase in stock will be returned by consumers. In
both cases, net sales are identical (and equal to the net demand). This means there is no
benefit of offering MR when the marginal cost of stock-outs is negligible. The second chapter
describes the structure of the market when MR and CR are (not) offered and provides a
more detailed discussion on these issues.
The third and fourth chapters of this dissertation investigate the impact of an emerg-
ing practice of selling products to consumers via group-buying services. Recent research
has shown that group-buying (which is a demand-aggregation mechanism) serves as a price-
discrimination device that helps the firm extract more surplus when the market condition
is uncertain (Anand and Aron 2003). The third chapter complements Anand and Aron
(2003)’s work by focusing on disaggregate consumer behavior and investigating two dimen-
sions of market heterogeneity that explain the rationale for using group-buying vis-a-vis the
traditional posted-pricing mechanism. The analysis focuses on the behavior of consumers
3The latter force, i.e., the one due to the motivation to reduce the cost of stock-outs is not present in this
case.
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whose valuation for the product and cost of purchasing via group-buying4 are heteroge-
neous. Consistent with Anand and Aron (2003)’s results (they do not consider disaggregate
behavior), here too the analysis shows that group-buying allows for price discriminating
higher-valuation consumers from those with lower valuation—consumers with high valuation
will purchase via the traditional posted-pricing mechanism while low-valuation consumers
purchase via group-buying, paying the lower group-buying price. However, consumer het-
erogeneity in both dimensions—valuation and cost of joining group-buying—is required for
this price-discrimination mechanism to be profitable.
Intuitively, in the absence of heterogeneity in consumers’ valuation—and thereby, willing-
ness-to-pay, there is no benefit of market segmentation. Meanwhile, without sufficient hetero-
geneity in the cost of joining group-buying, it will be too costly (and even infeasible in some
instances) for the firm to employ group-buying. For instance, if high-valuation consumers
have too low a cost of joining group-buying, then the firm may need to reduce the posted
price significantly to prevent them from purchasing the product via group-buying. Essen-
tially, the firm has to compensate consumers’ costs of joining group-buying. This means that
the firm incurs significant costs when employing these services, and under some conditions,
these costs may exceed any benefits arising from price-discrimination.
The fourth chapter builds on the previous one and investigates when a manufacturer may
induce its retailer to offer group-buying services and characterizes the conditions under which
channel coordination is improved. In practice, we notice that group-buying is employed by
retailers in various industries and has triggered different reactions from manufacturers (The
Wall Street Journal 2006). Further, the practice seems to arise where there is asymmetric
information between the manufacturer and the retailer—the latter may be better informed
about the market conditions than the former. For instance, the manufacturer may not
4In practice, consumers must spend extra time and efforts when purchasing via group-buying. Further,
since these services are quite novel, some consumers may find it too costly to join group-buying, resulting in
heterogeneity in terms of this cost among them.
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know the precise distribution of high- and low-valuation consumers in the retailer’s local
market; in contrast, the retailer has a much clearer understanding of the distribution of
consumer types (i.e., relative sizes of the consumer segments). Now, suppose that the size
of the high-valuation segment is large, relative to that of the low-valuation segment. This
market condition may allow the retailer to earn more profit by employing group-buying;
however, the retailer may not reveal this to the manufacturer and can seek to leverage its
informational advantage. Such asymmetry in information may also exist regarding other
market parameters, such as price sensitivity of consumers in the different segments.
In general, under asymmetric information, the retailer earns rents (Myerson 1979), and
from the manufacturer’s perspective, this has a negative impact on the efficiency of the distri-
bution channel. The analysis in Chapter Four shows that the availability of the group-buying
mechanism provides an opportunity for the manufacturer to improve channel coordination
under asymmetric information—that is, the manufacturer can reduce (and under some con-
ditions, even avoid paying) the informational rents of the retailer arising from its private
information about the market condition.
To illustrate the idea, Chapter Four analyzes a setting in which asymmetric information
may exist between the manufacturer and its retailer—the retailer may be better informed
about the market condition, i.e., the relative sizes of the consumer segments, and price
sensitivities of consumers in different segments, than the manufacturer. Further, the market
consists of two consumer segments—a high-valuation (H) and a low-valuation (L) segment;
consumers in the H-segment are less price-sensitive than those in the L-segment—and the
retailer has two pricing options in distributing the product, i.e, posted-pricing and group-
buying. The relationship between these two parties is established by a contract, whose terms
include a pricing mechanism, a wholesale price and a fixed fee.
When asymmetric information exists regarding the relative sizes of the high- and low-
valuation segments, the result shows that the manufacturer avoids paying any informational
8
rents and regains the first-best profitability (i.e., the profit it would earn under full infor-
mation). Clearly, the profitability of posted-pricing and group-buying (and consequently,
the retailer’s choice between these two pricing mechanisms) depends on the state of the
market5. Further, under a posted-pricing contract, the retailer’s profitability is unaffected
by the relative sizes of the consumer segments—no matter which segment (high or low) is
relatively larger in size, the profitability of the posted-pricing contract remains the same and
depends on the total demand of the two segments (which is fixed and known to the manu-
facturer). This allows the manufacturer to extract all the surplus from the retailer whenever
the posted-pricing contract is chosen. As a result, the retailer is not doing any better by
choosing the posted-pricing contract when it is not desired by the manufacturer.
On the other hand, the group-buying contract is more profitable when the size of the
high-valuation segment is relatively large (and vice versa—see Footnote 5); consequently, it
is desired by the manufacturer under this market condition and exhibits a (correspondingly)
higher fixed fee. Here too, the retailer has no incentive to choose the group-buying contract
when it is not desired by the manufacturer—if doing so, the retailer will incur a loss due to
the high fixed fee exceeding the low gross-profit of the group-buying contract when the high-
valuation segment is relatively small in size. In summary, the retailer always chooses the
contract desired by the manufacturer in each market state, and reveals its private information
about the market condition. As a result, it earns no informational rents.
Next, when asymmetric information exists regarding price sensitivities of consumers in
the high- and low-valuation segments, the retailer does enjoy some informational rents. This
is due to the fact that the profitability of both pricing mechanisms—posted-pricing and
group-buying—is low (high) when price sensitivity of consumers happens to be high (low).
5It is more profitable to employ group-buying as a price-discrimination device when the state of the
market is characterized by two consumer segments being more distinct from each other. For instance, if the
size of the high segment is relatively large (compared to that of the low segment, making the two segments
more distinct in this dimension from each other), then group-buying is more profitable (than posted-pricing),
despite the cost associated with its employment.
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Consequently, the full-information contract designed for the high (low) state would exhibit
too low (high) a fixed fee. This motivates the retailer to choose the undesired contract when
the market happens to be in the low state; by doing so, it pays a lower fixed fee (i.e., that of
the contract designed for the high state) while earning a higher profit due to the market being
in the low state. Nevertheless, these second-best contracts exhibit lower informational rents
than those contracts that do no allow the manufacturer to specify the appropriate pricing
mechanism. Notice that by choosing an appropriate pricing mechanism, the firm (retailer)
earns higher profits; therefore, a contract of the former type (i.e., with a term on pricing
mechanism) would allow the manufacturer to charge a higher fixed fee than that of the latter
type. Further, the undesired contract of the former type clearly exhibits an inappropriate
pricing mechanism, and thus, is less profitable to the retailer (compared to the undesired
contract of the latter type, wherein the retailer is not obligated to any pricing mechanism).
This higher fixed fee and lower profit reduce the retailer’s incentive to choose the undesired
contract; consequently, the retailer earns lower informational rents.
Interestingly, specifying the pricing mechanism could be considered as a type of perfor-
mance requirement as in Desiraju and Moorthy (1997); that study examines the relative
benefits of requirements on price - and/or effort - and not on group-buying. The analysis in
Chapter Four shows that by leveraging group-buying, the manufacturer can reduce the neg-
ative impact of asymmetric information while improving channel coordination (to different
extents, depending on the type of asymmetric information).
In summary, the three studies help develop a better understanding of the relationship be-
tween members of the distribution channel. Returns policies, which are commonly observed
in the retail industry, have been a topic of academic interest for many years. The study in
Chapter Two extends the literature on returns policies by investigating how a manufacturer’s
returns policy interacts with the retailers’ returns policies and affects channel coordination.
Chapters Three and Four are devoted to exploring the practice of group-buying due to
10
the availability of the Internet, the emergence of e-commerce, and the expansion of social-
networking in recent years. Relevant proofs of the mathematical results are provided in the
Appendices.
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CHAPTER 2: IMPACT OF RETURNS POLICIES ON
CHANNEL COORDINATION
2.1 Introduction
Accepting returns from consumers is a common practice in the retail industry. On average,
the rate of these returns is about 6-8% and can reach up to 10% in high season; in some
product categories, the returns rate can be even higher, e.g., 20% for personal computers
(The Wall Street Journal 1994, CEA 2005, Business Week 2007). In general, having the
option to return purchases is valuable to consumers since it insures them against buying and
keeping mismatched or defective products. For retailers, however, accepting returns tends
to raise the cost of doing business. Nevertheless, almost all retailers offer consumers such an
option.
In practice, manufacturers may accept returns6 of unsold stock from retailers and this
offsets at least some of the retailers’ costs arising from consumer returns. Research has
explored manufacturers’ incentives to alleviate retailers’ costs and several explanations have
been put forth. For instance, the manufacturer’s returns policy can help share the risk
with the retailers, safeguard the brand name and facilitate the distribution of new product
information (see e.g., Pasternack 1985, Kandel 1996, and Padmanabhan and Png 1995). An
intriguing research finding in this context is that accepting returns from retailers can, under
some conditions, raise the manufacturer’s profitability.
More specifically, when demand is uncertain, Padmanabhan and Png (2004) show that
when a manufacturer accepts returns, retail competition is intensified in the high demand
state, leading to lower retail prices, higher sales and higher manufacturer profitability. When
6For expositional ease, we will refer to these as “manufacturer’s returns”, denoted MR, here and through-
out the paper. In contrast, returns accepted by retailers are referred to as “consumer returns” and denoted
CR.
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there is no uncertainty about demand, though, retail competition is unaffected by the man-
ufacturer’s returns policy; consequently, in such a setting, the manufacturer has no incentive
to accept returns from the retailers (Padmanabhan and Png 1997, 2004; Wang 2004). This
stream of work, however, does not examine whether consumer returns affect the manufac-
turer’s returns policy. Our goal is to extend this literature by exploring when and how
consumer returns impact the manufacturer’s optimal returns policy.
We investigate the strategic interaction between consumer returns and manufacturer’s
returns by addressing the following questions: (1) Given the fact that retailers may accept
returns from consumers, how will the manufacturer’s returns policy affect retail decisions,
including retail pricing, stocking and consumer-returns policies? (2) Consequently, how will
the manufacturer and the retailers make the decision on their respective returns policies?
Specifically, (a) what are their respective benefit and cost associated with accepting returns?
(b) how will retail competition be affected by the manufacturer’s returns policy? (c) what are
the factors that moderate the impact of the manufacturer’s returns policy on the retailers’
choice of consumer returns?
To highlight the strategic interaction between consumer returns and manufacturer’s re-
turns, we examine a setting in which a manufacturer distributes the product through two
competing retailers. Each of these risk-neutral players decides whether to accept returns or
not; and accepting returns from consumers affects the retail demand parameters7. Further,
whenever the retailers accept returns from consumers, they will encounter two demand func-
tions, including an initial-demand function and a net-demand function (i.e., net of returns
from consumers). Using that demand structure, we determine the impact of the manufac-
turer’s distribution strategy, i.e., the choice of the wholesale price and returns policy, on the
retailers’ choice of prices, stock levels, and consumer-returns policies.
7For example, when returns are accepted by retailers, consumers are willing to pay higher prices leading
to a demand function that is less price-sensitive. In Appendix A, we develop an individual-level model that
exhibits these features.
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Suppose, for instance, that the manufacturer does not accept any returns from the retail-
ers, the retailers must bear the cost associated with consumer returns, if any. Interestingly,
depending on their pricing and stocking strategies, the retailers will incur different types of
cost when accepting returns from consumers: (a) if the retailers choose to order stock and set
prices according to the initial-demand function, then they will have enough stock to serve all
consumers who are willing to purchase the product initially; since some of these consumers
will return their purchase, resulting in some unsold inventory, the retailers must bear the
cost of having excess inventory, and (b) if they base their stocking and pricing decisions on
the net demand, then the stock they carry is lower than the initial demand, resulting in
stock-outs problem (i.e., not all consumers, who are willing to purchase, can get the product
initially); in this case, the retailers will incur the cost of such stock-outs8. Intuitively, if the
cost due to stock-outs is greater than that due to excess inventory, the retailers will choose
the former option.
In contrast, if the manufacturer accepts returns from the retailers, then excess inventory,
if any, is taken care of by the manufacturer. Therefore, the retailers will choose to order stock
and set prices according to the initial demand, i.e., the former option, when accepting returns
from consumers. In other words, accepting consumer returns is costless to the retailers under
the manufacturer’s returns policy.
When making the decision on their returns policies, the retailers consider the trade-off
between the above-mentioned costs and the benefit of accepting returns from consumers.
Since consumers are less price-sensitive when they can return unwanted products, the retail-
ers are able to charge a higher price and obtain a higher margin and profitability. Further,
when a retailer accepts returns while it rival does not, the benefit from accepting consumer
returns is enhanced since those consumers who are concerned about the risk of purchasing
8The retailers will resell any returned items to those “rain-check” consumers and eventually, clear their
stock. Therefore, they do not incur any excess inventory; the only cost they must bear is that due to
stock-outs. For detailed discussion, see the model section.
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a mis-matched product are more likely choose the retailer who offers consumer returns. In
other words, a returns policy makes the retail offer more attractive to consumers when not
all retailers offer such a policy. However, this attractiveness is limited if the product may not
be available (due to stock-outs) at the retailer who accepts returns—this is the case when
this retailer chooses to order stock according to the net demand (i.e., the second option
mentioned above).
Regarding the retailers’ returns policies, we find that when the manufacturer accepts
returns of unsold inventory, accepting consumer returns is costless to the retailers; they will
accept returns from consumers. In contrast, without the right to return excess inventory to
the manufacturer, the retailers’ returns policies depend on other factors, including (1) the
marginal cost of stock-outs, (2) the rate of returns from consumers, and (3) the wholesale
price.
Specifically, if the marginal cost of stock-outs is negligible, the retailers will offer consumer
returns; they will order stock as well as set the retail prices according to the net demand in
this case. As mentioned above, the cost associated with accepting consumer returns when
choosing this pricing option is the cost of stock-outs, which is negligible. In other words, the
retailers are able to avoid the cost of consumer returns while benefiting from such policy. In
the other extreme, if the marginal cost of stock-outs is high, all retailers will avoid stock-
out problems by ordering stock according to the initial demand upon accepting returns from
consumers. As pointed out earlier, when the product is always available, the competitive gain
of accepting returns when the rival retailer does not (and at the same time, the competitive
loss due to not accepting returns when the rival does) becomes significant, motivating the
retailers to accept returns despite the cost of excess inventory. Finally, if the marginal cost of
stock-outs is moderate, then the retailers will choose to bear this cost (instead of the cost of
excess inventory) by ordering stock according to the net demand. Though consumer returns
result in a less price-sensitive demand, the competitive gain from accepting returns is now
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limited due to the existing stock-outs problem. In equilibrium, if the rate of returns from
consumers is low, then the cost of consumer returns is low9; the retailers accept returns from
consumers. In contrast, if the rate of returns is significant, implying a significant cost of
accepting returns, then the product’s wholesale price determines whether consumer returns
are accepted or not: (a) If the wholesale price is low, then the retail prices will also be low.
In this case, the retailers have little incentive to screen for high-valuation consumers via a
returns policy; they will choose to not accept returns from consumers. (b) In contrast, if the
wholesale price is high, the retailers will be motivated to accept consumer returns since such
policy allows them to screen for high-valuation consumers who can afford paying the high
retail prices.
From the manufacturer’s perspective, accepting returns is costly since all excess inventory
will be returned by the retailers. However, the manufacturer still chooses to accept returns
if such policy raises its profitability. This happens when the marginal cost of stock-outs is
moderate. In this setting, by accepting returns of excess inventory, the manufacturer induces
the retailers to offer CR as well as order stock and set prices according to the initial demand.
In contrast, in the absence of the manufacturer’s returns policy, the retailers may or may
not offer CR (depending on the trade-off between the cost and benefit discussed above);
in both cases, they will order less stock. If CR is not offered, then sales are lower due to
higher price-sensitivity; consequently, stock is ordered less. In contrast, if consumer returns
are accepted, the level of ordered stock is reduced as a result of two driving forces: (1) the
motivation to avoid the cost of excess inventory—the retailers’ stocking and pricing decisions
are based on the net demand (instead of the higher initial demand)—and (2) the motivation
to reduce the cost of stock-outs10. This means that the manufacturer’s returns policy can
9Note that, in this case, the cost of accepting returns from consumers is the cost of stock-outs. When the
rate of returns is low, the difference between the initial demand and the net demand is small; as a result,
the level of stock-outs is low, implying a low level of stock-out cost.
10Recall that upon ordering stock according to the net demand, the retailers incur the cost of stock-outs.
Most interestingly, given a marginal cost of stock-outs, the motivation to reduce the cost of stock-outs induces
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induce the retailers to order more stock. Higher stock level implies more intense competition
between the retailers, lower prices, and higher profitability to the manufacturer. We find
that when the cost of stock-outs is moderate and the manufacturer’s marginal cost of having
excess inventory11 is relatively low, the gain from accepting returns exceeds the associated
cost and the manufacturer will be better off by offering the retailers the right to returns.
Otherwise, if the marginal cost of taking back returns is high, the manufacturer will not
accept any returns from the retailers.
Most interestingly, our analysis shows that under other conditions, i.e., when the marginal
cost of stock-outs is either negligible or relatively high, the benefit of accepting returns to
the manufacturer completely disappears and it will not accept returns at all. Consider the
setting when the marginal cost of stock-outs is negligible. If MR is not offered, then the
level of ordered stock is (solely) affected by the motivation to avoid excess inventory12—it
is ordered according to the net demand. By offering MR, the manufacturer does induce the
retailers to order more stock—they order stock based on the initial demand—but eventually,
this increase in stock will be returned by consumers. In both cases, net sales are identical
(and equal to the net demand). This means there is no benefit of offering MR when the
marginal cost of stock-outs is negligible.
In the second setting, when the marginal cost of stock-outs is relatively high, the retailers
will avoid this cost by ordering stock according to the initial demand if they choose to offer
CR. Further, as discussed above, the retailers will accept consumer returns in this case. Here,
even in the absence of MR, CR is still offered and stock is ordered according to the initial
demand. In other words, MR neither changes the retailers’ stocking (and pricing) strategy
the retailers to order less stock: when there is less stock to clear, the retailers will raise the prices; higher
prices imply lower initial demand, and consequently, less consumers experiencing the problem of stock-outs,
i.e., less stock-outs and lower stock-out cost.
11For the manufacturer, this is the marginal cost of production.
12The latter force, i.e., the one due to the motivation to reduce the cost of stock-outs is not present in this
case.
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nor their consumer-returns policies. In fact, the nature of competition between the retailers
remains unaffected by the manufacturer’s returns policy; the manufacturer has nothing to
gain from its returns policy.
The rest of this essay is organized as follows. In section §2.2, we provide a brief review
of the literature on returns policies. §2.3 describes the basic model, including the retailers’
demand functions under different combinations of returns policies. The optimal policies
under different market conditions are characterized in §2.4. §2.5 explores the impact of risk-
aversion on the part of consumers and presents some observations from numerical simulations.
§2.6 concludes the paper. Details related to an individual-consumer-level model that can
generate our demand functions, along with all other derivations, are presented in Appendix
A.
2.2 Literature review
Here we discuss two streams of relevant research—the first deals with manufacturer’s returns
while the second with consumer returns. The literature on manufacturer’s returns policies
is quite extensive and examines the impact of a variety of factors. Marvel and Peck (1995),
for instance, show that the decision to accept returns by manufacturers depends on the
nature of demand uncertainty. Specifically, uncertainty over customer arrivals favors returns
since returns compensate the retailers for holding risky inventory and result in optimal stock
levels; in contrast, when the uncertainty is over consumer’s valuation, a no-returns policy is
recommended to avoid price distortion. Padmanabhan and Png (1995) provide a summary
of the various explanations for the use of manufacturer’s returns policies, including the need
to (a) share the risk with the retailers when demand is uncertain, (b) safeguard the brand
name, and (c) facilitate the distribution of new product information. More recently, Tsay
(2002) shows how risk sensitivity affects the manufacturer’s optimal returns policy.
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Next, abstracting from the insurance role of manufacturer’s returns policies, Pellegrini
(1986) considers returns policies as an effective competitive tool for channel coordination
when products are close substitutes and retailers are risk-neutral. The channel-coordination
role of manufacturer’s returns policies is also explored by Pasternack (1985), who explores
how a partial credit for unsold stock can achieve channel coordination. Next, the manu-
facturer’s returns policy can serve as a tool either to signal the quality of the new product
when it is not observable by the retailers (as in Chu 1993) or to learn the demand for a new
product (as in Sarvary and Padmanabhan 2001). Finally, Kandel (1996) provides arguments
for offering returns based on the optimal allocation of responsibility for unsold inventory
between the manufacturer and the retailers. His research discusses six factors that affect the
choice of returns, including: (i) optimal inventory, (ii) capability to dispose of unsold stocks,
(iii) risk-sharing, (iv) incentives to provide marketing efforts in terms of quality, service,
and promotions, (v) beliefs about sales distribution–when there is asymmetric information
between the manufacturer and the retailer, and (vi) costs of returns.
Perhaps the most relevant papers for our analysis are Padmanabhan and Png (1997,
2004) and Wang (2004). These papers raise the intriguing possibility that manufacturer
returns may sometimes lead to more intense competition at the retail level. Wang (2004),
for example, qualifies the results of Padmanabhan and Png (1997) to show that when demand
is certain, there is no difference in stocking levels, retail prices, and profits between accepting
and not accepting returns. Padmanabhan and Png (2004) identify conditions, under demand
uncertainty, when a manufacturer’s returns policy does intensify competition and raise profit.
In contrast to Padmanabhan and Png (1997, 2004) and Wang (2004), our paper consid-
ers a setting in which the retailers may choose to accept returns from consumers. In the
presence of consumer returns, we show that even though the nature of competition remains
Cournot-like, manufacturer’s returns may nevertheless intensify retail competition under
some conditions. In that sense, our analysis adds to this stream of literature.
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We now turn to the second stream of literature, i.e., the one focusing on consumer
returns policies. Che (1996) investigates the role of consumer returns policy in screening for
high-valuation customers. He finds that when the retail cost is high and consumers are risk-
averse, the retailer can protect its margin by selling only to high-valuation customers under
a returns policy. Next, from a signaling perspective, Moorthy and Srinivasan (1995) (MS)
argue that money-back guarantees, i.e., accepting returns from consumers, can credibly signal
product quality. MS identify conditions under which money-back guarantees are necessary
to signal quality; they also identify conditions under which these guarantees serve as a useful
supplement to price in signaling quality.
Hess et al. (1996) investigate the role of a non-refundable charge in attenuating the moral
hazard problem associated with accepting returns from consumers. That is the case when
some consumers purchase the product with the intention of returning it after extracting
some free value out of it. They find that the retailer is better off imposing a non-refundable
charge when the trial value, the overall valuation, or the probability of consumer finding a
matched product is high. Such a charge is also recommended when consumers’ transaction
cost or the salvage value of the returned product is low. Next, Chu et al. (1998) study
the impact of consumers’ opportunistic behavior, which results in abusive returns, on the
firms’ optimal compensation policy. By investigating the trade-off between an increase in
consumers’ willingness-to-pay and opportunistic behavior due to a returns policy, they find
that a no-questions-asked refund policy is optimal; however, a full refund is not always rec-
ommended. Specifically, partial refund are more likely to be offered when (a) the probability
of dissatisfaction is low, (b) usage rate during product trial is high, (c) consumers’ cost of
complaining is low, and (d) salvage value is low. Davis et al. (1995, 1998) and Yalabik et al.
(2005) determine the optimal returns policy for the retailer in various settings. For instance,
Davis et al. (1995) suggest using full-returns policies either when the transaction cost is
low, the salvage value of the returned product is significant, or the probability of the match
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between consumers’ expectation and the product’s performance is small. Researchers in the
operations management area are also interested in consumer returns with the focus on the
impact of consumer returns on the design of the supply chain.
While this stream of research provides considerable insights, the focus is mainly on the
risk-sharing role of consumer returns in a monopolistic environment. Our paper extends
this literature by investigating the impact of consumer returns when retailers compete. We
show, for instance, that even when consumers are risk-neutral, the retailers can benefit
from accepting consumer returns. Overall, our paper contributes to the understanding of
returns policies by investigating the strategic interaction between manufacturer’s returns
and consumer returns.
2.3 The model
We focus on a single upstream manufacturer, M , who sells its product through two risk-
neutral competing downstream retailers, R1 and R2, who, in turn, distribute the product to
consumers. The manufacturer offers both retailers the same terms, which include a uniform
wholesale price, w, and a returns policy. As in Padmanabhan and Png (1997), here too, M
offers to the retailers one of the following two options for returns: (a) full returns, denoted
MR, and (b) no returns, denoted NMR. Under full returns, the manufacturer refunds the
wholesale price to the retailers for any unsold quantity of the product; in contrast, under
no returns, the retailers must bear the costs of any unsold items remaining in the ordered
stock.
In the downstream market, R1 and R2 offer consumers the product at the retail prices, p1
and p2 respectively, along with their own returns policies. Analogous to the manufacturer’s
returns policy, we focus on the simple setting, in which each retailer offers to consumers one
of two options: (a) accepting returns from consumers and giving them a full refund of the
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purchase price, denoted CR, or (b) not accepting any returns at all, denoted NCR. When
accepting returns, retailer i (i ∈ {1, 2}) generates initial sales, qˆi, and receives ρqˆi in returns,
where ρ is the rate of consumer returns. Consequently, the net sales volume, denoted qi,
equals (1 − ρ)qˆi. Meanwhile, when retailer i does not accept returns, all sales are final and
the initial demand, qˆi, is identical to the net demand, qi.
The sequence of events in this game unfolds in four stages (see Figure 2.1). In the
first stage, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price, w, and decides on its returns policy,
σM , where σM ∈ {MR,NMR}. In the second stage, the retailers choose, simultaneously
and non-collusively, their consumer-returns strategies, denoted σRi (i = 1, 2). Four possible
combinations of consumer-returns policies can arise in this stage: (a) {NCR,NCR} when no
retailers accept consumer returns, (b) {NCR,CR} when retailer R1 does not accept returns
from consumers while retailer R2 does, (c) {CR,NCR} when only retailer R1 offers consumer
returns, and (d) {CR,CR} when both retailers accept consumer returns.
Next, in stage three, the retailers decide on the stock levels, si, that they will order given
the manufacturer’s distribution policy (i.e., σM and w) and the choice of consumer-returns
policies (i.e., {σR1 , σR2 }) from stage two. In the final stage, R1 and R2 set their retail prices,
p1 and p2 respectively, given the decisions made in all the previous stages. Subsequently,
sales are realized and profits made.
When the manufacturer’s returns policy is considered in conjunction with the retailers’
consumer-returns policies, i.e., {σM , σR1 , σR2 }, there are eight possible combinations as de-
picted in Figure 2.1: (1) {NMR,NCR,NCR}, (2) {NMR,NCR,CR}, (3) {NMR,CR,NCR},
(4) {NMR,CR,CR}, (5) {MR,NCR,NCR}, (6) {MR,NCR,CR}, (7) {MR,CR,NCR}, and
(8) {MR,CR,CR}. We use Πij,k,l to denote retailer i’s profit when it employs consumer re-
turns policy j, and the competing retailer and the manufacturer use returns policies k and l
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Figure 2.1: The structure of the game.
a 0 to denote a no-returns policy (i.e., j, k, l ∈ {0, 1}). With this notation, Π11,0,1, for exam-
ple, denotes R1’s profit when it offers CR, R2 offers NCR and M offers MR. Finally, we use
piMj,k,l to denote M ’s profit, when R1, R2 and M use returns policies j, k, and l respectively.
Market demand depends on the retail prices, pi (i = 1, 2), and whether or not consumer
returns are accepted. We focus on the following linear initial-demand structure:
qˆi = α
i
j,k − βij,k pi + γij,k pj, (2.1)
where j, k ∈ {0, 1} denote the returns policies of R1 and R2 respectively, and
qi =
 qˆi if σ
R
i = NCR,
(1− ρ)qˆi if σRi = CR.
(2.2)
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The above structure accommodates the impact of consumer returns on the various de-
mand parameters (e.g., price sensitivity). In Appendix A, we develop one possible individual-
consumer-level model that can result in such a (linear) demand structure for the eight scenar-
ios examined here13. The specific demand functions that arise for the different combinations
of consumer returns policies are given in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Initial and net demand functions under different combinations of con-
sumer returns policies
{σR1 , σR2 } = {NCR,NCR} {σR1 , σR2 } = {NCR,CR}a {σR1 , σR2 } = {CR,CR}
Initial-demand functions:
qˆi = 1 + 2τv − 3τpi + τpj , qˆ1 = 1− τ2 + 3τv + µ− 3τp1 + τ2p2, qˆi = 1+τ−2µ− 3τ2 pi+ τ2pj .
(where i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j). qˆ2 = 1 + 3τ2 − τv − 3µ− 3τ2 p2 + τp1.
Net-demand functions:
qi = qˆi. q1 = qˆ1 and q2 = (1− ρ)qˆ2. qi = (1− ρ)qˆi.
Parametersb:
ρ ∈ [0, 1]: rate of returns,
v ∈ [ 16 , 12 ]: certainty equivalent,
τ ∈ (0,+∞): inverse of unit transportation cost, t,
µ ∈ [0, µ¯]: aggregate costs of returns, where (µ¯ def= 13 + τ2 − τv3 ).
aDemand functions when {σR1 , σR2 } = {CR,NCR} are similar to those under {NCR,CR} by symmetry.
bSee Appendix A for the description of these parameters.
We follow the literature (e.g., Che 1996, and Padmanabhan and Png 1997) in assuming
that (a) returned items can be resold as long as there is demand14, (b) unsold inventory (i.e.,
when demand is met) is worthless, (c) the manufacturer incurs only a constant marginal cost
of production, c, and (d) both the manufacturer and the two retailers are risk-neutral.
13Developing the demand functions from first principles allows us to characterize the relationship between
consumer returns and the various parameters more clearly; however, our qualitative insights will apply more
generally.
14Assumption (a) is supported by the fact that 95% of returned products are in working condition; they
are returned due to mis-match or change of mind (PC World 2008). Many products (e.g., house-hold items,
electronics, etc.) are returned unopened and are put back on the shelf. The most common practice is reselling
returned products as ‘opened’ items at discounted prices.
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We now discuss the retailers’ pricing strategies and specify their profit functions, along
with that of the manufacturer, under each of the eight combinations of the returns policies.
As noted in Wang (2004), the retailers set prices in stage four to clear the ordered stock
whether returns are accepted by the manufacturer or not. Recall from (2.1) and (2.2)
that when consumer returns are accepted, the retailers face an initial-demand function, qˆi
(i = 1, 2), and a net-demand function, qi (i = 1, 2). Consequently, in our model, the retailers
may choose one of the following two options, namely option A and option B, to set the
retail prices in stage four: In option A, the retailer sets the price to clear stock according
to the initial-demand function, qˆi, and in option B, the price is set so that stock is cleared
according to the net-demand function, qi.
Under option A, all consumers who are willing to purchase the product at the chosen
retail prices will be served. This means that the initial demand is met completely; however,
some customers return the product and the retailers end up with unsold inventory at the
end of the selling period. Under MR, the manufacturer compensates the retailers for unsold
inventory; in contrast, under NMR, the retailers must bear the cost of unsold inventory.
In contrast, under option B, prices are set to clear stock according to the net demand.
Consequently, the retailers will generate more initial demand than the stock they carry. This
means that some customers are not served initially due to stock-outs. Here, too, some of
the initial buyers will return the product. In this case, as in Che (1996), the retailers are
assumed to be reselling the returned items to other consumers; eventually, all consumers who
are willing to purchase the product will be served and the stock will be cleared. However,
the stock-out problem (i.e., some consumers cannot obtain the product immediately) can
result in various negative reactions from consumers (see Campo et al. 2004, Fitzsimons
2000, among others). Here, to capture the negative impact of stock-outs, we assume that
the retailers incur a constant marginal stock-out cost of η (η ≥ 0)15. Intuitively, option B is
15The cost due to stock-outs is truly an opportunity cost. Past research has considered the adverse
impact of stock-outs on both current and future profits of the firm (Fitzsimons 2000, Anderson et al. 2006).
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meaningful only when the manufacturer does not offer MR. Furthermore, option B is likely
to be preferred when the stock-out cost is relatively low16 compared to the cost of having
excess inventory (as in option A). Accordingly, our analysis focuses on two scenarios: (1)
when the cost of stock-outs is relatively low and the retailers set their retail prices under
NMR according to option B; and (2) when the stock-out cost is relatively high and the
retailers set prices according to option A17 when the manufacturer does not accept returns.
Recall that when the manufacturer accepts returns, the retailers will choose option A to
avoid the stock-out problem18.
Clearly, the responsibility of unsold inventory affects the retailers’ pricing decisions in
stage four. Specifically, under MR, all unsold inventory can be returned to the manufacturer
for refund; as a result, the retailers set their retail prices according to option A to avoid
stock-outs when offering CR. Thus, under MR, retailer i’s profit function is given by
Πij,k,1 = (1− ρ)j qˆi (pi − w) = qi(pi − w), (2.3)
where j = 1 when retailer i offers CR and j = 0 otherwise; k = 0, 1, is the returns policy of
the competing retailer.
A complete treatment of the stock-out problem would require, ideally, a dynamic model (at least a two-
period model) which captures both the current and the future impact of stock-outs on the firm’s demand
and consequently, profit. In the context of our static model, the marginal cost due to stock-outs can be
interpreted as the aggregate present-value measure of this cost. Such an interpretation allows us to focus on
the optimal returns policies in a simpler analytical setting, without compromising too much on the qualitative
insights.
16For instance, the stock-out cost for seasonal products is likely to be higher than that for commodity
products. Further, different firms may consider stock-out costs differently. Discount retailers, such as
Walmart, whose focus is on a low price strategy rather than on superior customer service, may perceive
stock-out cost at a lower level compared to more upscale retailers.
17We abstract from endogenizing the retailers’ choice between the two pricing options for analytical con-
venience. However, in the benchmark analysis of an integrated manufacturer, the choice between these
two options is determined endogenously; the results show that indeed option A is chosen when the cost of
stock-out is significant, and vice versa.
18Under zero marginal cost of stock-out, though both options are costless to the retailers when the man-
ufacturer accepts returns, we assume that the retailers prefer option A to option B ; this reflects the reality
in the sense that option B is likely to require some additional effort to put the product back on the shelf
(though this cost is not modeled explicitly in our framework).
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The manufacturer’s profit is:
piMj,k,1 =

s1(w − c) + s2(w − c) if j = 0 and k = 0
s1(1− ρ)w − s1c+ s2(w − c) if j = 1 and k = 0
s1(w − c) + s2(1− ρ)w − s2c if j = 0 and k = 1
s1(1− ρ)w − s1c+ s2(1− ρ)w − s2c if j = 1 and k = 1
= s1[(1− ρ)jw − c] + s2[(1− ρ)kw − c], (2.4)
where s1, s2 are the stock ordered by retailers R1 and R2 respectively, and j, k are their
respective returns policies.
In contrast, under NMR, the retailers may choose either option A or B, depending on
the level of stock-out cost. If pricing according to option A, R1 and R2 incur the cost of
unsold inventory (but not the stock-out cost) and their profit functions are given by:
Πi,Aj,k,0 =
 qipi − qiw if j = 0qˆipi − ρqˆipi − qˆiw if j = 1
= qˆi[(1− ρ)j pi − w], (2.5)
where j = 0, 1, is the returns policy of retailer i and k = 0, 1, is the competing retailer’s
returns policy. Notice in (2.5) that the retailer is pricing to clear stock according to the
initial demand (i.e., option A) and thus experiences excess inventory due to returns. Under
option B, the retail prices are set to clear stock according to the net demand, i.e., si = qi.
Consequently, there are qˆi − si = qˆi − qi = ρqˆi customers who are not served initially; this
results in a stock-out cost equal to ρqˆiη. Therefore, the profit function of retailer i is
Πi,Bj,k,0 = qi (pi − w)− j ρ qˆi η = qi
[





where j is the returns policy of retailer i and k is the returns policy of the competing retailer.
In either of the two cases, the manufacturer gets paid for all ordered stocks at the whole-
sale price, w, and its profit is:
piMj,k,0 = (s1 + s2)(w − c), (2.7)
where s1, s2 are the stocks ordered by retailers R1 and R2 respectively.
To highlight the interaction between consumer returns and manufacturer’s returns, we
focus on a setting where consumers are risk-neutral. Later we check for the robustness of
the results when this assumption is relaxed. In addition, we assume that consumers do not
incur any transaction cost of returning unwanted products and restrict the rate of returns,
ρ, to be practically reasonable, i.e., ρ ≤ 1
2
19.
To understand the manufacturer’s preference for inducing consumer returns, we begin by
analyzing a benchmark setting in which the manufacturer is the owner of the two retailers,
R1 and R2 (see Appendix A for all the details). In this setting, the manufacturer does not
have to tackle any incentive problems with the retailers. The optimal returns policies of such
an integrated manufacturer are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1 When ρ ≤ 1
2
, an integrated manufacturer will always choose to accept returns
from consumers. However, its pricing strategy depends on the magnitude of stock-out cost,
η, relative to the cost of production, c: If stock-outs are not too costly (i.e., η < c), then the
integrated manufacturer sets the retail price to clear stock according to the net demand (i.e.,
option B). In contrast, if stock-out costs are such that η ≥ c, then the retail price is set to
clear stock according the initial demand (i.e., option A).
19As mentioned earlier, the maximum rate of consumer returns is in the range of 10-20% (BusinessWeek,
2007).
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By accepting returns from consumers, the integrated manufacturer enjoys a less price-
sensitive demand. As a result, it can raise the retail price and obtain a higher profit. The
gain due to accepting returns dominates the cost when the rate of returns is reasonable (i.e.,
ρ ≤ 1
2
). In terms of pricing strategy, if the cost of stock-outs is relatively low, the integrated
manufacturer prefers bearing this cost to incurring the cost of unsold inventory. Option B
allows M to avoid unsold inventory by generating more demand, creating stock-outs and
reselling returned products to the “rain-check” customers who could not get the product
immediately. In contrast, if the cost of stock-outs is relatively high, the manufacturer will
avoid the stock-out problem by choosing option A when setting the retail price. Equipped
with this benchmark analysis, we now turn to our main model.
Here we examine three cases: (1) when the marginal cost of stock-outs, η, is negligible,
i.e., η = 0, (2) when η is low, and (3) when η is high. Recall that the retailers’ stocking
and pricing decisions, i.e., the choice between option A and B, upon accepting returns from
consumers depend on the level of the marginal cost of stock-outs. Specifically, in the first and
second cases, the retailers set the retail prices in stage four according to option B to avoid
the cost due to excess inventory when the manufacturer does not accept returns; in contrast,
in the third case, they choose option A when setting the retail prices since stock-outs are too
costly to bear. Focusing on each of the three cases allows us to derive an analytical solution
regarding the interaction between consumer returns and manufacturer’s returns as well as
the impact of the remaining factor, i.e., the rate of consumer returns. Later, by comparing
the equilibrium results of the three cases, we can highlight the moderating effect of the cost
of stock-outs. To characterize the equilibrium in each case, we proceed as follows.
First, we solve stages four and three to determine the retailers’ pricing and stocking
strategies in each of the eight combinations of returns policies, noting that each combination
exhibits a different demand function (cf. Table 2.1). After characterizing the retailers’ pricing
and stocking decisions, we investigate the choice of returns policies made by the retailers in
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stage two. Given a specific policy selected by M (i.e., {σM , w}), the retailers decide whether
to accept consumer returns by comparing profits earned under different combinations of




1,0,0 − Π20,0,0, (2.8)
δ2 = Π
1
1,1,0 − Π10,1,0, (2.9)
δ3 = Π
2
1,0,1 − Π20,0,1, and (2.10)
δ4 = Π
1
1,1,1 − Π10,1,1. (2.11)
The choice of consumer-returns policies under NMR is determined by the signs of δ1
and δ2





Π10,1,0, i.e., δ1 > 0 and δ2 > 0. No consumer returns are accepted by the retailers if δ1 < 0 and
δ2 < 0. Other combinations of the retailers’ returns policies, including asymmetric equilibria
and multiple equilibria, may also arise under different combinations of the signs of δ1 and
δ2
22. In an analogous fashion, the equilibrium of the consumer-returns subgame under MR
depends on the signs of δ3 and δ4.
Then, in the first stage of the game, anticipating the retailers’ pricing, stocking, and
consumer-returns strategies, we characterize the manufacturer’s choice of wholesale price
and returns policy. We now report the results for the three cases. When the cost of stock-
outs, η, is low, i.e., in the first and second cases, the results, including the optimal prices,
pij,k,l, the optimal stock levels, s
i
j,k,l, the retailers’ profits, Π
i
j,k,l, and the manufacturer’s profit,
piMj,k,l, are reported in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. When η is high (i.e., in the third case), the retailers
20To distinguish among the cases, when η is high (i.e., case 3), we use the notation δˆ1 = Πˆ21,0,0 − Π20,0,0
and δˆ2 = Πˆ11,1,0 − Πˆ10,1,0 (see Table 2.5 and Appendix A).






1,0,0, and so on. Therefore, the signs of δ1 and δ2
are sufficient to determine the game’s equilibrium.
22For instance, if δ1 < 0 and δ2 > 0, then both {NCR,NCR} and {CR,CR} will arise in equilibrium.
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set the retail prices according to option A under NMR; those results are summarized in
Table 2.5. Regularity conditions along with other details of the derivations are provided in
Appendix A.
2.4 Results
Case 1: No stock-out cost
When there is no stock-out cost, the following proposition summarizes the properties of
the equilibrium.
Proposition 2.1 When consumers are risk-neutral and the retailers do not incur any stock-
out cost (i.e., η = 0):
(a) The retailers always choose to accept returns from consumers whether or not manufac-
turer’s returns are offered. However, if the manufacturer accepts returns, then the retailers
order stock and set prices according to the initial demand; otherwise, without the right to
return excess inventory to the manufacturer, their stocking and pricing decisions are based
on the net demand.
(b) The manufacturer is better off by not accepting returns from the retailers.
To understand the retailers’ choice of consumer-returns policies, consider the following:
By accepting returns, the retailers can charge a higher retail price due to the decrease in
consumers’ price sensitivity. Further, accepting returns also allows them to screen for high-
valuation customers effectively. Most importantly, in this case, the retailers do not incur any
cost associated with accepting returns from consumers. Under MR, this cost is compensated
by the manufacturer; under NMR, by setting the retail prices to clear stock according to the
net demand (i.e., option B), the retailers can effectively (and costlessly, since η = 0) clear
all ordered stock by reselling returned items to those customers who cannot get the product
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initially due to stock-outs. Therefore, in the absence of stock-out cost, the retailers always
benefit from offering consumer returns.
The manufacturer, however, is worse off when accepting returns from the retailers. Notice
that by accepting returns, the manufacturer induces the retailers to set prices according to
option A, which results in higher stock orders; otherwise, the retailers choose option B
and order less stock. In both cases (i.e., under NMR and MR), the retailers’ profits are
determined by the net demand; further, in the absence of stock-out cost, they do not incur
any cost except the wholesale price. This implies identical profit functions for the retailers,
and hence identical retail prices in equilibrium under both NMR and MR23. Therefore,
eventual sales are identical under both cases; any increase in the levels of stock when MR is
offered will be eventually returned to the manufacturer. In other words, MR does not improve
the net performance of the channel. By offering MR, the manufacturer induces option A; it
is simply producing more and then taking back this additional production and incurring the
cost of returns. Our result is in contrast with that of Wang (2004) and Padmanabhan and
Png (2004), wherein the manufacturer is indifferent between NMR and MR. In their setting,
since consumer returns are not considered, the retailers do not have any unsold inventory
when demand is certain, and hence, there are no returns to the manufacturer.
Case 2: Low stock-out cost
In this setting, retail behavior is characterized in Lemma 2.2 and graphically illustrated
in Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4. (The specifications of the cut-off values, including ρ1 and w˜1,
are provided in the appendix.) Notice from these figures that under NMR, δ1 and δ2 behave
23When η = 0, the retailers’ profit functions under NMR and MR are identical (see equations 2.3 and





7τ when η = 0.
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-r r0 12 ρ
δ3 > 0 and δ4 > 0 ∀w ∈ [0, wM ]
⇒ NE = {CR,CR} ∀w ∈ [0, wM ]
⇒ NE = {CR,CR} ∀w ∈ [0, wM ]
Figure 2.2: Retailers’ choice of consumer returns policies under MR
in three different patterns (i.e., pattern I, II, and III ) depending on the magnitude of the
returns rate, ρ. Here, for the purpose of illustration, we set η = 1
4
24.
Lemma 2.2 When consumers are risk-neutral and the marginal cost of stock-outs is low:
(a) If the manufacturer accepts returns, then the retailers will accept returns from con-
sumers. In addition, the retailers will set the retail prices to clear stock according to the
initial demand (i.e., option A);
(b) If the manufacturer does not accept returns, then the retailers’ consumer-returns
policies depend on the rate of returns and the wholesale price: Under a low returns rate (i.e.,
ρ < ρ1), the retailers accept consumer returns at all relevant wholesale prices. In contrast,
when the rate of returns is high (i.e., ρ > ρ1): (i) If w < w˜1, the retailers will not accept
returns, and (ii) If w ≥ w˜1, the retailers will accept returns from consumers. Regarding the
retailers’ pricing strategies, retail prices are set to clear net demand, i.e., according to option
B, whenever consumer returns are accepted.
The intuition underlying this result can be explained as follows. Recall that accepting
returns from consumers lowers price sensitivity which allows the retailers to charge higher
24In Appendix A, we show that when η = 14 , the retailers are indeed better off in equilibrium under option
B than under option A.
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-r r r0 ρ1 ρ2 ρ
δ1 > 0 and δ2 > 0 ∀w ∈ [0, wN ]
⇒ NE = {CR,CR} ∀w ∈ [0, wN ]
⇒ NE = {CR,CR} ∀w ∈ [0, wN ]
(since when w ∈ (wN , wN ], only
{CR,CR} is feasible)
δ2 > 0 ∀w ∈ [0, wN ]
δ1 ≤ 0 if w ∈ [0, w˜1]
δ1 > 0 if w ∈ (w˜1, wN ]
⇒ NE = {NCR,NCR} and {CR,CR}
if w ∈ [0, w˜1], and
NE = {CR,CR} if w ∈ (w˜1, wN ]
δ1 < 0 and δ2 < 0 if w ∈ [0, w˜2)
δ1 ≤ 0 and δ2 ≥ 0 if w ∈ [w˜2, w˜1]
δ1 > 0 and δ2 > 0 if w ∈ (w˜1, wN ]
⇒ NE = {NCR,NCR} if w ∈ [0, w˜2),
NE = {NCR,NCR} and {CR,CR}
if w ∈ [w˜2, w˜1], and
NE = {CR,CR} if w ∈ (w˜1, wN ]
PATTERN IIIPATTERN I PATTERN II
Figure 2.3: Retailers’ choice of consumer-returns policies under NMR
prices and earn higher profits. However, there is a cost associated with accepting returns from
consumers. If the retailers set prices according to the initial demand (i.e., option A), then
they incur the cost of unsold inventory due to returns from consumers; in contrast, if prices
are set according to the net demand (i.e., option B), then they incur the cost of stock-outs
instead. Under MR, though, the manufacturer refunds the wholesale price for any unsold
stock, and therefore, accepting returns from consumers is costless to the retailers (given
pricing option A). Therefore, the retailers always benefit from offering consumer returns
under MR.
In contrast, when the manufacturer does not accept returns, the retailers are responsible
for any unsold stock. In this case, they can avoid the cost of having excess inventory by























Figure 2.4: Summary of retailers’ returns policies under NMR.
prices); however, they incur stock-out cost, which is increasing in the rate of returns (because
net demand is lower with a higher returns rate25; see equations 2.1 and 2.2). When the rate
of returns is relatively low, the cost associated with accepting consumer returns (i.e., the cost
of stock-outs) is low, and the retailers are better off by accepting returns. When the returns
rate is relatively high, this cost becomes significant and may deter the retailers from adopting
a returns policy. In this latter setting, if the wholesale price were low, the retail prices will
also be low and there is little incentive to accept returns from consumers. In contrast, if
the wholesale price were higher, then retail prices will also be higher, and there is a greater
incentive for the retailers to focus on the higher-valuation consumer segment. Accepting
returns allows the retailers to screen for those consumers effectively. Consequently, accepting
consumer returns when the wholesale price is high is beneficial despite the associated cost.
These results are broadly consistent with Che (1996). However, the findings of Che
(1996) are based on the risk-sharing effect of consumer returns observed in a monopolist
setting. In contrast, our results arise even in the absence of consumers’ risk-aversion. In
our setting, the motivation to accept consumer returns stems from the advantage of the less
25Recall that stock-out cost is proportional to the number of customers who are not served immediately
due to the limited stock; see equation 2.6.
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price-sensitive demand, which benefits the retailers in competing with the other retailers.
In fact, with retail competition, adopting a no-returns policy while other retailers accept
consumer returns is hurtful due to the higher own-price sensitivity and the lower cross-price
sensitivity in the demand function (see Table 2.1 and Appendix A).
Anticipating the above-characterized behavior of the retailers, the manufacturer sets its
distribution policy in the first stage. Notice that the manufacturer’s profit function depends
on the retailers’ consumer-returns policies. The decision whether to accept returns from the
retailers is made by comparing the profits earned under the two regimes, i.e., NMR and
MR. We summarize the optimal wholesale prices under NMR and MR in Figure 2.5. Figure
2.6 depicts the manufacturer’s distribution policy in equilibrium. The following proposition
summarizes the findings. All derivations, along with the specifications of the cut-offs, are
provided in Appendix A.
Proposition 2.2 When consumers are risk-neutral and the marginal cost of stock-outs in-
curred by the retailers is low, the manufacturer’s returns policy depends on the cost of pro-
duction: If production cost is low (i.e., c ≤ c∗), then the manufacturer accepts returns from
the retailers; else, the manufacturer does not accept returns. The retailers, in equilibrium,
will accept returns from consumers.
When the cost of stock-outs is low, the retailers’ pricing decision (i.e., option A versus
option B) depends on the manufacturer’s returns policy. Specifically, by offering MR, the
manufacturer induces the retailers to choose option A and order stock based on the initial-
demand function26; otherwise, under NMR, the retailers will choose option B and order
stock based on the net demand. Intuitively, the level of ordered stock under option B is
less than that under option A. This is due to (1) the net demand is lower than the initial
26Recall that setting the retail prices to clear stock according to the initial demand is equivalent to ordering
enough stock to cover the initial demand. Analogously, setting prices to clear stock according to the net
demand is equivalent to ordering stock enough to cover the net demand.
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-r r0 ττ1 = 4(4−3√2)5√2−8
Choice of w:
-q q q0 c
wNc2
Under NMR:
•{w∗0} ∀ρ ∈ [0, 12 ], c ∈ [0, wN ];
• no business if c > wN
Under MR:
•{w∗1} ∀ρ ∈ [0, 12 ], c ∈ [0, c2];
• no business if c > c2
-q q q0 ρρˆ 12
-q q q0 c
wNc2
Under NMR:
•{w∗0} ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρˆ], c ∈ [0, wN ];
• no business if c > wN
Under MR:
•{w∗1} ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρˆ], c ∈ [0, c2];
• no business if c > c2
-q q qq0 c
wNc2c1
Under NMR:
•{w˜1} ∀ρ ∈ [ρˆ, 12 ], c ∈ [0, c1);
•{w∗0} ∀ρ ∈ [ρˆ, 12 ], c ∈ [c1, wN ];
• no business if c > wN
Under MR:
•{w∗1} ∀ρ ∈ [ρˆ, 12 ], c ∈ [0, c2];
• no business if c > c2
Figure 2.5: Manufacturer’s choice of wholesale price
-r r r r r0 cc1 c∗ c2 wN
M chooses {MR, w∗1} ∀c ∈ [0, c∗];
R1 and R2 offer {CR,CR}.
M chooses {NMR, w∗0} ∀c ∈ (c∗, wN ];
R1 and R2 offer {CR,CR}.
Figure 2.6: Manufacturer’s distribution policy in equilibrium
demand, and (2) the retailers have an additional incentive to lower the level of ordered stock
to reduce the cost of stock-outs, which equals η ρ
1−ρs. Further, under option B, the cost of
stock-outs is eventually incorporated in the retail prices27, resulting in higher retail prices.
Therefore, option A is more attractive (due to higher stock levels and lower retail prices) to
the manufacturer than option B. In other words, the manufacturer has incentive to induce
option A via accepting returns from retailers. However, that benefit is attenuated by the
cost of accepting returns (which equals the cost of production). Hence, if this cost is low, the






manufacturer will choose to accept returns; and when it is high, the manufacturer prefers a
no-returns policy as outlined in the proposition.
Wang (2004) argues that in the framework of Padmanabhan and Png (1997), manufac-
turer’s returns policy does not intensify retail competition when demand is certain since the
retailers compete in the same manner under both NMR and MR, i.e., in a Cournot fashion.
That argument may hold when consumer returns are not taken into consideration. However,
when consumer returns are considered, even though manufacturer’s returns policy does not
shift the basis of competition from Cournot to Bertrand (Padmanabhan and Png 1997, Wang
2004), it does induce higher retail competition and alters the retailers’ stocking and pricing
strategies.
Case 3: High stock-out cost
When the cost of stock-outs is high, the retailers will avoid stock-out problem by choos-
ing option A when setting the retail prices under NMR. Consequently, the optimal retail
prices, the optimal levels of stock and the retailers’ profits are different from those in the
second case under the following combinations: {NMR,NCR,CR}, {NMR,CR,NCR}, and
{NMR,CR,CR}. The results under the remaining combinations of returns policies are iden-
tical to those in the second case. Appendix A provides the detailed analysis of this case.
We summarize the results, including the optimal prices, pˆij,k,0, stock levels, sˆ
i
j,k,0, and profits,
Πˆij,k,0 in Table 2.5. The following proposition describes the characteristics of the equilibrium
in this case.
Proposition 2.3 When consumers are risk-neutral and the marginal cost of stock-outs in-
curred by the retailers is high, the retailers always order stock and set prices according to the
initial demand. Further, they always accept returns from consumers. In contrast, the manu-
facturer is indifferent between accepting returns and not accepting returns from the retailers.
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Under high stock-out cost, the retailers set the retail prices to clear stock according to
the initial demand (i.e., according to option A) under both NMR and MR. This means that
in contrast to the case of low stock-out cost, the retailers are motivated to choose the pricing
option desired by the manufacturer (which is option A) without additional incentive. In
other words, MR does not provide any extra benefit to the manufacturer when the cost of
stock-outs is high. In fact, MR neither shifts the nature of retail competition nor changes the
retailers’ pricing strategies—competition remains Cournot-like and prices are set according
to option A. Though MR does increase the levels of stock and reduces the retail prices, all
that gain is counter-balanced by the cost of returned product that the manufacturer has to
cover. Consequently, the manufacturer is indifferent between accepting and not accepting
returns.
Interestingly, this is reminiscent of Wang (2004) result in the absence of consumer returns.
Note that in Wang (2004), when demand is certain, the retail prices and stock levels remain
identical under MR and NMR. This means that accepting returns by the manufacturer has
no impact on the channel’s performance. In contrast, when consumer returns are considered,
MR does improve the channel’s performance due to the removal of the concern about unsold
inventory. As noted above, though, the gain is counter-balanced by the loss due to the cost
of returns.
2.5 Numerical simulation
This section aims to provide some robustness evidence of our findings when consumers are
risk-averse. Recall that when consumers are assumed to be risk-neutral, their certainty
equivalent is v = 1
2
. When consumers are risk-averse, the certainty equivalent decreases, i.e.,
v < 1
2
(see Appendix A). Table 2.2 compares the equilibrium results when consumers are risk-
averse (v = 0.2) to those when they are risk-neutral (v = 1
2
). The following variables (along
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with the respective notations) are reported in this table: (1) the manufacturer’s choice of
returns policy in equilibrium, σM∗, (2) the optimal wholesale price under NMR, w∗NMR, (3) the
manufacturer’s profit, piM∗NMR, when choosing {NMR, w∗NMR}, (4) the retailers’ returns policies
under NMR, σRi |NMR, (5) the retailers’ choice of returns policies when the manufacturer sets
the wholesale price at w∗NMR and does not accept returns, σ
R∗
i |NMR, (6) the optimal wholesale
price under MR, w∗MR, (7) the manufacturer’s profit, pi
M∗
MR, when choosing {MR, w∗MR}, (8) the
retailers’ returns policies under MR, σRi |MR, and (9) the retailers’ choice of returns policies
when the manufacturer sets the wholesale price at w∗MR and accepts returns, σ
R∗
i |MR.
We observe two possible patterns of the retailers’ consumer returns policies under NMR,
σRi |NMR 28: (Pattern I ) the retailers choose to accept returns, i.e. {CR,CR}, for all relevant
wholesale price, i.e. for all w ∈ [c, w2], and (Pattern III ) the retailers’s returns policies
depend on the wholesale price, w; specifically, they choose (a) {NCR,NCR} if w ∈ [c, w9),
(b) either {NCR,NCR} or {CR,CR} if w ∈ [w9, w8], and (c) {CR,CR} if w ∈ (w8, w2].
Observation 2.1 As consumers become more risk-averse, accepting consumer returns can
become more profitable to the retailers.
Suppose the cost of production were low (in the table, c = 0.1), then the above ob-
servation is based on the fact that when the rate of returns is high (ρ = 1
2
), the pattern
of consumer returns policies is changed from pattern III when consumers are risk-neutral
(v = 1
2
) to pattern I when they are risk-averse (v = 0.2). (See Figure 2.3 for details on
the difference between pattern I and III.) Intuitively, when consumers are risk-averse, the
retailers need to share the risk with consumers. They can do so by either lowering the retail
price or by offering consumer returns. As consumer risk-aversion increases, the retailers must
compensate consumers more for the risk. Consequently, the no returns policy becomes less
attractive. This observation is consistent with Che (1996).
28See Figure 2.3 for an illustration of the patterns.
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Table 2.2: Impact of consumers’ risk aversion (v)









MR 3.049 1.968 Pattern I {CR,CR} 3.051 1.969 Pattern I {CR,CR}




NMR 3.149 1.8364 Pattern I {CR,CR} 3.152 1.8361 Pattern I {CR,CR}





MR 3.043 1.881 Pattern I {CR,CR} 3.053 1.886 Pattern I {CR,CR}




NMR 3.143 1.756 Pattern I {CR,CR} 3.158 1.754 Pattern I {CR,CR}





MR 2.925 0.912 Pattern II {CR,CR} 3.1 0.961 Pattern I {CR,CR}




NMR 3.025 0.849 Pattern I {CR,CR} 3.3 0.833 Pattern I {CR,CR}
0.2 NMR 3.025 0.849 Pattern I {CR,CR} 3.3 0.833 Pattern I {CR,CR}
aOther parameters include k = 0, η = 14 , and τ = 0.2.
bWhen v = 12 , consumers are risk-neutral; when v <
1
2 , consumers are risk-averse.
Observation 2.2 Changes in consumer’s level of risk-aversion does not affect the choice of
manufacturer’s returns policy or the choice of consumer returns policies in equilibrium.
Given a reasonable rate of returns as in our analysis, i.e. ρ ≤ 1
2
, the retailers are likely
to accept returns from consumers even when consumers are risk-neutral. Raising the level
of risk-aversion serves to only strengthen this result. When consumer returns are accepted
under both NMR and MR, the choice of manufacturer’s returns policy is based on the
magnitude of production cost as noted in Proposition 2.2.
2.6 Conclusion and future research
This study extends the literature on returns policies by investigating the strategic interaction
between the returns policies of a manufacturer and its retailers. We show that the manufac-
turer’s returns policy can affect the intensity of retail competition even under Cournot-like
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conditions. Essentially, when consumer returns are accounted for, the manufacturer’s returns
policy shifts the responsibility of unsold inventory away from the retailers; consequently, they
order more stock and price more competitively.
Further, we find that the manufacturer’s returns policy affects the retailers’ pricing strate-
gies when the marginal cost of stock-outs is low. When unsold inventory can be returned to
the manufacturer, the retailers order stock and set the retail prices to clear stock according
to the initial demand. In contrast, when no returns are accepted and the cost of stock-outs
is low, the retailers will price to clear stock according to the net demand to avoid bearing
the cost of unsold inventory. This strategy results in lower levels of stock and higher retail
prices. Such behavior creates an opportunity for the manufacturer to accept returns from
retailers and provide them with appropriate incentives to improve channel profit. That op-
portunity does not arise when consumer returns are not accommodated in the analysis (see
e.g., Padmanabhan and Png 1997, 2004; Wang 2004).
Interestingly, if the marginal cost of stock-outs is relatively high, our analysis reveals that
the manufacturer’s benefit of accepting returns is nullified by the cost of unsold inventory.
Under such conditions, the manufacturer has no incentive to accept returns since that policy
neither affects the nature of retail competition nor the pricing and stocking strategies of the
retailers. Our analysis also provides insights about when retailers may accept returns from
consumers. In addition to the role of risk-sharing and consumer screening (Che 1996), these
policies can serve as a competitive tool at the retail level. In fact, retail profitability can
be hurt under a no returns policy from a higher own-price-sensitive and lower cross-price-
sensitive demand structure.
It is worth noting that our model does not consider competition at the manufacturer
level. One may expect that competition provides additional incentives for the manufacturer
to accept returns. In addition, we do not consider the salvage value of returned products and
the cost of managing returns by either the manufacturer or the retailers. In practice, returned
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products after the selling period can be re-processed to be sold in secondary markets; this
can help recover the cost of returns. To highlight the interaction between the returns policies
of a manufacturer and its retailers, our analysis focused on a relatively streamlined model.
We hope that our effort will spark further work in this important area of research.
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Table 2.3: Retailers’ pricing and stocking strategies under NMR and low stock-out cost
Combination 1: Combination 2:29 Combination 4:
{σM , σR1 , σR2 } = {NMR,NCR,NCR} {σM , σR1 , σR2 } ={NMR,NCR,CR} {σM , σR1 , σR2 } ={NMR,CR,CR}
pi0,0,0
















































1,0,0)(w − c) piM1,1,0 = 8[(1+τ−2µ)(1−ρ)−τρη−τ(1−ρ)w](w−c)7
Regularity conditions: Regularity conditions: Regularity conditions:
(To ensure non-negative stocks) w ≤ min{w3, w4}, w ≤ 1+τ−2µτ − ρη1−ρ
def= w2
w ≤ v + 12τ






def= η1 (to ensure w2 > 0)
w4
def= 5+2τ(3−v)−12µ4τ − 3ρη2(1−ρ)
η < [5+2τ(3−v)−12µ](1−ρ)6τρ
def= η2 (to ensure w4 > 0)
Relabel: w3
def= wN Relabel: w2
def= wN
Demand functions: Demand functions: Demand functions:
qi = 1 + 2τv − 3τpi + τpj R1: q1 = 1− τ2 + 3τv + µ− 3τp1 + τ2p2 • Init. sales: qˆi = 1 + τ − 2µ− 3τ2 pi + τ2pj
R2: • Init. sales: qˆ2 = 1 + 3τ2 − τv − 3µ− 3τ2 p2 + τp1 • Net sales: qi = (1− ρ)qˆi
• Net sales: q2 = (1− ρ)qˆ2
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Table 2.4: Retailers’ pricing and stocking strategies under MR and low stock-out cost
Combination 5: Combination 6:31 Combination 8:

















































0,1,1 + (1− ρ)s21,0,1]w − (s10,1,1 + s21,0,1)c piM1,1,1 = 8(1+τ−2µ−τw)[(1−ρ)w−c]7
Regularity conditions: Regularity conditions: Regularity conditions:
(To ensure non-negative stocks) w ≤ min{w6, w7}, where w6 def= 5−τ(1−12v)+2µ11τ w ≤ 1+τ−2µτ
def= w5




def= wM Relabel: w5
def= wM
Demand functions: Demand functions: Demand functions:
qi = 1 + 2τv − 3τpi + τpj R1: q1 = 1− τ2 + 3τv + µ− 3τp1 + τ2p2 • Init. sales: qˆi = 1 + τ − 2µ− 3τ2 pi + τ2pj
R2: • Init. sales: qˆ2 = 1 + 3τ2 − τv − 3µ− 3τ2 p2 + τp1 • Net sales: qi = (1− ρ)qˆi
• Net sales: q2 = (1− ρ)qˆ2
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Table 2.5: Retailers’ pricing and stocking strategies under NMR and high η
Combination 2:a Combination 4:



































1,0,0)(w − c) pˆiM1,1,0 = 8[(1+τ−2µ)(1−ρ)−τw](w−c)7(1−ρ)
Regularity conditions: Regularity conditions:




aBy symmetry, the results of combination 3, i.e. {NMR,CR,NCR}, are similar to those of combination 2.
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CHAPTER 3: OPTIMALITY OF GROUP-BUYING SERVICES
3.1 Introduction
With the advent of the Internet, electronic commerce has emerged. The business environ-
ment is changing rapidly and significantly—competition becomes more intense due to the
lower barrier of entry and consumers are getting more powerful due to the explosion of social
networks. These are both challenges and opportunities for firms in most industries. Firms
have responded to (and taken advantage of) the changing business environment via creating
numerous business models, such as on-line auction, direct on-line channels (Chiang, Chhajed
and Hess 2003), third-party referral infomediaries (Chen et al. 2002), name-your-own-price
channels (Fay 2004), and demand-aggregation mechanism (namely group-buying services;
Anand and Aron 2003, and Kauffman and Wang 2001, 2002), among others. Most impor-
tantly, the employment of these innovative business models does have an impact on the
strategic relationships between the parties of the distribution channel.
This chapter investigates the rationale—the benefits and costs—for using group-buying
services, which can be seen as a response of the business community to the emerging trends
of on-line shopping among consumers. This practice has a short but quite interesting his-
tory, especially in the B2C market. Upon its introduction in the late 1990s, the market
has responded enthusiastically; it was predicted to be “the next big thing in e-commerce”
(Adweek 2000). Many popular websites, such as Mercata.com, Mobshop.com, etc., were
established and had attracted tens of thousands of participants. They were predicted to
grow much faster than on-line auction services (such as Ebay.com; Business Week 2000).
However, despite the rosy picture, many of them have failed after a few years of operation in
the B2C market. But interestingly, the recent development of social networks has triggered
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a miracle revival of these services in China (they are called “tuangou” in Chinese, mean-
ing team-buying; The Wall Street Journal 2006, 2008). Modified formats of group-buying
services have also emerged recently in Europe and the US.
This phenomenon has attracted the interest of academic research, though modest. Anand
and Aron (2003) provide an excellent survey of the various formats of group-buying, used
in both B2B and B2C environments. A brief description of the group-buying concept is as
follows: instead of a single posted price, the seller offers to customers a pricing schedule,
which consists of many price tiers, depending on the total number of orders. For instance,
using the example from Anand and Aron (2003), given the retail price of an electronic device
being $500, the unit price via group-buying will be $480 if at least three units are demanded,
$450 if there is demand for five units or more, and so on. Most importantly, at the closing
date of the sale, all consumers are paying the same price, irrespective of the price at the time
they join group-buying.
Theoretical explanations of the rationale for using group-buying (versus posted-pricing)
are offered by Anand and Aron (2003)—this mechanism serves as an effective price discrim-
ination tool for firms to extract more market surplus when market demand is uncertain.
They show that group-buying is only profitable if market demand is uncertain in a spe-
cific way: the demand curves in the high and low regimes must exhibit different levels of
price sensitivity and intersect each other. While this work provides useful insights into the
mechanism of group-buying services, a complete understanding of this phenomenon requires
further research. Toward that goal, this essay explores alternative rationales for using group-
buying services and provides a richer understanding of how this mechanism operates as a
price-discrimination device.
Specifically, we complement the work of Anand and Aron (2003) by exploring other di-
mensions of market heterogeneity that determine the benefits and costs of group-buying
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services when they are used in addition to the traditional posted-pricing mechanism. In par-
ticular, we investigate consumer heterogeneity in their valuation for the product and the cost
they incur when purchasing via different pricing mechanisms29. Further, note that in Anand
and Aron (2003), the firm employs group-buying services as a replacement of the posted-
pricing mechanism. In practice, however, retailers introduce the option of group-buying
purchase in addition to the posted-pricing, i.e., both options are available to consumers for
self-selection (The Wall Street Journal 2006).
We do so by developing an individual-level model in which consumers are heterogeneous
in their valuations for the product as well as in their costs of purchasing it via group-
buying. We find that even in the absence of market uncertainty, group-buying still serves
as a price-discrimination device—consumers who have high valuation purchase the product
in the traditional way, paying the high posted price while those who have low valuation
purchase via group-buying and pay the low group-buying price.
However, it would require consumers’ heterogeneity in both dimensions—valuation and
cost of joining group-buying—to be profitable. Intuitively, in the absence of heterogeneity in
consumers’ valuation—and thereby, willingness-to-pay—, there is no benefit of market seg-
mentation. Meanwhile, without sufficient heterogeneity in the cost of joining group-buying,
it is too costly (and even infeasible in some instances) to employ this price-discrimination
mechanism. For instance, if high-valuation consumers have too low the cost of joining group-
buying, then the firm may need to significantly reduce the posted price to prevent them
from purchasing the product via group-buying. Finally, the firm may have to compensate
for consumers’ cost of joining group-buying. This means that it must incur some cost when
employing these services. Under some conditions, these costs may exceed the benefits from
price discrimination. The analysis characterizes the conditions under which group-buying
29In practice, consumers must spend extra time and efforts when purchasing via group-buying. Further,
since these services are quite novel, some consumers may find it too costly to join group-buying, resulting in
heterogeneity in terms of this cost among them.
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is (and is not) profitable to the firm. As an implication of our findings, one can explain
the role of social-networking in the current development of group-buying services—the in-
creasing popularity of social-networking strengthens the power of consumers and lowers their
cost of joining various on-line communities. Group-buying services clearly benefit from this
emerging trend.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. First, we provide a review of the re-
lated literature—group-buying and price discrimination—in §3.2. Next, §3.3 describes the
structure of the market and develops the individual-level model of our analysis. Next, we
summarize the results in §3.4 and discuss their implications in §3.5.
3.2 Literature review
Past research on group-buying, though modest, provides useful insights on consumers’ be-
havior upon joining group-buying as well as how this pricing mechanism may benefit the firm.
Kauffman and Wang (2001, 2002) initiate academic research on group-buying by investigat-
ing consumers’ bidding behavior. They identify different effects that impact the evolution
of group-buying bids. These include (a) a positive participation effect, i.e., the number of
existing orders exhibits a positive effect on the placement of new orders, (b) a price-drop
effect, that exists when the number of orders approaches the next tier, and (c) an ending
effect, showing a significant increase in orders, placed by the end of the auction cycle.
At the aggregate level, Anand and Aron (2003) are the first to formalize the study of
group-buying using an analytical model. They compare the performance of the group-buying
mechanism to that of the traditional posted-pricing and identify the conditions, under which
the former mechanism outperforms the latter. Their paper shows that group-buying is
indeed a price-discrimination tool that allows the retailer (seller) to extract more surplus
from the market, which exhibits demand heterogeneity. Specifically, demand heterogeneity
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is captured in this work by the uncertainty in the total demand of the entire market. It
is the nature of this uncertainty that determines the profitability of group-buying services:
only when uncertainty results in ‘non-similar’ demand curves in the high and low regimes
(i.e., intersecting demand curves), employing group-buying is profitable.
Here, I extend the group-buying stream of research by exploring another dimension
of market heterogeneity—consumers’ valuation for the product—that explains the price-
discrimination mechanism of group-buying. It is quite clear that this analysis, in its own
nature, relates to the literature on price discrimination. The phenomenon of price discrim-
ination has been identified a long time ago—in the first edition of Pigou’s book, entitled
“The Economics of Welfare”, published in 1920. Later, it has attracted scholars in both eco-
nomics and marketing, including, for instance, Phlips (1983), Spulber (1979), Tirole (1988),
Narasimhan (1984), and others. Recently, two excellent review papers on price discrimina-
tion have been written (Armstrong 2006, Stole 2006), providing a complete picture of the
economics of price discrimination.
Formally, price discrimination happens when “two varieties of a commodity are sold
(by the same seller) to two buyers at different net prices” (Phlips 1983). The rationales
for adopting price discrimination can be explained via the additional flexibility that the
firm enjoys when marketing its product (Norman 1999); consequently, more surplus can be
extracted from the market. The feasibility of price discrimination requires (a) some degree
of market power (that allows the firm to charge a price not equal to the marginal cost), (b)
ability to separate consumers into different segments, and (c) ability to prevent consumer
arbitrage.
When the firm can observe all dimensions of consumers’ heterogeneity and segment the
market based on these characteristics, it may employ first-degree price discrimination by
pricing each unit of the product precisely at the consumer’s marginal willingness-to-pay
(Spulber 1979). By doing so, the firm can extract the most surplus from consumers. (All
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surplus can be extracted in a monopolist setting.) However, first-degree price discrimination
is not always preferred: Thisse and Vives (1988) show that the firms would collectively
prefer uniform pricing strategies when the demand curve is highly elastic and the market is
competitive.
In most instances, the firm only observes some of consumers’ characteristics and therefore,
cannot employ first-degree price discrimination. In this case, it may follow third-degree
price discrimination. Obviously, this type of price discrimination does not allow the firm
to extract all the surplus from consumers even under monopoly. In most cases, consumers
are price discriminated based on their price elasticities and as a result, prices are higher in
strong markets (i.e., with lower price elasticity) and lower in weak markets (i.e., with higher
price elasticity; Robinson 1933, Borenstein 1985, and Holmes 1989). Most interestingly, in
duopoly, firms may rank markets (as strong or weak) differently, resulting in ‘best-response
asymmetry’. In these settings, third-degree price discrimination may result in lower prices
in all markets due to the fact that the ‘market-stealing’ effect (i.e., competition) is likely to
dominate the ‘rent-extraction’ effect (Thisse and Vives 1988, and Stole 2006); consequently,
firms may be worse off when price discriminating. Further, firms may leverage consumers’
purchase history to price discriminate them based on their heterogeneous preferences for the
product (e.g., see Fudenberg and Tirole 2000).
Finally, when the firm cannot directly separate consumers based on observable charac-
teristics (i.e., first-degree as well as third-degree price discrimination is not feasible), it may
rely on consumers’ self-selection to segment the market. In this way, the firm follows second-
degree price discrimination—it offers a schedule of prices to consumers for self-selection.
This schedule of prices may be based on product quality (Mussa and Rosen 1978) or pur-
chase volume, i.e, quantity (Maskin and Riley 1984). Other mechanisms, such as coupons
(Narasimhan 1984), may also serve as a device for second-degree price discrimination. This
is also the case when group-buying is offered.
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By including an additional option—group-buying—for consumers to purchase the prod-
uct, the retailer can indirectly price discriminate consumers in different market segments.
They self-select the purchase mechanism (i.e., posted-pricing versus group-buying) based
on their willingness-to-pay and cost of joining group-buying. Here, the price they pay is
contingent on the purchase mechanism. Even in the setting, when each consumer demands
only one unit of the product, this additional purchase option effectively creates a schedule of
prices and allows the firm to extract more surplus from the market. In this perspective, this
essay extends the literature on second-degree price discrimination, which has investigated
pricing schedules based on quality (Mussa and Rosen 1978) and quantity (Maskin and Riley
1984).
3.3 The model
We consider a market served by a monopolist retailer, who has two options to set the price
of its product: (a) It can set a single posted price, pP , which is available to all customers;
this is the traditional single posted-pricing strategy, denoted PP. (b) The retailer can follow
a group-buying strategy (denoted GB), under which, in addition to the traditional posted-
pricing, it allows consumers to purchase the product via group-buying. Here, we focus on a
simple group-buying schedule, which consists of two price tiers, ph and pl (ph ≥ pl). If the
number of the group-buying orders, q, is less than a specific value, q¯, then all group-buying
consumers pay the high price, ph. In contrast, if q exceeds q¯, then they all pay the low price,






 ph if q < q¯,pl if q ≥ q¯.
(3.1)
On the demand side, the market consists of N consumers; each consumer is interested in
purchasing at most one unit of the product and derives a valuation, v, for it. Without further
loss of generality, we normalize the market size by setting N = 1. Further, we assume that
a fraction, φ, of these consumers belongs to a high (H) segment and the remaining, (1− φ),
makes up the low (L) segment. In the L-segment, consumers’ valuation for the product is
uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, i.e., v ∼ U [0, 1]. On the other hand, consumers
in the H-segment have higher valuation on average; their valuation is uniformly distributed
between v0 and v0 +1, i.e., v ∼ U [v0, v0 +1], where v0 ≥ 0. Figure 3.1 graphically illustrates
the two market segments.
r r
r rL-segment: {1− φ, κL}
H -segment: {φ, κH}
0 1
vo vo + 1
Figure 3.1: The market structure
Upon purchasing the product via the traditional posted-pricing mechanism, consumers
pay pP and receive the product immediately; they obtain a net utility: vP = v − pP . In
contrast, if purchasing the product via group-buying (given that such option is available),
then they must spend extra time and efforts in monitoring the auction, i.e., incur an extra
cost, namely the group-buying cost. Regarding the distribution of this cost, we assume
that consumers in the H-segment incur a high group-buying cost, κH, such that they never
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find it optimal to join group-buying; however, L-consumers have a lower group-buying cost,
κL < κH, so that they may want to purchase the product via group-buying when available;
this also requires κL ≤ 130. By doing so, L-consumers obtain a net utility, given by:
vG,L = v − pGB − κL. (3.2)
Therefore, they will prefer the group-buying than the posted-pricing option if:
vG,L ≥ vP ⇔ pGB + κL ≤ pP . (3.3)
Now, we derive the retailer’s demand functions, Dj,i (where i ∈ {H,L} denotes the market
segment, and j the retailer’s pricing strategy—j = P,G if the PP and GB strategies are
employed, respectively). If following the PP strategy, then consumers who have vP ≥ 0 ⇔
v ≥ pP will purchase the product. Thus, the demand functions in the H- and L-segments
are given by:
DP,H =φ (1 + vo − pP ), and (3.4)
DP,L =(1− φ)(1− pP ). (3.5)
Together, total demand for the product under the PP strategy is:
DP = DP,H +DP,L = 1 + φ v0 − pP . (3.6)
Next, consider the GB strategy. Note that since H-consumers always choose the posted-
pricing option, the employment of the GB strategy implies that prices must be set so that
L-consumers are motivated to join group-buying, i.e., according to (3.3). Given that (a)
30If κL > 1, then L-consumers, whose valuation for the product is v ∈ [0, 1], will never join group-buying.
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pGB depends on q as described in (3.1), (b) the potential number of group-buying orders (at
a given pGB) is (1 − φ)(1 − pGB − κL), and (c) consumers behave rationally based on this
knowledge, the retailer has three options to set its pricing schedule as follows:
(A) Set pP and q¯ at high levels, i.e., pP ≥ ph + κL > pl + κL and q¯ > (1− φ)(1− pl− κL).
In this case, knowing that the high price, ph, will become effective due to high q¯, only those
L-consumers who have vG,L
∣∣
pGB=ph
≥ 0 will make the purchase (via group-buying). Demand
in the L-segment is given by:
DG,L = (1− φ)(1− ph − κL). (3.7)
(B) Set high pP and low q¯, i.e., pP ≥ ph + κL > pl + κL and q¯ ≤ (1 − φ)(1 − pl − κL).




purchase the product via group-buying. Therefore,
DG,L = (1− φ)(1− pl − κL). (3.8)
(C ) Set pP in the middle range, i.e., ph + κL > p
P ≥ pl + κL, and q¯ at a low level, i.e.,
q¯ ≤ (1− φ)(1− pl − κL). This schedule allows the low price, pl, to prevail and generates the
same demand as that in Option B (see equation 3.8).
In all cases, H-consumers always purchase the product at the posted price. Therefore,
the demand function in the H-segment under the GB strategy, DG,H, is identical to that
under the PP strategy (see equation 3.4):
DG,H =φ (1 + vo − pP ). (3.9)
The total demand under the GB strategy is DG = DG,H +DG,L. These results are summa-
rized in Table 3.1 and graphically illustrated in Figure 3.2.
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pl + κL < ph + κL ≤ pP DG,H = φ (1 + v0 − pP )
q¯ > (1− φ)(1− pl − κL) DG,L = (1− φ)(1− ph − κL)
B
pl + κL < ph + κL ≤ pP DG,H = φ (1 + v0 − pP )
q¯ ≤ (1− φ)(1− pl − κL) DG,L = (1− φ)(1− pl − κL)
C
pl + κL ≤ pP < ph + κL DG,H = φ (1 + v0 − pP )
q¯ ≤ (1− φ)(1− pl − κL) DG,L = (1− φ)(1− pl − κL)
r rqff -
r rq qff -
Option A:
pl + κL < ph + κL ≤ pP
q¯ > (1− φ)(1− pl − κL) 0 1pl + κL ph + κL
GB
vo vo + 1pP
PP
r rqff -
r rq qff -
Option B:
pl + κL < ph + κL ≤ pP
q¯ ≤ (1− φ)(1− pl − κL) 0 1pl + κL ph + κL
GB
vo vo + 1pP
PP
r rqff -
r rq qff -
Option C:
pl + κL ≤ pP < ph + κL
q¯ ≤ (1− φ)(1− pl − κL) 0 1pl + κL ph + κL
GB
vo vo + 1pP
PP
Figure 3.2: Pricing options and demand structure under the GB strategy
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3.4 The retailer’s choice of pricing strategy
The retailer decides whether to follow the PP or GB strategy by comparing the profitability
of the two pricing strategies. Without loss of generality, we assume that the retailer incur
zero production cost. In the following, we derive the optimal price(s) and the retailer’s profits
under each strategy. The choice of pricing strategy in equilibrium is discussed subsequently.
3.4.1 Profitability of the PP strategy
If employing the PP strategy, the retailer sets the single posted price, pP , at the optimal
level; it solves the following optimization problem:
max
pP















where the superscript ∗ denotes the equilibrium solution in this case. Notes that the equilib-
rium posted price, pP
∗
, increases as the H-segment becomes bigger (i.e., larger φ)—a bigger
H-segment induces the retailer to charge a higher price to extract more surplus.
3.4.2 Prices and profitability of the GB strategy
Recall that the retailer has three options (i.e., Option A-C) to set its prices upon the employ-
ment of the GB strategy. In the following, we describe the retailer’s optimization problem
58
when choosing each of the three options along with the characterization of the solution. All
the derivations are provided in Appendix B.
First, consider Option A. If choosing this option, the retailer generates demands in the
H- and L-segments according to (3.9) and (3.7) respectively. The optimization problem is
given by:
max
pP , ph, pl, q¯
ΠG = DG,H pP +DG,L ph = φ (1 + v0 − pP ) pP + (1− φ)(1− ph − κL) ph (3.13)
s.t.
 p
P ≥ ph + κL > pl + κL
q¯ > (1− φ)(1− pl − κL).
(3.14)




ΠG = φ (1 + v0 − pP ) pP + (1− φ)(1− ph − κL) ph (3.15)
s.t. pP ≥ ph + κL, (3.16)
















+ (1− φ) (1−κL)2
4









Π̂G = [1−φ v0−(1−φ)κL]
2+ 4φ v0
4
, if κL > v0.
(3.18)
59
Next, if choosing Option B, then given the respective demand functions (i.e., equation
3.8 and 3.9), the retailer solves the following problem:
max
pP , ph, pl, q¯
ΠG = DG,H pP +DG,L pl = φ (1 + v0 − pP ) pP + (1− φ)(1− pl − κL) pl (3.19)
s.t.
 p
P ≥ ph + κL > pl + κL
q¯ ≤ (1− φ)(1− pl − κL),
(3.20)
which is equivalent to:
max
pP , pl
ΠG = φ (1 + v0 − pP ) pP + (1− φ)(1− pl − κL) pl (3.21)
s.t. pP > pl + κL, (3.22)
given that ph and q¯ are chosen according to (3.20). In Appendix B, we show that this option

















Finally, consider Option C. The optimization problem is then given by:
max
pP , ph, pl, q¯
ΠG = DG,H pP +DG,L pl = φ (1 + v0 − pP ) pP + (1− φ)(1− pl − κL) pl (3.24)
s.t.
 ph + κL > p
P ≥ pl + κL





ΠG = φ (1 + v0 − pP ) pP + (1− φ)(1− pl − κL) pl (3.26)
s.t. pP ≥ pl + κL, (3.27)















+ (1− φ) (1−κL)2
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Π̂G = [1−φ v0−(1−φ)κL]
2+ 4φ v0
4
, if κL > v0.
(3.29)
First, notice that the result of Option B could be combined with that of Option C, which
allows ph to take any value in a wider range, i.e., ph > p
∗∗
l . Next, given a specific condition
(i.e., κL), the retailer earns identical profit whether it sets the prices according to Option A,
B, or C. For instance, if κL ≤ v0, while the effective group-buying price is ph in Option A




l . Given this observation,
we summarize the characteristics of the pricing schedule (including the posted price, pP , and
the effective group-buying price, pGB) and the profits of the GB strategy to the retailer in
Lemma 3.1.
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Lemma 3.1 Upon the employment of the GB strategy,














+ (1− φ) (1−κL)2
4
.
(b) Otherwise, if κL > v0, then the retailer sets its prices according to: p̂
P = 1+φ v0+(1−φ)κL
2








This implies that the group-buying mechanism operates as a price-discrimination device:
the firm has the posted price to target at consumers in the H-segment and the group-buying
schedule to serve consumers in the L-segments; these prices are set at the optimal levels,
reflecting the respective willingness-to-pay of consumers in the two segments. Most impor-
tantly, since the group-buying option is costly to consumers, the retailer has to (partially)
compensate them for this cost; compensation is implemented via lowering the group-buying
price. Further, if this cost becomes too big (i.e., exceeds v0), then the GB strategy re-
quires the prices in equilibrium being bound by the incentive constraints of L-consumers.
(Otherwise, L-consumers will purchase via the posted-pricing option.)
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3.4.3 Pricing strategy in equilibrium
Here, we compare the profitability of the PP and GB strategies (see Appendix L); the result
is summarized in Proposition 3.1 and depicted graphically in Figure 3.3.
-q qq qff -ff - κLPPGB
0 1voκ∗ = 1−√1− φ v2o
Figure 3.3: Pricing strategy in equilibrium
Proposition 3.1 The retailer’s pricing strategy depends on the cost that consumers in the
L-segment incur upon joining group-buying, κL. If κL is not too big, i.e., κL ≤ κ∗, then
the retailer will optimally introduce group-buying services in addition to the posted-pricing
mechanism. In contrast, if κL is too big, i.e., κL > κ
∗, then it is better off by selling the
product via the traditional posted-pricing mechanism.
As discussed above, the group-buying mechanism serves as a price-discrimination device.
It allows the retailers to extract more surplus from both the H- and L-segments via ‘two’
prices, i.e., the posted price and the group-buying price. However, it is costly to the retailer
to employ this mechanism; this cost is proportional to κL (see Lemma 3.1). The retailer,
therefore, must consider the trade-off between the benefit and the cost of price-discrimination
when choosing between the two pricing strategies. If κL is sufficiently small, then the benefit
of price-discrimination exceeds the cost and the retailer will choose the GB strategy in
equilibrium. As κL increases, the cost of following the GB strategy increases; the retailer
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will be better off by employing the traditional PP strategy when κL exceeds a specific
threshold, κ∗.
Additional investigation of κ∗ reveals that as the size (φ) and (or) valuation (v0) of the
H-segment increase, then holding all else constant, it may become more profitable for the
retailer to follow the GB rather than the PP strategy. This is due to the effect of these
two factors on the profitability of price discriminating the two segments. Note that price-
discrimination is essentially market segmentation and its profitability is positively driven by
the difference in size (φ) and valuation (v0) (which reflects willingness-to-pay) of consumers
in these segments. Further, it can be seen that an increase in φ also results in a decrease
in the cost of employing the group-buying mechanism (since as the size of the H-segment
increases, the size of the L-segment decreases).
Finally, recall that the feasibility of the GB strategy requires heterogeneity in the cost
of joining group-buying by consumers in the two segments (κH versus κL). Note that we
made the assumption that κH is significantly large, making the group-buying mechanism
unattractive to all consumers in the H-segment. It should be clear that this heterogeneity
is the supporting condition, required by the feasibility of the GB strategy. In the absence of
this heterogeneity, the employment of the GB strategy requires additional cost to separate
the two segments. This leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 3.1 In the absence of heterogeneity in the valuation and(or) group-buying cost
among consumers, the retailer never finds the group-buying mechanism profitable.
The explanation is straightforward. In the absence of heterogeneity in valuation between
the two market segments, (i.e, v0 = 0, for instance), there is obviously no benefit of seg-
mentation. Second, if there is no heterogeneity in the group-buying cost, then segmentation
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would be more costly, and even unfeasible in most instances; consumers should be given suf-
ficient incentives to choose the desired purchase mechanism. Here, heterogeneity in the cost
of joining group-buying is necessary for this price-discrimination device to be operative.
3.5 Conclusion and future research
This chapter enriches our understanding of how group-buying operates and benefits the
firm as a second-degree price-discrimination device. We show that the introduction of this
mechanism allows the firm to price discriminate consumers who are heterogeneous in their
valuation for the product, and therefore, extract more surplus from the market. However,
the employment of this demand-aggregation mechanism is costly to the firm—it has to
compensate consumers for the cost they incur when purchasing the product via group-buying.
Finally, our analysis suggests that while consumers’ heterogeneity in the cost of joining group-
buying is required for group-buying to be feasible, heterogeneity in consumers’ valuation for
the product is needed for the profitability of this device.
Our results also helps understand the success/failure of group-buying services. When
first introduced in the late 1990s, group-buying was a very new concept to consumers. For
this and many other reasons, group-buying was perceived as an unattractive option; it seems
to be too costly for consumers to join (The Wall Street Journal 2008). At that time, the
employment of this demand-aggregation mechanism would require too much compensation
and has proved to be unprofitable. When social-networking emerges and becomes popular,
the concept of on-line social communities is familiar and so is that of on-line shopping
communities, such as group-buying. It becomes less costly and hence, more profitable for
retailers to employ.
In this study, the impact of group-buying on the profitability of the other channel member,
i.e., the manufacturer, is not considered. This is the direction of investigation of the following
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chapter in this dissertation. Further, we do not consider competition in this analysis. While
the benefit of group-buying services seems to be clear under monopoly, i.e., in our setting as
well as in Anand and Aron (2003), it is not clear when the market is competitive and further
research is needed to investigate the competitive reactions of channel members when group-
buying is used. The use of group-buying may help the retailers to compete in the downstream
market since they now have an additional distribution option to attract consumers who are
price-sensitive. On the other hand, group-buying may be detrimental to manufacturers since
it may raise the level of price competition among different brands and lower the margin and
profitability to the manufacturers as suggested in the popular press (The Wall Street Journal
2006). This and other aspects of group-buying are interesting topics for future academic
research.
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CHAPTER 4: THE ROLE OF GROUP-BUYING IN CHANNEL
COORDINATION
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter and past research (Anand and Aron 2003) have provided the insights
on the rationale for using group-buying services by retailers—this demand-aggregation mech-
anism serves as a price-discrimination device, allowing the retailers to extract more surplus
from the market. However, it remains unclear about the impacts of this pricing mechanism
on the profitability of other channel members (e.g., the manufacturer), and most importantly,
the issue of channel coordination. For instance, given that group-buying offers significant
discounts and attracts consumers in the price-sensitive segment, its employment should gen-
erate more sales, and thus, should be supported by the manufacturer. In practice, this is not
always the case; we notice that retailers’ engagement in this novel pricing mechanism has
triggered different reactions from manufacturers. Some of them (e.g., Estee Lauder, Cartier,
and BMW) even discourage their retailers from engaging in group-buying services (The Wall
Street Journal 2006). Unfortunately, these recommendations are not always followed by the
retailers. A few questions of interest to marketing managers then arise: How can we explain
these conflicting behaviors of channel members—the manufacturer and the retailer? How
does group-buying affect channel performance? How can the manufacturer leverage group-
buying services to improve channel coordination? These questions motivate the third study
in this dissertation.
Accordingly, this chapter explores how group-buying can help coordinate the behaviors
of different members of the distribution channel. There are two central questions in this
analysis: (1) When does the manufacturer have the incentive to induce its retailer(s) to offer
group-buying services? (2) How may group-buying improve the efficiency of the distribution
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channel? The study addresses these two questions by analyzing a setting in which a manu-
facturer distributes its product to consumers through a retailer and asymmetric information
may exist between these two parties—the retailer may be better informed about the market
condition than the manufacturer. Further, the market consists of two consumer segments—a
high- and a low-valuation segment; consumers in the high segment are less price-sensitive
than those in the low segment—and the retailer may employ group-buying services, in addi-
tion to the conventional posted-pricing mechanism, in distributing the product to consumers.
The relationship between these two parties is established via a (menu of) contract(s), whose
terms include a pricing mechanism—posted-pricing or group-buying—, a wholesale price,
and a fixed fee.
Regarding the type of asymmetric information, this study investigates three settings
where asymmetric information may exist regarding: (1) the relative sizes of the two consumer
segments, (2) price sensitivity of consumers in the high segment, and (3) price sensitivity
of those in the low segment. In the first setting, while the size of the entire market is of
common knowledge, the information about the size of the high segment, relative to that of
the low segment, is unknown to the manufacturer. In the latter settings, the manufacturer
is less informed about consumers’ price sensitivities. More specifically, we assume that two
realizations of the market condition, including a high and a low state regarding the focal
market characteristics, may arise—when the market is in the high (low) state, the size of the
high segment is relatively large (small) in the first setting and consumers’ price sensitivity
is high (low) in the latter two settings. This information is available to both parties. In
addition, the manufacturer also has a prior knowledge of the probability that each of these
market states may arise. However, only the retailer observes the actual realization observes
the actual realization of the market state when asymmetry in information exists.
As in every principal-agent relationship (the manufacturer plays the role of the principal
and the retailer is the agent), asymmetry in information may give rise to an adverse-selection
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problem. For instance, the manufacturer may not know the precise distribution of high- and
low-valuation consumers in the retailer’s local market (i.e., relative sizes of the consumer
segments); in contrast, the retailer has a much clearer understanding of the distribution of
consumer types. Now, suppose that the size of the high-valuation segment is large, relative
to that of the low-valuation segment. This market condition may allow the retailer to earn
more profit by employing group-buying; however, the retailer may not reveal this to the
manufacturer and can seek to leverage its informational advantage. Such asymmetry in
information may also exist regarding other market parameters, such as price sensitivity of
consumers in the different segments.
In general, under asymmetric information, the retailer earns informational rents (Myerson
1979), and from the manufacturer’s perspective, this has a negative impact on the efficiency
of the distribution channel. The analysis shows that by including a term on pricing mech-
anism (i.e., leveraging the use of group-buying) in the contract, the manufacturer has an
opportunity to better coordinate the distribution channel. This arrangement can help align
the interests of the two parties (to different extents, depending on the type of asymmetric
information), and therefore, reduces the informational rents of the retailer under asymmetric
information.
Intuitively, the profitability of posted-pricing and group-buying to the retailer depends on
the state of the market—for instance, given that group-buying serves as a price-discrimination
device (which provides more benefits when the two consumer segments are more distinct),
this pricing mechanism is more profitable when the market happens to be in: (1) the high
state regarding the relative size of the high-valuation segment, (2) the low state regarding
price sensitivity of consumers in the high-valuation segment, and (3) the high state regarding
price sensitivity of those in the low-valuation segment (in these market conditions, the high-
and low-valuation segments more distinct from each other in the respective dimensions).
Therefore, the retailer’s choice of pricing mechanism depends on the actual realization of the
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market condition. As a consequence, the pricing mechanism when included in the contract
serves as a sensor of the market condition, which helps the manufacturer detect the state
of the market via the retailer’s choice of contract. In particular, the availability of group-
buying provides additional flexibility to the retailer in setting prices; eventually, it could
extract more surplus from the market by choosing the contract with an appropriate pricing
mechanism. This means that the market itself provides some incentive (via this extra sur-
plus) for the retailer to reveal its private information. When the retailer has less incentive to
hide its private information (i.e., mis-inform the manufacturer about the market condition),
the latter can reduce the informational rents of the former.
Most interestingly, the manufacturer can induce the retailer to reveal its private informa-
tion without paying any informational rents when asymmetric information exists regarding
the relative sizes of the two segments, and therefore, regains the first-best profitability (i.e.,
the profit it would earn under full information). Notice that the profitability of posted-
pricing and group-buying (and consequently, the retailer’s choice between these two pricing
mechanisms) depends on the state of the market—for instance, it is more profitable to price
discriminate (via group-buying) when the size of the high-valuation segment is large, relative
to that of the low-valuation segment (since they are more distinct from each other). Further,
under a posted-pricing contract, the retailer’s profitability is unaffected by the relative sizes of
the two consumer segments—no matter which segment (high- or low-valuation) is relatively
larger in size, the profitability of the posted-pricing contract remains the same and depends
on the total demand of the two segment (which is fixed and known to the manufacturer).
This allows the manufacturer to extract all the surplus from the retailer whenever the posted-
pricing contract is chosen. Consequently, the retailer is not doing any better by choosing
the posted-pricing contract when it is not desired by the manufacturer. On the other hand,
the group-buying contract is more profitable when the size of the high-valuation segment is
relatively large (as discussed above); therefore, it is desired by the manufacturer under this
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market condition and exhibits a correspondingly higher fixed fee. Here too, the retailer has
no incentive to choose this contract when it is not desired by the manufacturer—doing so
implies paying a high fixed fee while earning a low gross-profit (due to the high-valuation
segment being relatively small in size). In summary, the retailer always chooses the contract
desired by the manufacturer in each market state, and reveals its private information about
the market condition. As a consequence, it earns no informational rents.
Next, when asymmetric information exists regarding price sensitivities of consumers in
the high- and low-valuation segments, the retailer does benefit from its private information
and earn informational rents. This is due to the fact that the profitability of both the
posted-pricing and group-buying mechanisms is low (high) when consumers’ price sensitivity
happens to be high (low). In this setting, the full-information contract designed for the high
(low) state would exhibit too low (high) a fixed fee. This motivates the retailer to choose the
undesired contract when the market is in the low state—by doing so, it pays a lower fixed
fee (i.e., that of the contract designed for the high state) while earning a higher profit due
to the market being in the low state. To prevent this from happening, the manufacturer has
to pay some informational rents to the retailer. Nevertheless, these second-best contracts
exhibit lower informational rents than those contracts that do not allow the manufacturer to
specify the appropriate pricing mechanism. Notice that by choosing an appropriate pricing
mechanism, the firm (retailer) earns higher profits; therefore, a contract of the former type
(i.e., with a term on pricing mechanism) would allow the manufacturer to charge a higher
fixed fee than that of the latter type. Further, the undesired contract of the former type
clearly exhibits an inappropriate pricing mechanism, and thus, is less profitable to the retailer
(compared to the undesired contract of the latter type, wherein the retailer is not obligated to
any pricing mechanism). This higher fixed fee and lower profit reduce the retailer’s incentive
to choose the undesired contract; consequently, the retailer earns lower informational rents.
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Interestingly, specifying the pricing mechanism could be considered as a type of perfor-
mance requirement as in Desiraju and Moorthy (1997). From this perspective, this study ex-
tends their work (which examines the relative benefits of price - and/or effort - requirements)
by showing that requirements on pricing mechanism—posted-pricing and group-buying—
may also improve channel coordination by aligning the interests of the manufacturer and the
retailer when asymmetry in information between the two parties exists.
Further, the findings in this chapter suggest that group-buying may be (more or less)
profitable to the manufacturer. The manufacturer should not be too quick to (ineffectively)
discourage the use of this demand-aggregation mechanism by its retailers, even if it appears
to create a downward pressure on the wholesale price (which may negatively affect profit
margin; The Wall Street Journal 2006). To the contrary, they could benefit from leveraging
group-buying. By inducing group-buying, not only the profitability of the entire channel is
improved but also the share of profit to the manufacturer may increase due to the reduction
in informational rents of the retailers under asymmetric information.
This chapter is organized as follows. In §4.2, I review the related literature. §4.3 describes
the model of the analysis. The characteristics of the full- and asymmetric-information (menu
of) contracts in the first setting of asymmetric information (i.e., when asymmetric informa-
tion may exist regarding the relative sizes of the two segments) are provided in §4.4 and 4.5.
The extended analysis investigating the second and third setting of asymmetric information
(i.e, regarding price sensitivities of consumers in the high and low segments) follows in §4.6.
The chapter concludes in §4.7.
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4.2 Literature review
Past research on group-buying, though modest, has provided useful insights on how this
price-discovery mechanism may evolve as well as how it may benefit the firm. Kauffman
and Wang (2001, 2002) initiate academic research on this business model by investigating
consumers’ bidding behavior. They identify different effects that impact the evolution of
group-buying bids. These include (a) a positive participation effect, i.e., the number of
existing orders exhibits a positive effect on the placement of new orders, (b) a price-drop
effect, that exists when the number of orders approaches the next tier, and (c) an ending
effect, showing a significant increase in orders, placed by the end of the auction cycle.
At the aggregate level, Anand and Aron (2003) are the first to formalize the study of
group-buying using an analytical model. They compare the performance of the group-buying
mechanism to that of the traditional posted-pricing and identify the conditions, under which
the former mechanism outperforms the latter. Their paper shows that group-buying is indeed
a price-discrimination tool that allows the retailer (seller) extracts more surplus from the
market, which exhibits demand heterogeneity. Specifically, demand heterogeneity is captured
in this work by the uncertainty in the total demand of the entire market. It is the nature
of this uncertainty that determines when group-buying is profitable—only when uncertainty
results in ‘non-similar’ demand curves in the high and low regimes (i.e., intersecting demand
curves), the employment of group-buying is profitable.
This essay extends the group-buying stream of research in the following way. Given that
group-buying could be used by the retailer as a price-discrimination device, it provides the
insights on how the manufacturer can leverage this pricing mechanism to improve channel
coordination when information about the market condition is asymmetric among the mem-
bers of the distribution channel. In doing so, the essay integrates the streams of research on
channel coordination, information economics and price discrimination. In the following, we
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briefly review each of these three relevant streams and discuss how our work fits in each of
them.
The literature on channel coordination spans decades of research (e.g., see Spengler 1950,
Jeuland and Shugan 1983, McGuire and Staelin 1986, Weng 1995, Desiraju and Moorthy
1997, Chiang, Chhajed and Hess 2003), and continues to be an important topic, particularly
when the market is changing rapidly as a result of technology improvement. A variety of
remedies to improve the performance of the distribution channel has been suggested, in-
cluding contract design (Jeuland and Shugan 1983), implicit understanding from repeated
interaction (Shugan 1985), franchising (Lal 1990), quantity discount (Ingene and Parry 1995),
performance requirements (Desiraju and Moorthy 1997), cooperative advertising (Corstjens
and Lal 1989), pull price promotion (Gerstner and Hess 1995), and direct channel (Chiang,
Chhajed and Hess 2003) among others. Most recent research focuses on the employment of
innovative business models to attract and better serve customers as well as to improve the
profitability of the entire channel. For instance, Chiang, Chhajed, and Hess (2003) study
the impact of the introduction of direct on-line channel by the manufacturer on the retailers’
pricing decisions. They show that by adding a dual channel, the manufacturer induces the
existing channel (i.e., the retailers) to expand sales via a more efficient pricing strategy. An-
other example of using communication innovation is Chen, Iyer, and Padmanabhan (2002).
They investigate how Internet referral services, offered by a third party, affect competition
among retailers and their profitability.
This essay is similar to, and distinctive from, these works in the following ways. It studies
the role of group-buying, which is an emerging on-line business model, in better distributing
products to consumers. The use of this pricing mechanism, in addition to the traditional
posted-pricing, could be considered as an introduction of a new channel (compared to the
direct channel). However, this mechanism is employed by the retailer, not the manufacturer
as in direct channel. Nevertheless, we show that the manufacturer can leverage group-buying
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to improve the channel’s performance (via a different mechanism though) and extract more
surplus from the retailer—it helps reduce the informational rent due to the retailer when
asymmetric information exists. In this manner, our work is related to the literature of
information economics.
In particular, we apply the theory of adverse selection and countervailing incentives into
the relationship among participants of the distribution channel. The pioneering work in
this field is due to Akerlof (1970), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), and Guesnerie and Laffont
(1984), Lewis and Sappington (1988), among others. For a survey of the various issues related
to the incentives in the principal-agent relationships, see Sappington (1991). In addition, a
complete exposition of the incentive theory is provided by Laffont and Martimort (2002).
In a channel context, the manufacturer serves the role of the principal, and the retailer is
the agent. In most instances, the manufacturer is less informed about the state of the mar-
ket than the retailer, who directly interacts with consumers. This asymmetric information
gives rise to the adverse-selection problem upon the design and employment of the contract
that regulates the relationship between these two parties. Specifically, the informational
asymmetry provides an incentive for the retailer to overstate (or understate) the private
information (i.e., the state of the market) in order to secure higher compensation (or better
treatment) by the manufacturer. Consequently, in its optimal contract, the principal (i.e.,
the manufacturer) has to give up a specific amount of informational rent to the agent (i.e.,
the retailer) when the nature happens to be in its ‘better’ state (see, for example, Guesnerie
and Laffont, 1984).
However, exceptions are applicable; we show that the nature of the asymmetric informa-
tion determines whether the retailer will receive that informational rent or not. Specifically,
in our framework, if information is asymmetric regarding consumers’ price-sensitivity, then
private information does benefit the retailer. In contrast, if asymmetric information exists
regarding the relative sizes of the consumer segments, then the manufacturer can regain
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the first-best profitability by having a term on the pricing mechanism (i.e., inducing group-
buying under some market conditions) in its contract with the retailer.
Finally, this paper relates to the price discrimination literature by its own nature. This
phenomenon has been formally defined in the first edition of Pigou’s book, “The Economics
of Welfare”, in 1920. Later, it has attracted scholars in both economics and marketing,
including, for instance, Phlips (1983), Spulber (1979), Tirole (1988), Narasimhan (1984),
and others. Recently, two excellent review papers on price discrimination have been written
(Armstrong 2006 and Stole 2006). The availability of these two review papers provides a
complete picture of the economics of price discrimination and allows us to discuss briefly
the type of price discrimination, which is most relevant to group-buying, i.e., second-degree
price discrimination.
Second-degree price discrimination arises when the firm cannot directly separate con-
sumers into segments based on observable characteristics. Instead, it relies on consumers’
self-selection to reveal their types and consequently, choose the ‘right’ price. To ensure proper
self-selection, the firm needs to provide appropriate incentive to each type of consumers via
its pricing schedule. It can do so by offering consumers a pricing schedule based on quality
(Mussa and Rosen 1978) or quantity (Maskin and Riley 1984).
By having an additional option for consumers to purchase the product (i.e., via group-
buying), the retailer can indirectly price discriminate consumers in different market segments.
They self-select the purchase mechanism (i.e, group-buying versus posted-pricing) based
on their willingness-to-pay and costs, incurred when joining group-buying. Even in the
setting, when each consumer demands only one unit of the product (and therefore, price
discrimination via quantity as in Maskin and Riley (1984) is not applicable), this additional
purchase option can effectively create a schedule of prices and allows the firm to extract
the most surplus out of each market segment. In this perspective, this essay extends the
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literature, adding a new tool, i.e., the pricing mechanism, to the toolbox of second-degree
price discrimination (Mussa and Rosen 1978, and Maskin and Riley 1984).
In summary, our work intersects the above research streams and discovers a new device,
the group-buying mechanism, that can improve the performance of the distribution channel.
It provides the insights on the ability of the manufacturer to regain its first-best profitabil-
ity under asymmetric information (using this demand-aggregation mechanism and possibly,
other similar price-discrimination practices). Together with Anand and Aron (2003), this
analysis enhances our understanding of the impacts of group-buying on the behaviors of the
channel members.
4.3 The model
We focus on a market, which consists of two segments of consumers. Consumers in the high
segment, denoted H, are less price-sensitive than those in the low segment, denoted L; their
price sensitivities are β and γ respectively (β < γ) and the potential market sizes of the high
and low segments are η α and (1−η)α respectively. The market is offered a product made by
a monopolist manufacturer, M , at zero production cost31 and distributed by a monopolist
retailer, R. The relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer is established via
a contract. This contract, denoted {j, wj, F j}, is designed by the manufacturer; its terms
include: (a) a pricing mechanism, j, (b) a wholesale price, wj, and (c) a fixed fee, F j. The
pricing mechanism, j, could be either posted-pricing, denoted P, or group-buying, denoted
G. In general, the manufacturer could offer a menu of contracts and the retailer self-selects
one from the menu.
Under the P contract, the retailer has a single posted price, p, to serve consumers in both
segments of the market, who then make a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ purchase decision. In contrast,
31Non-trivial cost of production does not provide any additional qualitative insight.
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under the G contract, the retailer introduces a group-buying mechanism, in addition to the
conventional posted-pricing, to sell the product.
Specifically, under the G contract, the retailer offers to consumers two purchase options:
(a) purchase the product at the posted price32, pP , and (b) purchase the product via the
group-buying mechanism and pay a price, pGB, depending on the realization of the group-
buying auction. We consider the simplest version of the group-buying pricing mechanism,
which consists of two price tiers: a low price, p1, and a high price, p2. If the number of
orders placed in the group-buying auction, q, is less than the cut-off level, q¯, then the high
price, p2, is effective; otherwise, if the number of group-buying orders exceeds q¯, then the
low price, p1, will be charged. Mathematically,
pGB =
 p2 if q < q¯,p1 if q ≥ q¯. (4.1)
In contrast to the posted-pricing mechanism, consumers incur some intangible costs when
purchasing the product via group-buying due to the extra time, efforts, and even emotion33.
We capture the cost of joining group-buying, that consumers in the high and low segments
incur, by κH and κL, respectively.
In this research, we focus on the overall effect of the group-buying mechanism on channel
management via the construction of the contract between the manufacturer and the retailer,
and abstract away from the stochastic aspect of the group-buying mechanism (see Kauffman
and Wang 2001). Specifically, we employ an ‘aggregate’ treatment to the group-buying
mechanism and focus on the effective price of the group-buying schedule. We provide here a
brief description of this treatment and refer to Appendix C for the full exposition. Despite
32Notation pP is introduced to denote the posted price under the G contract to distinguish from the posted
price, p, of the P contract.
33Transaction time is extended by the duration of the group-buying auction. More efforts are spent to
monitor the evolution of the auction. Emotional cost may arise when consumers feel disappointed if the
effective group-buying price does not reach the (lower) tier they expect.
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the fact that the group-buying pricing schedule includes multiple price tiers and either one
may become effective from the consumers’ perspective, this schedule is designed by the
retailer in such a way, that one of the price tiers, either p1 or p2, is de facto the effective price
and other parameters of the schedule, including the cut-off quantities and the other price(s),
are set to support the realization of this price. Most importantly, the retailer is indifferent in
choosing either the low or high price, p1 or p2, as the effective price. Therefore, the complex
group-buying schedule could be treated, at the aggregate level, as a single effective price,
pGB, namely the group-buying price. The group-buying price will be set at the optimal level,
along with the posted price, pP , upon the employment of the G contract.
Even though the choice between the two purchase mechanisms (i.e., the conventional
posted-pricing and the group-buying) is made by consumers, they are designed following a
specific targeting strategy: the posted-pricing targets at consumers in the high segment while
the group-buying targets at those in the low segment. To implement this targeting strategy,
the posted price, pP , and the group-buying price, pGB, must be set to ensure proper incentives
for each type of consumers to self-select the desired option; this imposes some constraints,
which may or may not bind on the prices, pP and pGB. In Appendix C, we investigate the
retailer’s optimization problem and derive the conditions regarding the costs of joining group-
buying (i.e., κL and κH), under which (a) the incentive-compatibility constraints on the part
of consumers in both segments are not binding, (b) the incentive-compatibility constraint
of consumers in the high segment binds on the prices, and (c) the incentive-compatibility
constraint of low consumers is binding. In the subsequent analysis, we choose to focus on the
first case, which requires the cost of joining group-buying being not too high for consumers
in the low segment and significantly big for those in the high segment. These conditions,
along with the derivation and the simplification of the retailer’s optimization problem, are
given in Appendix C.
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Most importantly, there may exist asymmetric information between the manufacturer
and the retailer about the condition of the market (i.e., η, β, and γ). This could happen due
to the market being uncertain in these parameters. Consequently, there are three settings for
investigation, in which asymmetric information may exist regarding: (a) the relative sizes of
the two consumers segments, i.e., η, (b) price sensitivity of consumers in the high segment,
and (c) price-sensitivity of those in the L-segment. We denote these three settings by the
η-, β-, and γ-case respectively. Further, the analysis focuses on a simple structure, in which
the state of the market, denoted i, could be either high (denoted h) or low (denoted l), i.e.,
i ∈ {h, l}. Compared to the low state, the high state is characterized by (a) a bigger relative
size of the high segment (i.e., ηh > ηl) in the η-case, (b) a higher degree of price sensitivity
of consumers in the high segment (i.e., βh > βl) in the β-case, and (c) a higher degree of
price sensitivity of consumers in the low segment (i.e., γh > γl) in the γ-case. In all cases,
the remaining parameters of the market (e.g., β and γ in the η-case) are fixed and known to
all parties.
The realization of the market state is observed by the retailer when choosing the contract
as well as when setting the retail prices. However, the manufacturer may or may not possess
this information when designing the contract(s). If full information is available, the manu-
facturer will be able to determine the optimal contract, specific to the realized market state,
and offers this first-best contract to the retailer. In contrast, under asymmetric information,
the manufacturer does not observe the realization of the market condition (i.e., ηi in the
η-case, etc.) when designing the contract(s); it will offer a menu of contracts and lets the
retailer, who is better informed, choose one from the menu. As a matter of fact, asymmetric
information must be taken into consideration in the design of this menu of contracts.
In this analysis, we investigate both the full- and asymmetric-information settings and
determine the optimal (menu of) contracts that the manufacturer offers to the retailer as
well as the retailer’s choice of contracts. Details on the sequence of events under full and
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asymmetric information are provided in the following sections. Regarding the nature of
asymmetric information, we focus on the η-case and investigate how the group-buying mech-
anism could be used in the contracts to recover the first-best outcome under asymmetric
information. Then, in the extensions, the effects of asymmetric information in price sensitiv-
ities (i.e., β and γ) are investigated. In these settings, we show that having the group-buying
mechanism, as an additional tool in the design of the contract(s), does not help the manu-
facturer recover the first-best outcome when information is asymmetric; it needs to reserve
a specific amount of rent for the retailer, when the market is in the low state.
Finally, we assume a linear structure of the demand in both the H- and L-segments.
Under the P contract with a single posted price, p, the demand functions in the H- and
L-segments are given by:
DH,P (p; η, β) = η α− β p, and (4.2)
DL,P (p; η, γ) = (1− η)α− γ p, respectively; (4.3)
in contrast, under the G contract with a pricing schedule {pP , pGB}, demand functions34 are:
DH,G(pP ; η, β) = η α− β pP , and (4.4)
DL,G(pGB; η, γ) = (1− η)α− γ (pGB + κL). (4.5)
34Note that consumers in the low segment purchase the product via the group-buying mechanism. The
total cost of purchasing the product to these consumers includes the group-buying price, pGB, and the cost
of joining group-buying, κL.
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Given this demand structure, the retailer’s profit functions, upon the employment of the
P and G contracts, are given by:
ΠP (p, w, F ; η, β, γ) = [DH,P (p; ·) +DL,P (p; ·)](p− w)− F
=
[
α− (β + γ)p](p− w)− F, and (4.6)
ΠG(pP , pGB, w, F ; η, β, γ) = DH,G(pP ; ·)(pP − w) +DL,G(pGB; ·)(pGB − w)− F
= (η α− β pP )(pP − w) + [(1− η)α− γ(pGB + κL)](pGB − w)− F,
(4.7)
respectively. Meanwhile, the profit functions of the manufacturer are:
piP (w,F, p; η, β, γ) =
[
DH,P (p; ·) +DL,P (p; ·)]w + F
=
[
α− (β + γ)p]w + F, and (4.8)
piG(w,F, pP , pGB; η, β, γ) =
[
DH,G(pP ; ·) +DL,G(pGB; ·)]w + F
=
[
α− β pP − γ(pGB + κL)
]
w + F, (4.9)
upon the employment of the P and G contracts.
4.4 The full-information contracts
Under full information, both the manufacturer and the retailer observe the realization of
the parameters, characterizing the market, before making their respective decisions. Full
information allows the manufacturer to design the optimal (i.e., first-best) contract, which
could be either {P,wP , F P} or {G,wG, FG}, depending on the state of the market.
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The sequence of events, under full information, unfolds in five stages as follows. In the
first stage, nature moves and the state of the market is realized. In the second stage, both
M and R observe the realization of all parameters, that characterize the state of the market.
Next, in stage three, M designs and offers to R the {j, wj, F j} contract (j ∈ {P,G}), which
requires R to employ pricing strategy j and pay a wholesale price of wj and a fixed fee of
F j. In stage four, if R accepts the contract, then it sets the final retail prices according to
the contract. Finally, in the last stage, demand is realized and profits made.
We derive the full-information G and P contracts in the most general setting, i.e., for
any given market state, characterized by {η, β, γ}, in §4.4.1 and §4.4.2. Then, in §4.4.3, we
compare the profitability of these two full-information contracts to determine the one that
arises in the equilibrium of the η-case.
4.4.1 The full-information G contract
Under the G contract, the group-buying mechanism is introduced in addition to the con-
ventional posted-pricing mechanism. Specifically, the retailer will offer a set of prices, which
includes a posted price, pP , and a group-buying schedule, pGB. These prices must satisfy
the incentive-compatibility constraints for consumers in the two segments to self-select the
desired pricing mechanism as discussed above. A complete analysis of the retailer’s opti-
mization problem (see Appendix C ) identifies the conditions, regarding the costs of joining
group-buying (i.e., κH and κL), under which these incentive-compatibility constraints impact
(i.e., bind or do not bind on) the retail prices. Here, we focus on the setting, in which the costs
of joining group-buying, κH and κL, are such that the incentive-compatibility constraints are
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not binding on pP and pGB. This setting requires35:
















In this setting, given the parameters of the market (i.e., η, β, and γ), the G contract,
{G,wG, FG}, is designed by setting the wholesale price, wG, and the fixed fee, FG, so that the
manufacturer’s profit, piG(·), is maximized. Assuming that the retailer’s reservation profit
equals to zero, it will accept the contract if its profit is non-negative, i.e., ΠG(·) ≥ 0. As a




piG(wG, FG, p˚P , p˚GB; ·) = [α− β p˚P − γ(p˚GB + κL)]wG + FG, (4.12)
subject to:
{p˚P , p˚GB} = argmax
pP , pGB
ΠG(pP , pGB, wG, FG; ·) = (η α− β pP )(pP − wG) + [(1− η)α
− γ(pGB + κL)
]
(pGB − wG)− FG,
ΠG∗ = max
pP , pGB
ΠG(pP , pGB, wG, FG; ·) ≥ 0.
(4.13)
We summarize the characteristics of the full-information G contract, given the market char-
acterized by {η, β, γ}, in the following Lemma. The proof is provided in Appendix C.
Lemma 4.1 Given that the cost of purchasing the product via the group-buying mechanism
is sufficiently low for consumers in the low segment, i.e., κL ≤ η αβ − (1−η)αγ , and significantly







, the full-information G
35Note that (4.10) requires η αβ − (1−η)αγ > 0. Otherwise, the incentive-compatibility constraint on the
part of low consumers binds on the retail prices even if κL = 0 (see Appendix C ).
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Finally, the feasibility of this contract also requires:
(1− η)α− γ κL ≥ 0. (4.17)
Upon the introduction of the group-buying mechanism under the G contract, the firm
eventually has a schedule of ‘two’ prices: a posted price and a group-buying price. Consumers
in the high segment will be interested in purchasing the product in the traditional way, paying
the posted price. This is due to the fact that these consumers perceive the group-buying
option to be too “costly” to join (i.e., high κH). In contrast, the group-buying mechanism
is less “costly” for consumers in the low segment; therefore, they may have incentives to
purchase via group-buying. Given that the costs of joining group-buying are sufficiently low
for L-consumers and significantly high for those in the H-segment, the retailer will set the
prices for high and low consumers, i.e., the posted price and the group-buying price, according
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to their respective willingness-to-pay36. Effectively, the retailer is now price discriminating
the two segments via the group-buying mechanism. Notice that the retailer needs to further
lower the group-buying price to compensate for the cost of joining group-buying incurred by
low consumers, κL. Finally, since the wholesale price directly impacts the retail price, it is
set at the production cost (i.e., c = 0) to eliminate the double-marginalization problem. In
contrast, the fixed fee, which does not affect the retail price, is set at the highest level in
order to extract all the surplus (i.e., profit) of the channel (see Moorthy 1987).
4.4.2 The full-information P contract
Upon the employment of the P contract, the retailer sells the product to all consumers via the
traditional posted-pricing mechanism at a single posted price, p. The demand functions in the
high and low segments are given by (4.2) and (4.3) respectively. Though the retailer, under
some conditions, may choose to serve only one of the two market segments (and shuts down
the other one), we focus on the setting, in which consumers in both segments are served37;
this requires some conditions on the parameters of the market to hold. In the following,
we describe the optimization problem, that the manufacturer faces when designing the P
contract (i.e., {P,wP , F P}), given the market characterized by {η, β, γ}. The characteristics
of this contract, along with the required conditions, are summarized in Lemma 4.2. All the
derivations are provided in Appendix C.
36Willingness-to-pay at the aggregate level is proportional to the ratio of the market size and consumers’
price sensitivity. For instance, given the same market size in the two segments (i.e., η = 12 ), willingness-
to-pay of consumers in the high segment is α4β , which is higher than that of consumers in the low segment,
α
4γ .
37i.e., DH,P (p, ·) ≥ 0 and DL,P (p, ·) ≥ 0.
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To design the P contract, the manufacturer solves the following constrained optimization
problem:
max
wP , FP , p˚





ΠP (p, wP , F P ; ·) = [α− (β + γ)p](p− wP )− F P ,
ΠP ∗ = max
p
ΠP (p, wP , F P ; ·) ≥ 0.
(4.19)
Lemma 4.2 The full-information P contract, serving consumers in both the high and low
segments, is characterized by:
 w
P ∗ = 0,









retailer sets the retail price at p∗ = α
2(β+γ)
. In addition, this contract is feasible under the
following conditions:
(1− η2)β ≥ η2 γ, and (4.21)
η(2− η)γ ≥ (1− η)2 β. (4.22)
Upon the employment of the P contract, the retailer has only a single price to serve
both segments of the market. This price is set at the level, which reflects the ‘average’
willingness-to-pay of consumers in the two market segments, i.e., below the willingness-to-
pay of consumers in the high segment and above that of consumers in the low segment.
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Obviously, a single (posted) price does not allow the firm to extract all the surplus from
the market. However, in contrast to the group-buying mechanism, consumers incur no extra
cost (except the retail price), and therefore, no compensation is required. Finally, analogous
to the G contract, the wholesale price is set at the production cost level and the fixed fee is
set to extract the entire profit from the retailer.
4.4.3 The optimal full-information contract in equilibrium
Now, consider the η-case. For a given realization of the market state (i.e., η), the manufac-
turer with full information compares the profitability of the {P,wP , F P} contract to that of
the {G,wG, FG} contract; the one with higher profitability is chosen in equilibrium. First,
we investigate the optimal full-information contract in a benchmark setting, when the cost of
joining group-buying is negligible for consumers in the low segment, i.e., κL = 0. (High con-
sumers still incur a significantly high κH, as required by (4.11).) Next, the optimal contract
under full information is determined for the case of non-trivial κL.
4.4.3.1 The benchmark: κL = 0
In this benchmark setting, consumers in the low segment do not incur any cost upon pur-
chasing the product via group-buying (i.e., κL = 0). Lemma 4.3 characterizes the optimal
contract, chosen by the manufacturer in this setting. The proof is given in Appendix C.
Lemma 4.3 Given that both the {P,wP , F P} and {G,wG, FG} contracts are feasible38, if the
cost of purchasing the product via the group-buying mechanism is negligible for consumers in
the low segment (i.e., κL = 0) and significantly high for those in the high segment (i.e., κH ≥








), then the manufacturer always chooses the G contract, i.e., {G,wG, FG}, in equilibrium.
As discussed above, if choosing the {P,wP , F P} contract, the single posted price is op-
timally set to reflect the ‘average’ willingness-to-pay of consumers in the high and low seg-
ments, and the firm cannot extract the most surplus out of each market segment. In contrast,
the group-buying mechanism allows the firm to price discriminate between the two segments.
Upon the employment of the {G,wG, FG} contract, the retailer sets the two prices, pP and
pGB, according to the willingness-to-pay of the two respective segments, and thus, extracts
more surplus from the market. Most importantly, in this benchmark setting, since κL = 0,
the firm can price discriminate without further lowering the group-buying price to compen-
sate for κL. In other words, the group-buying mechanism serves as a price discrimination
tool at no cost to the firm. Therefore, the G contract is always chosen by the manufacturer.
4.4.3.2 Non-trivial κL
Now, consider the setting in which consumers in the low segment incur a non-trivial cost
of joining group-buying, (i.e., κL > 0); however, this cost should not be too high to
satisfy condition 4.10. Based on Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, we specify the ranges of η, in
which both the {P,wP , F P} and {G,wG, FG} contracts could be employed. This result



























In these ranges of η, the manufacturer’s choice of contract in equilibrium is determined
by comparing the profits earned under the two contracts, i.e., {P,wP , F P} and {G,wG, FG}.
We summarize the result in Proposition 4.1 and provide the proof in Appendix C.
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Figure 4.2: Profitability of the full-information G and P contracts
Proposition 4.1 Given that the cost of joining group-buying is significantly high for con-
sumers in the high segment, i.e., κH ≥ κL2 + α2β ,
(a) if the cost of joining group-buying is sufficiently low for consumers in the low segment,
i.e., κL ≤ κ2, then the manufacturer offers the {P,wP , F P} contract to the retailer
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when the size of the H-segment is relatively small (i.e., η < η∗); otherwise, when the
size of the H-segment is relatively big (i.e., η ≥ η∗), the {G,wG, FG} contract arises
in equilibrium.
(b) In contrast, if the cost of joining group-buying is not sufficiently low, i.e., κ2 < κL < κ1,
then the manufacturer always chooses the {P,wP , F P} contract whenever this contract
is feasible (i.e., for all η ∈ [η, η¯]).
Under full information, the manufacturer observes the realization of the market state
(i.e., η) when designing the contracts. This allows M to design the first-best contract to
offer to the retailer. As discussed above, the G contract helps the firm price discriminate
the two market segments. Therefore, more surplus could be extracted under the G contract
than under the P contract. However, under the G contract, since consumers in the low
segment incur the cost of joining group-buying, κL, the group-buying price must be lowered
further (i.e., below the willingness-to-pay of low consumers) to compensate for this κL; the
G contract now becomes costly when κL is non-trivial. The manufacturer must consider the
trade-off between the benefit and the cost of employing the G contract. If κL is high (i.e.,
κ2 < κL < κ1), then the cost of the G contract exceeds the benefit the firm could gain by
price discriminating the two market segments; the G contract is thus dominated by the P
contract.
It is only when κL is sufficiently low (i.e., κL ≤ κ2), the G contract may arise in equilib-
rium. In this case, the choice of contracts depends on the state of the market, i.e., η. Recall
that under the P contract, the single posted price is set to reflect the ‘average’ willingness-
to-pay of consumers in the two segments; in contrast, under the G contract, the firm has
‘two’ prices to serve the two segments.
If the size of the high segment is (relatively) big, i.e., η > η∗, then upon the employment of
the P contract, the low segment, which is then (relatively) small in size, would ‘contaminate’
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the single posted price: this price-sensitive segment imposes a downward pressure on the
single posted price, while not providing too much of profit to the firm due to its small size.
In contrast, under the G contract, the posted price is ‘free’ from this ‘detrimental’ downward
pressure; it is set to reflect the willingness-to-pay of consumers in the high segment. (Those
in the low segment now purchase via the group-buying mechanism and pay the group-buying
price.) In other words, the benefit of price discrimination, upon the employment of the G
contract, is high when the size of the H-(L-)segment is big (small). Further, as the size
of the low segment becomes smaller, the cost of employing the G contract (due the need
of compensating for κL) decreases. Together, the incremental benefit of the G contract,
compared to the P contract, is sufficiently high when the high segment is relatively big; it
exceeds the cost (due to κL) and hence, the G contract is dominating.
In contrast, when η is small (i.e., η < η∗), the above arguments hold in the opposite
direction, i.e., the benefit of the G contract is now limited while its cost becomes significantly
high. The G contract is dominated then.
4.5 The asymmetric-information contracts
Now, consider the asymmetric-information setting: the manufacturer does not observe the
realization of the market state (i.e., η) when designing the contracts. However, it knows that
the market could be in the high state, i.e., η = ηh, with probability φ, and in the low state,
i.e., η = ηl with probability 1 − φ. In contrast, the retailer, who is better informed than
the manufacturer, observes the realization of the market state when making the decision to
choose and accept the contracts, as well as when setting the retail prices.
In this analysis, we assume that κL ≤ κ2 and κH ≥ κL2 + α2β and let ηh ∈ [η∗, η2]
and ηl ∈ [η, η∗)39. Under asymmetric information, the manufacturer will offer a menu of
39These conditions ensure that the {G,wG, FG} arises as a candidate of the optimal contract in equilibrium;
see Proposition 4.1. Further, under these conditions, consumers in the high segment always purchase via the
92
contracts, {G,wG, FG} and {P,wP , F P}, to the retailer for self-selection. Based on the result
of Proposition 4.1, if the market is in the high state, then the G contract is more profitable;
in contrast, if the market is in the low state, then the P contract is better. Therefore, the
{G,wG, FG} contract in the menu under asymmetric information is designed for the high
state (i.e., ηh), and the {P,wP , F P} contract is designed for the low state (i.e., ηl).
In the asymmetric-information setting, the sequence of events unfolds in five stages as
follows. In the first stage, the manufacturer designs a menu of contracts, knowing that the
market could be in the high state with probability φ and in the low state with probability
1−φ. In the second stage, nature moves and the state of the market is realized (ηi ∈ {ηh, ηl}).
In the third stage, the retailer observes the realization of the market state and decides on
which of the two contracts to accept, if any. In the forth stage, the retailer sets its retail
prices according to the contract it accepts. Finally, in the last stage, demand is realized and
profits made.
In the following, we describe the optimization problem that the manufacturer is facing
when designing this menu of contracts. Note that this menu must ensure proper incentives
for the retailer to participate (see the IR-h and IR-l constraints), as well as to choose the
‘right’ contract (i.e., {G,wG, FG} when the market is in the high state and {P,wP , F P} in
the low state; see the IC-h and IC-l constraints). The characteristics of the optimal menu
is summarized in Proposition 4.2. All the derivations are given in Appendix C.
The menu of contracts under asymmetric information regarding η solves the following
constrained optimization problem:
traditional posted-pricing mechanism while those in the low segment will choose the group-buying option







wP , FP , p
l|l
pi = φpiGh|h + (1− φ) piPl|l
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(FOC-G) : {pPh|h, pGBh|h} = argmax
pP , pGB
ΠGh|h = Π
G(pP , pGB, wG, FG; ηh, ·), (4.24)
(FOC-P) : pl|l = argmax
p
ΠPl|l = Π








ΠPl|l ≥ 0, (4.27)
(IC-h) : ΠGh|h
∗ ≥ ΠPl|h∗ = max
p
ΠPl|h = Π
P (p, wP , F P ; ηh, ·), (4.28)
(IC-l) : ΠPl|l
∗ ≥ ΠGh|l∗ = max
pP , pGB
ΠGh|l = Π
G(pP , pGB, wG, FG; ηl, ·). (4.29)
Proposition 4.2 Under asymmetric information, given that the cost of joining group-buying
is significantly high for consumers in the high segment (i.e., κH ≥ κL2 + α2β ) and sufficiently
low for those in the low segment (i.e., κL ≤ κ2), the manufacturer offers to the retailer a
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The former contract is chosen by the retailer when the market is in the high state, and the
latter in the low state.
This result implies that under asymmetric information regarding η, the manufacturer, by
offering the menu of contracts as described above, can regain the first-best profitability. To
understand the intuition underlying this interesting finding, consider the nature of market
uncertainty and its impact on the profitability of the two contracts (i.e., the P and G
contracts), as well as on the retailer’s incentive of choosing the contracts. Whether the
market is in the high or low state regarding η, the size of the entire market remains fixed.
In other words, consumers just reallocate themselves from one segment to the other between
the two states; the total demand of the market remains identical. Therefore, the P contract,
which serves the entire market with a single price, provides the same profitability in both
market states. Most importantly, having the information on the total market demand, the
manufacturer can determine the fixed fee in the P contract (i.e., F P ) to extract all the
surplus from the retailer whenever this contract is chosen. Regarding the G contract, as
discussed above, it is more profitable when the market is in the high state (due to the higher
benefit and the lower cost of price discrimination). Designed to be chosen in the high state,
the fixed fee in the G contract (i.e., FG) is set to extract all the gross profit that the retailer
may earn upon the employment of the G contract in the high state.
It is the profitability of the two contracts in each market state that determines the
retailer’s incentive to choose either one of them. The above-mentioned pattern of profitability
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perfectly aligns the retailer’s incentive to that of the manufacturer, and therefore, allows M
to recover the first-best results even under asymmetric information. In particular, when the
market is in the low state, the retailer has no incentive to choose the undesired G contract—
choosing this contract in the low state results in negative profit to the retailer since the fixed
fee, FG, is higher than the gross profit (i.e., profit prior to paying the fixed fee) it would
earn from this contract in the low state40. Most importantly, when the market is in the high
state, the undesired contract, which is now the P contract, is not attractive to the retailer
due to the fact that its profitability is identical to that when the market is in the low state
and equals to the fixed fee it would pay to the manufacturer.
In summary, the term on the pricing mechanism in the contracts serves as a perfect sensor
for the manufacturer to detect the state of the market (regarding the relative sizes of the two
consumer segments) via the behaviors of the retailer. It helps eliminate the adverse incentive
that the retailer would have under asymmetric information. In this setting, the private infor-
mation regarding the relative sizes of the two consumer segment does not reward the retailer
for its (possible) adverse selection of the pricing mechanism. This arrangement effectively
improves channel coordination and increases the efficiency of the entire distribution system.
4.6 Extensions
4.6.1 Uncertainty-in-β case
Now, consider the setting when asymmetric information may exist regarding the price sen-
sitivity of consumers in the high segment, i.e., β. First, we investigate the manufacturer’s
choice of full-information contracts—given the full-information G and P contracts, whose
characteristics are given in Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, the manufacturer will choose the optimal
40Note that the G contract is designed for the high state, and thus requires a high fixed cost. This fixed
cost equals to the ‘gross’ profit of the retailer upon the employment of the G contract in the high state.
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one, depending on the realized β that it observes. Next, we investigate the menu of contracts
that M will offer to the retailer under asymmetric information regarding β. In this setting,
though the manufacturer cannot recover the first-best outcome, it pays a lower informational
rent when having a term on the pricing mechanism in the contract.
4.6.1.1 The optimal full-information contract in the uncertainty-in-β case
Based on the results of Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, we specify the ranges of β, in which both the
{G,wG, FG} and {P,wP , F P} are feasible. Then, we compare the profitability of the two con-
tracts in these ranges of β to determine the optimal full-information contract. Proposition 4.3
describes the manufacturer’s choice of full-information contracts in this β-case, given η = 1
2
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a complete description of the result is provided (i.e., when η takes on different values). All
the proofs and the specification of β∗ are provided in Appendix C.
-q q q(1) η ∈ [0, 12 ] ∧ κL ∈ [0, κ3];or η ∈ ( 12 , 1√2 ] ∧ κL ∈ (κ5, κ3]: 0 β∗ min{β¯, γ} β
︷ ︸︸ ︷︷ ︸︸ ︷{P,wP , FP }{G,wG, FG}
-q q(2) η ∈ ( 12 , 1√2 ] ∧ κL ∈ [0, κ5]: 0 γ β
︷ ︸︸ ︷{G,wG, FG}
Figure 4.3: The manufacturer’s choice of full-information contracts in the β-case
Proposition 4.3 Given that κL is sufficiently low (i.e., κL ≤ κ3) and κH is significantly
high, if the price sensitivity of high consumers is low, i.e., β ≤ β∗, then the {G,wG, FG}








Figure 4.4: Profitability of the full-information G and P contracts in the β-case
The intuition of this result is quite straightforward. Notice that both contracts have
higher profitability in the low state than in the high state due to a low β. However, the G
contract is more profitable when the market is in the low state. Recall that the benefit of
the G contract comes from its ability to price discriminate the two segments. This benefit
increases as the two segments become more distinct with respect to their willingness-to-pay.
This happens when the market is in the low state: the low price sensitivity of consumers in the
high segments implies a high willingness-to-pay of these consumers, making the two segments
significantly distinct. Therefore, the benefit of the G contract due to price discrimination
is higher in the low state than in the high state; it exceeds the cost of compensating for κL
upon the employment of this contract. In contrast, when the market is in the high state, the
price sensitivity of consumers in the high segment is high and close to that of those in the low
segment, making the two segments ‘close’ to each other. The benefit of price discrimination
is limited; the cost now exceeds the benefit and the firm is better off by choosing the P
contract.
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4.6.1.2 The menus of contracts under asymmetric information regarding β
Now, we investigate the setting of asymmetric information regarding β. Though not observ-
ing the realization of β when designing the contracts, M knows that the high state (βh) will
realize with probability φ and the low state (βl) with probability 1 − φ. Here, we focus on
the setting, described in the upper part of Figure 4.3, i.e., {η, κL} ∈ [0, 12 ]×(0, κ3]∪(12 , 1√2 ]×
(κ5, κ3]. Further, we assume that βh ∈ (β∗,min{β¯, γ}] and βl ∈ (0, β∗]. In this setting, the
first-best contract (under full information) would be the P contract if the market is in the
high state and the G contract in the low state.
In the following analysis, we show that the first-best outcome is not achievable under
asymmetric information regarding β. However, the manufacturer can obtain the second-best
outcome by offering a menu of P and G contracts. Specifically, it has three options to design
the menu of contracts: (a) a menu of (only) P contracts (namely, the P -menu), (b) a menu
of (only) G contracts (namely, the G-menu), and (c) a menu of P and G contracts, in which
the former is designed for the high state and the latter for the low state. In the following,
we describe the optimization problem that defines each of the three menus, and summarize
the characteristics of each contract in Table 4.1. All derivations are provided in Appendix
C.
(i) The menu of P contracts: {P,wPh , F Ph } (designed for the high state) and {P,wPl , F Pl }
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= φ
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(FOC-h) : p˚h|h = argmax
p
Π˚Ph|h = Π
P (p, wPh , F
P
h ; βh, ·), (4.32)
(FOC-l) : p˚l|l = argmax
p
Π˚Pl|l = Π
P (p, wPl , F
P
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P (p, wPl , F
P
l ; βl, ·). (4.37)
(ii) The menu of G contracts: {P,wGh , FGh } and {P,wGl , FGl }. The optimal menu of G






















h|h ; βh, ·) + (1− φ) piG(wGl , FGl , p˚Pl|l, p˚GBl|l ; βl, ·)
= φ
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(FOC-h) : {p˚Ph|h, p˚GBh|h} = argmax
pP , pGB
Π˚Gh|h = Π
G(pP , pGB, wGh , F
G
h ; βh, ·), (4.39)
(FOC-l) : {p˚Pl|l, p˚GBl|l } = argmax
pP , pGB
Π˚Gl|l = Π
G(pP , pGB, wGl , F
G
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G(pP , pGB, wPh , F
P
h ; βl, ·). (4.44)
(iii) The menu of P and G contracts: {P,wP , F P} (designed for the high state) and
{G,wG, FG} (designed for the low state). This menu solves the following optimiza-
tion problem:
max





pi = φpiPh|h + (1− φ) piGl|l
= φpiP (wP , F P , ph|h; βh, ·) + (1− φ)piG(wG, FG, pPl|l, pGBl|l ; βl, ·)
= φ
{[
α− (βh + γ)ph|h
]










(FOC-P) : ph|h = argmax
p
ΠPh|h = Π
P (p, wP , F P ; βh, ·), (4.46)
(FOC-G) : {pPl|l, pGBl|l } = argmax
pP , pGB
ΠGl|l = Π








ΠGl|l ≥ 0, (4.49)
(IC-h) : ΠPh|h
∗ ≥ ΠGl|h∗ = max
pP , pGB
ΠGl|h = Π
G(pP , pGB, wG, FG; βh, ·), and (4.50)
(IC-l) : ΠGl|l
∗ ≥ ΠPh|l∗ = max
p
ΠPh|l = Π
P (p, wP , F P ; βl, ·). (4.51)
By investigating the profitability of the three menus, it can be seen that the menu of P
and G contracts outperforms the other two menus. First, if the market is in the high state,
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Table 4.1: Characteristics of the (menus of) contracts under asymmetric informa-
tion regarding β
High state (βh) Low state (βl)
Full First-best contract: wP ∗ = 0 wG∗ = 0









Asymmetric The menu of P contracts: wPh
∗ = 0 wPl
∗ = 0









The menu ofG contracts: wGh
∗ = 0 wGl
∗ = 0















− (βh−βl)η2 α24βh βl
The menu of P and G wP ∗ = 0 wG∗ = 0









{P,wP , FP } & {G,wG, FG} − (βh−βl)α24(βh+γ)(βl+γ)
asee Proposition 4.3.
bwhere c = 0.
this menu gives the manufacturer the profit it would earn under full information with the
P contract. Next, if the market is in the low state, the manufacturer can extract the higher
surplus of the ‘G-menu’ while giving back to the retailer the smaller rent that would be due
under the ‘P -menu’41. Proposition 4.4 formalizes this result.
Proposition 4.4 Under asymmetric information regarding β, the manufacturer cannot re-
gain the first-best outcome with the menu of P and G contracts. However, this menu out-
performs the menu of P contracts and the menu of G contracts: it allows the manufacturer
to extract more surplus at a lower rent due to the retailer.
First, under asymmetric information regarding β, the menu based on the first-best con-
tracts could not be employed since the retailer will choose the undesired contract when the
market is in the low state. To see this, recall the result of the full-information setting (see
Figure 4.4): both contracts (i.e., the P and G contracts) are more profitable when the mar-
ket is in the low state than in the high state. The P contract, designed for the high state,
41In Table 4.1, the last terms of F Pl
∗ and FGl
∗ represent the rent due to asymmetric information in the P -








includes a fixed fee, which is equal to the ‘gross’ profit of the retailer upon the employment
of this contract in the high state; this fixed fee is smaller than the ‘gross’ profit that the
retailer can earn when the market is in the low state. This gives the retailer an incentive to
choose the P contract in the low state, in place of the desired G contract.
Therefore, under asymmetric information, the manufacturer must give up some informa-
tion rent to the retailer in the low market state in order to mitigate the incentive of choosing
the undesired contract. Compare the G- to the P -menu: (a) the fixed fees of the ‘high’
contracts in both menus are set to extract all the surpluses from the retailers in the high
state, and (b) the G contract is more profitable than the P contract in the low state (due to
its ability of price discriminating the two significantly ‘distinct’ segments of the market; see
Proposition 4.3), and less profitable in the high state. This implies that when the market is
in the low state, the retailer would earn more if choosing the undesired, ‘high’ G contract
(i.e., {G,wGh , FGh }) in the G-menu than if choosing the ‘high’ P contract (i.e., {P,wPh , F Ph }) in
the P -menu. More incentives mean higher rent: the rent paid to the retailer in the G-menu
is higher than that in the P -menu. However, the G-menu allows for higher surplus extraction
in the low state, compared to the P -menu.
By having the menu of both the P and G contracts, the manufacturer can extract the
most surplus while paying the lowest rent. The employment of the G contract in the low
state and the P contract in the high state (as designed by this menu) allows for extracting
the most surplus in both states, as shown in Proposition 4.3. Regarding the rent of this
menu, it is the rent, required to prevent the retailer from choosing the undesired P contract,
that needs to be paid. As discussed above, since the P contract is less profitable in the low
state, this rent is lower than that required in the G-menu. In summary, the menu of P and
G contracts combines the best of the two menus (i.e., the P - and G-menus). This is the
second-best outcome that the manufacturer can achieve.
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4.6.2 Uncertainty-in-γ case
Consider the γ-case. Analogous to the previous analysis, we begin by characterizing the
first-best contracts under full information. Then, under asymmetric information, the opti-
mal menu of contracts is investigated. Here, too, we show that the first-best outcome is
unachievable: the manufacturer has to give up some rent to the retailer when the market is
in the low state.
4.6.2.1 The optimal full-information contract in the uncertainty-in-γ case
-q q q









β γ1 γ¯ γ2γ∗
{P,wP , FP } feasible -ff
{G,wG, FG} feasible -ff
︸ ︷︷ ︸︸ ︷︷ ︸
{P,wP , FP } {G,wG, FG}
Equilibrium
β γ1 γ¯γ2






{P,wP , FP }
Figure 4.5: Feasibility and the manufacturer’s choice of full-information contracts
when the market is uncertain in γ (given η = 1
2
)
Under full information, the manufacturer chooses between the two full-information con-
tracts, described in Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, by comparing their respective profitabilities. To
reduce the level of mathematical complexity, we focus on the setting of η = 1
2
. We report
the result when κL is sufficiently low (i.e., κL <
α
6β
) in Proposition 4.5. The complete re-
sult is presented in Figure 4.5. Figure 4.6 illustrates the profitability of the contracts when









Figure 4.6: Profitability of the full-information G and P contracts under uncer-
tainty in γ (given η = 1
2








. Here, γ∗ does not have a close-formed specification.
However, its existence is shown in Appendix C, along with all the derivations.
Proposition 4.5 Given that κL is sufficiently low (i.e., κL <
α
6β
) and κH is significantly
high, if the price sensitivity of consumers in the low segment is high, i.e., γ > γ∗, then
the manufacturer offers the {G,wG, FG} contract to the retailer. In contrast, if the price
sensitivity of these consumers is low, i.e., γ ≤ γ∗, then the {P,wP , F P} contract is chosen
in equilibrium.
The logic that explains this result is similar to that of Proposition 4.3. The G contract
allows the firm to price discriminate the two market segments. The benefit due to price
discrimination increases as the two segments become more ‘distinct’ with respect to their
willingness-to-pay, i.e., when the low segment becomes more price-sensitive. However, the
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G contract is costly to employ due to the need of compensating consumers for κL. It is
when the low segment is highly price-sensitive (i.e., γ is high), the benefit of the G contract
exceeds its cost; it is then more profitable than the P contract. In contrast, when γ is low,
the manufacturer cannot recover the cost of the G contract due to the limited benefit from
price discrimination; the P contract is dominating the G contract.
4.6.2.2 The menus of contracts under asymmetric information regarding γ
This analysis investigates the setting of asymmetric information and uncertainty in γ. The
manufacturer offers a menu of P and G contracts to the retailer. The P contract of the
menu is designed for the low state and the G contract for the high state. Here, the result is
similar to the setting of market uncertain in β: the menu of P and G contracts allows the
manufacturer to extract more surplus at a lower rent, due to the retailer. Analogously, we
describe the optimization problem of the manufacturer when designing (a) the menu of P
contracts (namely, the P -menu), (b) the menu of G contracts (namely, the G-menu), and
(c) the menu of P and G contracts. The characteristics of these menus are summarized in
Table 4.2. We formalize the result in Proposition 4.6. The proof is given in Appendix C.
(i) The menu of P contracts: {P,wPh , F Ph } (designed for the high state) and {P,wPl , F Pl }








p˘iP = φpiP (wPh , F
P
h , p˘h|h; γh, ·) + (1− φ) piP (wPl , F Pl , p˘l|l; γl, ·)
= φ
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(FOC-h) : p˘h|h = argmax
p
Π˘Ph|h = Π
P (p, wPh , F
P
h ; γh, ·), (4.53)
(FOC-l) : p˘l|l = argmax
p
Π˘Pl|l = Π
P (p, wPl , F
P
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l ; γl, ·). (4.58)
(ii) The menu of G contracts: {P,wGh , FGh } and {P,wGl , FGl } (designed for the high and low






















h|h ; γh, ·) + (1− φ) piG(wGl , FGl , p˘Pl|l, p˘GBl|l ; γl, ·)
= φ
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(FOC-h) : {p˘Ph|h, p˘GBh|h} = argmax
pP , pGB
Π˘Gh|h = Π
G(pP , pGB, wGh , F
G
h ; γh, ·), (4.60)
(FOC-l) : {p˘Pl|l, p˘GBl|l } = argmax
pP , pGB
Π˘Gl|l = Π
G(pP , pGB, wGl , F
G
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G(pP , pGB, wPh , F
P
h ; γl, ·). (4.65)
(iii) The menu of P and G contracts: {P,wP , F P} (designed for the low state) and {G,wG, FG}
(designed for the high state)
max






pi = φpiGh|h + (1− φ) piPl|l
= φpiG(wG, FG, pPh|h, p
GB
h|h ; γh, ·) + (1− φ) piP (wP , F P , pl|l, ; γl, ·)
= φ
{[






α− (β + γl)pl|l
]




(FOC-P) : pl|l = argmax
p
ΠPl|l = Π
P (p, wP , F P ; γl, ·), (4.67)
(FOC-G) : {pPh|h, pGBh|h} = argmax
pP , pGB
ΠGh|h = Π








ΠPl|l ≥ 0, (4.70)
(IC-h) : ΠGh|h
∗ ≥ ΠPl|h∗ = max
p
ΠPl|h = Π
P (p, wP , F P ; γh, ·), and (4.71)
(IC-l) : ΠPl|l
∗ ≥ ΠGh|l∗ = max
pP , pGB
ΠGh|l = Π
G(pP , pGB, wG, FG; γl, ·). (4.72)
Proposition 4.6 Under asymmetric information regarding γ, the menu of P and G con-
tracts does not help the manufacturer recover the first-best profitability. However, it provides
an opportunity for the manufacturer to extract the most surplus at the lowest rent.
108
Table 4.2: Characteristics of the (menus of) contracts under asymmetric informa-
tion regarding γ
High state (γh) Low state (γl)
Full First-best contract: wG∗ = 0 wP ∗ = 0





F P ∗ = α
2
4(β+γl)
Asymmetric The menu of P contracts: wPh
∗ = 0 wPl
∗ = 0









The menu ofG contracts: wGh




{G,wGh , FGh } & {G,wGl , FGl } FGh

























The menu of P and G wG∗ = (1−φ)(γh−γl)κLφ(β+γh)−(1−φ)(γh−γl) w
P ∗ = 0






P ∗ = α
2
4(β+γl)













bwhere c = 0.
Recall that (a) both the P and G contracts are more profitable in the low state than
in the high state, and (b) the G contract is less profitable than the P contract in the low
state. By the construction of the menu, the P contract is selected in the low state and the
G in the high state. In other words, the menu provides the benefit of price discrimination in
the high state and helps avoid the cost due to κL in the low state. However, it does require
an amount of rent, paid to the retailer in the low state. This is the rent to mitigate the
retailer’s incentive to choose the undesired, G contract when the market is in the low state.
Since the G contract is less profitable than the P contract in the low state, the rent is less
than that of the P -menu. In summary, though the first-best is not recovered, the menu of
P and G contracts gives the manufacturer the second-best outcome.
4.7 Conclusion and future research
In this chapter, we explore the role that group-buying services may play in improving channel
coordination. Given that the retailer may introduce group-buying as an additional option
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for consumers to purchase the product, the manufacturer can take advantage of the retailer’s
dual pricing mechanism for better channel coordination. Here, the problem of channel co-
ordination is one of asymmetric information whose existence requires, in general, the man-
ufacturer to reserve some informational rent to the retailer due to its private information.
Interestingly, by including pricing mechanism as a term in the contract and offering a menu
of these contracts to the retailer for self-selection, the manufacturer is better off—it pays a
lower rent (compared to the contract without the pricing term or one with a single pricing
mechanism) and under some conditions, it needs not pay any rent at all.
Consider a menu of P and G contracts. Since one contract is more profitable in a specific
market state and less profitable in the other (e.g., the P contract is more profitable when the
market is in the high state regarding the price sensitivity of consumers in the L-segment),
the pricing mechanism in the contract serves as a sensor of the market condition. In other
words, the manufacturer can detect the state of the market when having this device in the
contract. Most importantly, depending on the type of asymmetric information, the use of
this device has different cost to the manufacturer.
Importantly, when asymmetric information exists regarding the relative sizes of the two
segments, a term on pricing mechanism in the contract serves as a market detector at no cost
to the manufacturer. In this setting, since the retailer earns identical profits in both market
states—high and low—when employing the P contract, it has no incentive to deviate from
the type of contract that the manufacturer desires. This results in an alignment of interests
and allows the manufacturer to restore the outcome of the first-best setting (i.e., under full
information) without paying any informational rent to the retailer.
However, when asymmetric information exists regarding price sensitivity of consumers
in either segment—high and low—, the retailer will have incentive to deviate from the full-
information contract that the manufacturer desires when the market is in the low state (in
order to pay the low fixed fee of the high-state full-information contract). Informational
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rent is due to the retailer in this setting. But, since the employment of the optimal pricing
mechanism raises the profitability, and consequently, the fixed fee of the high-state full-
information contract, the retailer has less incentive to choose this contract (i.e., mis-inform
the manufacturer about the market condition) when the market is in the low state; less
incentives results in lower informational rent.
Overall, this study contributes to the literature on channel coordination and group-
buying—it provides the insights on how group-buying may be used to improve channel
coordination. A possible direction for future research on group-buying includes the explo-
ration of other market characteristics, such as market fragmentation/consumer collective
power and price transparency, that may impact the benefit of this mechanism. These are
important aspects of the emerging on-line social/shopping communities. A systematic anal-
ysis is helpful in understanding the mechanism of this and other on-line business models as
well as predicting the future of on-line shopping. Further, competition at both the upstream
and downstream levels is not considered in our analysis. Since competition may enhance the
benefit of this pricing mechanism to one party and raise the cost to the other party, future
research in this direction is warranted.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS OF RESULTS IN CHAPTER 2
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A.1 The demand structure
As noted in the model section, our focus is on a duopoly market served by two retailers, R1
and R2, with the same product supplied by a single manufacturer. The market consists of m
consumers, each of whom desires at most one unit of the product offered by either retailer.
Each consumer is characterized by two parameters: (a) a valuation for the product, and (b)
a preference for shopping at a particular retailer.
The valuation for the product, V , is unknown to consumers ex-ante (i.e., at the time of
purchasing), but is known ex-post (i.e., after they actually experience the product). Specif-
ically, after using the product, consumers will be able to determine whether the product
matches their needs or not. When the product is a match, consumers enjoy a high valua-
tion, VH ; otherwise, the valuation is VL (0 ≤ VL < VH). At the time of purchasing, though
not knowing the actual valuation for the product, consumers have a prior belief that the
product will (not) match their needs, and hence, will deliver a high (low) valuation of VH
(VL) with probability φ (with probability 1 − φ); mathematically, prob[V = VH ] def= φ and
prob[V = VL]
def
= 1 − φ, where φ ∈ [0, 1]. It is important to note that the actual realization
of V is independent from consumers’ belief. For instance, when deciding to buy a computer,
consumers may have a strong belief that the computer will be a match based on the observed
product features, but may realize ex-post that this is not the case, e.g., due to the inconve-
nient keyboard design or the layout of the touch-pad. Further, we make the assumption that
consumers are identical in terms of prior belief and risk-aversion (and therefore, identical in
the certainty equivalent, v), but heterogeneous in their ex-post valuation, V .
When making the purchase decision, consumers do not know their ex-post valuation, and
therefore, rely on their belief as well as level of risk aversion. In other words, they make
the purchase decision based on the certainty equivalent, v, of the product. Specifically, if
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consumers are risk neutral, then v = E[V ] = φVH + (1 − φ)VL; otherwise, if they are risk-
averse, then VL ≤ v < E[V ] (see Che 1996). In contrast, after experiencing the product,
consumers observe the realized valuation (either VH or VL), and make the decision to keep
or return the product if a returns policy is available. The reasons for returning the product
may include (1) dissatisfaction due to the mismatch between the product and the needs of
consumers, i.e., a low ex-post valuation (VL), and (2) opportunism (Chu et al. 1998). Denote
the rate of returns from consumers by ρ. In this paper, ρ captures the fraction of consumers
who either experience VL or behave in an opportunistic manner per Chu et al. (1998) and
return the product despite high valuation VH
42.
Regarding consumers’ preferences for the retailers, we assume that the m consumers
are uniformly distributed on a Hotelling-type (1929) linear market, from x to x¯ with a
unit transportation cost of t while retailers R1 and R2 are located at a1 and a2 respectively
(x < a1 ≤ x+x¯2 ≤ a2 < x¯). Further, the two retailers are assumed to be located symmetrically,
i.e., a1 − x = x¯ − a2 ⇔ a2 = x + x¯ − a1. Given these market characteristics, we derive
the demand functions under various combinations of consumer returns, {σR1 , σR2 }. Notice
that by symmetry, the demand functions in the cases when only one retailer offers consumer
returns (i.e., under {NCR,CR} and {CR,NCR}), are identical.
A.1.1 Demand functions when no retailers accept consumer returns
Under a no-returns policy, consumers bear the entire risk associated with uncertain ex-post
valuation. As a result, consumers’ purchase decisions are based on the certainty equivalent,
42Note that in most businesses, it is the retailers’ (and ultimately, the manufacturer’s responsibility) to
accept returns of defective products from consumers. In contrast, accepting returns from the two sources
listed above is the choice of the retailers. Since we are interested in understanding the strategic reasons
why the manufacturer and the retailers accept returns, our focus is on these sources of returns. This focus
facilitates our treatment of ρ as a legitimate exogenous parameter. For a given level of product quality, the
distribution of consumers who return the product due to a mismatch or opportunistic incentives is likely to
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Purchase decisions are based on v when no firms accept returns.
Market coverage
R1’s demand R2’s demand
Figure A.1: Market structure when no retailers accept consumer returns
v. Figure A.1 depicts the market structure when neither retailer accepts returns, i.e., under
{NCR,NCR}.
To derive the demand function of each retailer, we need to specify the locations of three
critical consumers, including the two zero-utility consumers located at x1 and x2 and the
indifferent consumer located at x3. Consumers located between x1 and x3 will choose to buy
from retailer R1 while those located between x3 and x2 consider buying from retailer R2.
For a given set of retail prices {p1, p2}, the specifications of x1, x2, and x3 are given below:
v − (a1 − x1)t− p1 = 0 ⇔ x1 = a1 + p1 − v
t
, (A.1)
v − (x2 − a2)t− p2 = 0 ⇔ x2 = a2 − p2 − v
t
, and (A.2)
v − (x3 − a1)t− p1 = v − (a2 − x3)t− p2 ⇔ x3 = a1 + a2
2




Note that the above-mentioned market structure arises under the following conditions:

x ≤ x1 ≤ a1
a2 ≤ x2 ≤ x¯
a1 ≤ x3 ≤ a2
⇔

v − (a1 − x)t ≤ p1 ≤ v
v − (x¯− a2)t ≤ p2 ≤ v
|p1 − p2| ≤ (a2 − a1)t.
(A.4)
Hereafter, we focus on the setting in which conditions A.4 are satisfied. As a result, the
demand function of retailer R1 has the following specification:











Analogously, the demand function of retailer R2 is:

























Purchase decisions are based on Enet[V ] when both firms accept returns.
Initial market coverage
R1’s demand R2’s demand
Figure A.2: Market structure when both retailers accept consumer returns
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When returns are accepted, consumers have an option to return the product after pur-
chase to get a full refund of the retail price. A returns policy releases consumers from the
risk of buying a product with a low ex-post valuation (VL). Despite a full refund, we as-
sume that consumers will incur a cost of κ (κ ≥ 0) to return the product. For instance, it
costs consumers extra time and effort to bring the product back to the store43. At the time
of purchasing, consumers believe that (1) with probability φ, the product will match their
needs and deliver a high value, VH , and hence, they will keep the product paying the retail
price, p, and (2) with probability 1−φ, they will experience VL and will return the product,
incurring the cost of returns, κ. Based on this belief, consumers derive a net expected utility,
Enet[V ] = φ(VH − p) + (1− φ)(−κ) and make purchase decisions based on this expectation
(see Figure A.2). After purchasing, a fraction ρ of consumers will return the product.
In this case, the initial demand functions are derived based on the locations of the three
critical consumers, x1, x2 and x3, whose specifications are given below:






φ(VH − p2) + (1− φ)(−κ)− t(x2 − a2) = 0 ⇔ x2 = a2 − (1− φ)κ
t
− φ(p2 − VH)
t
, (A.8)
φ(VH − p1) + (1− φ)(−κ)− t(x3 − a1) = φ(VH − p2) + (1− φ)(−κ)− t(a2 − x3)






Again, we assume that the conditions that ensure the above-mentioned market structure
are satisfied:
x ≤ x1 ≤ a1
a2 ≤ x2 ≤ x¯
a1 ≤ x3 ≤ a2
⇔

VH − (1−φ)κφ − (a1−x)tφ ≤ p1 ≤ VH − (1−φ)κφ
VH − (1−φ)κφ − (a1−x)tφ ≤ p2 ≤ VH − (1−φ)κφ
|p1 − p2| ≤ (a2−a1)tφ .
(A.10)
43Note that in our setting, a positive κ limits the magnitude of opportunistic returns; in contrast, when
κ = 0, such a limit will not arise.
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As a result, retailer R1’s initial-demand function is:













Meanwhile, retailer R2 faces initial demands according to the following function:













At the rate of returns equal to ρ, the retailers’ net-demand functions are:
qi = (1− ρ)qˆi, where i = 1, 2. (A.13)
A.1.3 Demand functions when one retailer accepts consumer returns
Consider the case when only R2 accepts returns. (The case when only R1 accepts returns
is analogous by symmetry.) Having the option to return products, consumers who consider
purchasing from R2 make their decision based on the net expected utility, Enet[V ] (for defi-
nition, see the previous section). In contrast, those consumers who consider purchasing from
R1 will take the certainty equivalent, v, into account.
Solving for the locations of the three critical consumers, x1, x2, and x3, we get:
v − (a1 − x1)t− p1 = 0 ⇔ x1 = a1 + p1 − v
t
, (A.14)
φ(VH − p2) + (1− φ)(−κ)− t(x2 − a2) = 0 ⇔ x2 = a2 − (1− φ)κ
t
− φ(p2 − VH)
t
, (A.15)
v − (x3 − a1)t− p1 = φ(VH − p2) + (1− φ)(−κ)− t(a2 − x3)
⇔ x3 = a2 + a1
2























Consumers based their decision on v and Enet[V ] when purchasing





Figure A.3: Market structure when only R2 accepts consumer returns
Analogously, this market structure requires:

x ≤ x1 ≤ a1
a2 ≤ x2 ≤ x¯




v − (a1 − x)t ≤ p1 ≤ v
VH − (1−φ)κφ − (a1−x)tφ ≤ p2 ≤ VH − (1−φ)κφ
(a1 − a2)t+ (φVH − v) + (1− φ)κ ≤ φp2 − p1 ≤ (a2 − a1)t+ (φVH − v) + (1− φ)κ.
(A.18)
Consequently, R1’s demand function has the following specification:
q1 = m(x3 − x1) = mv
t















while R2’s initial-demand function, qˆ2, and net-demand function, q2, are given by:


















q2 = (1− ρ)qˆ2, respectively. (A.21)
A.1.4 Simplification of the demand functions
Without loss of generality, let m = 2, VH = 1, VL = 0, a1 = 0, and a2 = 1
44. For further
simplification, we assume that consumers are ex-ante completely unsure about their ex-post
valuation of the product45, i.e. φ = 1
2









simplifications, the demand functions can be rewritten as follows.
When no retailers offer consumer returns, i.e., under {NCR,NCR}, the demand functions
are:
qi = 1 + 2τv − 3τpi + τpj (i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j). (A.22)
When both retailers choose to offer consumer returns, i.e. under {CR,CR}, their initial
sales are realized based on the initial-demand functions





pj (i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j). (A.23)
44This requires: (1) x < 0, (2) x¯ > 1, (3) x = 1− x¯ (for symmetric location of the two retailers), and (4) x
and x¯ are such that the market is not fully covered (i.e., conditions stated by (A.4), (A.10), and (A.18) are
satisfied).
45Relaxing this assumption does not change the insights of the analysis since a stronger belief (i.e., higher
φ) is equivalent to a higher rate of returns, ρ and vice versa.
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In the case where only retailer i offers consumer returns, its initial-demand function, qˆi,
is:
qˆi = 1 +
3τ
2
− τv − 3µ− 3τ
2
pi + τpj. (A.24)
The demand function of retailer j, who does not accept returns from consumers, is
qj = 1− τ
2
+ 3τv + µ− 3τpj + τ
2
pi. (A.25)
Next, we summarize the range of the parameters used in the model. We have t ≥
0 ⇔ τ ∈ (0,+∞), and VL ≤ v ≤ E[V ] ⇔ v ∈ [0, 12 ]. In addition, we need to ensure
non-negative primary demand (i.e., the intercept) in each of the demand functions specified
above. First, notice that the primary demand when no retailers accept returns is positive.
Non-negativity of primary demand in (A.25) is guaranteed when v ≥ 1
6
. Accordingly, we
make the assumption that consumers are not extremely risk-averse so that v ≥ 1
6
and impose
the following restraints on (A.23) and (A.24):
























Table 2.1 summarizes this result—the demand functions of the retailers under various
combinations of consumer returns policies and the range of the parameters.
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A.2 The integrated-manufacturer model (Proof of Lemma 2.1)
Consider an integrated manufacturer (refer to as IM ), who is the owner of the two retailers
(or stores), R1 and R2. Let the demand functions of R1 and R2 be defined as in Table 2.1.
The game unfolds in three stages. In the first stage, IM decides whether to accept consumer
returns. Next, it chooses the production (stock) level, s, in the second stage, and then sets
the retail prices, p1 and p2, in the third stage. We solve the game by employing backward
induction.
A.2.1 The optimal price and stock level under NCR
From Table 2.1, the demand functions of the two retailers, R1 and R2, are:
q1 = 1 + 2τv − 3τp1 + τp2, and (A.28)
q2 = 1 + 2τv − 3τp2 + τp1 respectively. (A.29)
In the third stage, IM sets the retail prices to clear stock:
s = q1 + q2 = 2(1 + 2τv)− 2τp1 − 2τp2 ⇔ p1 + p2 = 2(1 + 2τv)− s
2τ
. (A.30)
Since IM may set different retail prices (i.e., p1 6= p2), let p2 = p1 + , where  ≥ 0. The
profit function of IM is then given by:
piI = q1p1 + q2p2 − sc =
[




Notice that since ∂pi
I
∂
= −4τ and ∂2piI
∂2
= −4τ < 0, IM is always better off by choosing  = 0;
this means IM will set the same retail prices at the two retailers:
p1 = p2 =
2(1 + 2τv)− s
4τ
(by (A.30)). (A.32)




piI = q1p1 + q2p2 − sc = s
[2(1 + 2τv)− s
4τ
− c]. (A.33)
Solving the first-order condition, we obtain the optimal stock level46:
s0 = 1 + 2τv − 2τc. (A.34)
Consequently, the optimal retail prices and profit of IM under NCR are as follows:
p0 =




(1 + 2τc− 2τc)2
4τ
. (A.36)
Regularity requires the stock level to be non-negative, i.e., s0 ≥ 0⇔ c ≤ v + 12τ
def
= cˆ1.
A.2.2 The optimal price and stock level under CR
Under CR, the initial- and net-demand functions are given by:






qi = (1− ρ)qˆi, (A.38)
46Note that the second-order condition holds in this case as well as in the subsequent analyses.
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where i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
IM has two options to set the retail prices in the third stage: (Option A) price to clear
stock according to the initial demand, qˆi, and (Option B) price to clear stock according to
the net demand, qi. Choosing option A, IM will have enough stock to serve all customers
who are willing to purchase the product at the chosen price. However, it will incur some
unsold inventory due to returns at the end of the selling period. In contrast, under option
B, IM will eventually clear all the ordered stock47 but will incur the stock-out cost since the
level of stock is not enough to cover the initial demand.
Consider pricing option A. At a given level of stock, s, IM sets the retail prices in the
third stage as follows:
s = qˆ1 + qˆ2 = 2(1 + τ − 2µ)− τ(p1 + p2)
⇔ p1 + p2 = 2(1 + τ − 2µ)− s
τ
. (A.39)
Analogous to the case under NCR, we can show that IM will set the same retail prices at
the two retailers, i.e.,
p1 = p2 =
2(1 + τ − 2µ)− s
2τ
. (A.40)
At this price, it earns:
piI,A1 = (1− ρ)qˆ1p1 + (1− ρ)qˆ2p1 − sc
=
s[2(1 + τ − 2k)(1− ρ)− (1− ρ)s− 2τc]
2τ
. (A.41)
47By adopting the reselling policy (see Che 1996).
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In contrast, under option B, IM sets the retail prices at:
s = q1 + q2 = (1− ρ)[2(1 + τ − 2k)− τ(p1 + p2)]
⇔ p1 + p2 =




Again, it can be shown that IM will optimally set the same retail prices:
p1 = p2 =




Consequently, its profit function is given by:
piI,B1 = (1− ρ)qˆ1 p1 + (1− ρ)qˆ2 p1 − η(qˆ1 + qˆ2 − s)− sc (A.44)
= (1− ρ)qˆ1 p1 + (1− ρ)qˆ2 p1 − η ρ
1− ρs− sc
=
s[2(1 + τ − 2k)(1− ρ)− s− 2τ(1− ρ)c− 2τρη]
2τ(1− ρ) . (A.45)
Upon comparing the profitability of the two options, IM will choose option A if and only
if:
piI,A1 ≥ piI,B1 ⇔ piI,A1 − piI,B1 ≥ 0
⇔ sρ[s(2− ρ) + 2τη − 2(1 + τ − 2k)(1− ρ)]
2τ(1− ρ) ≥ 0




In summary, IM sets the retail price in the third stage as follows:








if s < sˆ.
(A.47)
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1 if s ≥ sˆ,
piI,B1 if s < sˆ.
(A.48)
Notice that piI,A1 is a concave quadratic function in s. Its maximum value,
piI,A∗1 =
[(1 + τ − 2k)(1− ρ)− τc]2
2τ(1− ρ) , (A.49)
is obtained at
s∗A = 1 + τ − 2k −
τ
1− ρc. (A.50)
Regularity requires s∗A ≥ 0⇔ c ≤ (1+τ−2k)(1−ρ)τ
def
= cˆ2.
Similarly, piI,B1 is also a concave quadratic function in s, which obtains maximum at
s∗B = (1 + τ − 2k)(1− ρ)− τ(1− ρ)c− τρη. (A.51)
The maximum value of piI,B1 is
piI,B∗1 =
[(1 + τ − 2k)(1− ρ)− τ(1− ρ)c− τρη]2
2τ(1− ρ) . (A.52)
Here, regularity requires s∗B ≥ 0⇔ η ≤ (2−c)(1−ρ)ρ
def
= η¯.
Solving the optimization problem defined by (A.48)48, we obtain the following result: (a)
when η < c, IM chooses production level s∗B, prices according to option B and earns profits
piI,B∗1 , and (b) when η ≥ c, IM is better off by setting the production level at s∗A and pricing
according to option A; it earns profit equal piI,A∗1 .
48The proof is available upon request.
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A.2.3 IM ’s choice of consumer returns
In the first stage, IM decides on its consumer-returns policy by comparing the profit earned
under NCR to that under CR. For simplicity, we focus on the case of risk-neutral consumers
and zero transaction cost for returning the product (i.e., v = 1
2
and µ = 0). In addition,
we restrict the production cost, c, and stock-out cost, η, to be reasonable, i.e., c ≤ c¯ def=
min{cˆ1, cˆ2} and η ≤ min{η¯, c¯}. Based on the previous results, we have two possibilities:
(1) When 0 ≤ c < η, IM chooses option A under CR. Therefore, it compares piI0 to piI,A∗1
when deciding whether to accept returns. Consider
∆1 = pi
I,A∗




(1 + τ)2(1− 2ρ)
4τ
. (A.53)
Notice that (a) ∆1 is a concave quadratic function in c ∈ [0, η], (b) ∆1|c=0 = (1−2ρ)(1+τ)24τ ≥ 0
since ρ ≤ 1
2
, and (c) ∆1|c=η = (1−2ρ)[1+2τ+(1−2η2)τ2−ρ(1+τ)2]4τ(1−ρ) ≥ 0 (since ρ ≤ 12 and η ≤ cˆ1). This
implies that ∆1 ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ [0, η], i.e., IM is better off by choosing CR.




1,B − piIM0 =−
1
2
τ(1 + ρ)c2 + (1 + τ + τη)ρc+
(1 + τ)2 + 2ρ2(1 + τ + τη)2 − (1 + τ)[3 + τ(3 + 4η)]ρ
4τ(1− ρ) . (A.54)
Since (a) ∆2 is a concave quadratic function in c ∈ [η, cˆ1] ⊆ [η, c¯]49, (b) ∆2|c=η = ∆1|c=η ≥
0 (as shown above), and (c) ∆2|c=cˆ1 = [(1+τ)(1−ρ)−2τρη]
2
8τ(1−ρ) ≥ 0, we have ∆2 ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ [η, cˆ1],
which implies ∆2 ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ [η, c¯]. Consequently, IM also chooses to accept consumer
returns when η ≤ c ≤ c¯.
49More precisely, cˆ1 = c¯ = min{cˆ1, cˆ2} since cˆ1 < cˆ2.
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In summary, the integrated manufacturer will always choose to accept consumer returns.
However, its pricing strategy depends on the magnitude of stock-out cost relative to the
magnitude of production cost. Specifically, if stock-outs are less costly (i.e., η < c), then IM
prefers incuring the cost of stock-outs to bearing the cost of unsold inventory; it sets the
retail price to clear stock according to the net demand in this case. In contrast, if stock-outs
are more costly (i.e., η ≥ c), IM is in favor of having unsold inventory; it sets the retail price
according to the initial demand. The statement of Lemma 2.1 follows. 
A.3 Analysis with independent retailers
For expositional ease, we begin with the analysis of the case where the marginal cost of stock-
outs, η, is low (i.e., case 2), followed by the analysis of cases 1 and 3. We solve the game
in each case using backward induction: First, we solve for the retailers’ optimal prices and
stock levels in stages four and three. Then, we characterize the retailers’ choice of consumer
returns policy in the second stage. Finally, the manufacturer’s distribution policy, including
the optimal wholesale price and returns policy, is determined.
A.3.1 Proof of Lemma 2.2 and Proposition 2.2
A.3.1.1 The retailers’ pricing and stocking strategies (Case 2, stages 4 and 3)
We start with the combinations of symmetric consumer returns under NMR, i.e., {NMR,NCR,
NCR} and {NMR,CR,CR}. Then, we solve one of the two combinations with asymmet-
ric consumer returns under NMR: {NMR,NCR,CR}. By symmetry, the results of the
other asymmetric combination, {NMR,CR,NCR}, are similar to those of {NMR,NCR,CR}.
Next, under MR, we investigate combinations {MR,NCR,NCR}, {MR,CR,CR}, and {MR,
NCR,CR}. The results are summarized in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Note: When η is relatively
128
low, we focus on the setting where, under NMR, the retailers are willing to bear the stock-out
cost (instead of the cost of unsold inventory), i.e., they set the retail prices in stage four to
clear stock according to the net-demand functions when the manufacturer does not accept
returns.
Combination 1: {NMR,NCR,NCR}
Under {NCR,NCR}, the net demand is identical to the initial demand, i.e., qi = qˆi =
1 + 2τv − 3τpi + τpj, where i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j (see Table 2.1). The retailers set prices in
stage four to clear stock and then, in stage three, they choose the stock levels that maximize
their profits.













Π1 = s1(p1 − w), and (A.56)
max
s2
Π2 = s2(p2 − w). (A.57)
Substituting for the retail prices, p1 and p2, from (A.55) and optimizing these profit functions
simultaneously, we get the optimal stock levels, s10,0,0 and s
2
0,0,0, that retailers R1 and R2 will








Consequently, the optimal retail prices, pi0,0,0 (i = 1, 2), are
pi0,0,0 =
3 + 6τv + 8τw
14τ
. (A.59)





0,0,0 − w) =
6(1 + 2τv − 2τw)2
49τ
, (A.60)





0,0,0)(w − c) =
8(1 + 2τv − 2τw)(w − c)
7
. (A.61)
Regularity conditions: To ensure non-negative stock, i.e., si0,0,0 ≥ 0⇔ 1+2τv−2τw ≥
0, the wholesale price, w, cannot exceed w1
def




In this case, both retailers accept consumer returns while the manufacturer does not
accept any returns from the retailers. The initial-demand function, qˆi (i = 1, 2), and the
corresponding net-demand function, qi, are given by:





pj, (i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j), and (A.62)
qi = (1− ρ)qˆi, respectively. (A.63)
Stage 4: The retailers set the retail prices, pi (i = 1, 2), to clear stock according to the

















Stage 3: The optimal levels of stock are determined by solving:
max
s1





p2)(p1 − w − ρ
1− ρη)
= s1(p1 − w − ρ
1− ρη) (by (A.64)), and (A.65)
max
s2





p1)(p2 − w − ρ
1− ρη)
= s2(p2 − w − ρ
1− ρη). (A.66)
Solving the first-order conditions simultaneously with p1 and p2 given by (A.64), we
obtain:
si1,1,0 =
4[(1 + τ − 2µ)(1− ρ)− τ(1− ρ)w − τρη]
7
(i = 1, 2). (A.67)
At those stock levels, the resulting retail prices, pi1,1,0, the retailers’ profits, Π
i
1,1,0, and
the manufacturer’s profit, piM1,1,0, are provided in Table 2.3.










= η1. This upper bound is consistent with the “low η” setting we examine
here in case 2. Furthermore, as shown later, w2 is the upper bound of the wholesale price




Under NMR, when only retailer R2 accepts consumer returns, its initial-demand function
is qˆ2 = 1 +
3τ
2
− τv− 3µ− 3τ
2
p2 + τp1, and net sales are realized according to q2 = (1− ρ)qˆ2.
Meanwhile, retailerR1 has only one demand function, which is q1 = 1− τ2 +3τv+µ−3τp1+ τ2p2.
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Stage 4: Retailer R1 sets its retail price, p1, to clear stock according to q1, while its
rival aims at clearing stock according to the net-demand function, q2: s1 = 1−
τ
2
+ 3τv + µ− 3τp1 + τ2p2









Stage 3: The retailers aim at maximizing (net) profits by choice of stocking levels, si
(i = 1, 2):
max
s1
Π1 = s1(p1 − w), and (A.69)
max
s2
Π2 = s2(p2 − w − ρ
1− ρη). (A.70)
The results, including the optimal stock levels, si0,1,0 (i = 1, 2), the optimal retail prices,




0,1,0, are reported in






1,0,0)(w − c), (A.71)
where s10,1,0 and s
2
1,0,0 are the optimal stock levels ordered by R1 and R2 respectively.






= w3 and w ≤ 5+2τ(3−v)−12µ4τ − 3ρη2(1−ρ)
def
= w4 respectively. Together,
we need w ≤ min{w3, w4}. In addition, w4 > 0 if and only if η < [5+2τ(3−v)−12µ](1−ρ)6τρ
def
= η2.
Further, we define wN
def
= w3 for expositional ease in the subsequent analysis.
Combination 5: {MR,NCR,NCR}
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As noted in Wang (2004), the retailers set prices to clear stock in stage four when MR
is offered. Then, in the third stage, they order stock so that profits are maximized as under
{NMR,NCR,NCR}. Therefore, their optimal retail prices, pi0,0,1, stock levels, si0,0,1, and
profits, Πi0,0,1, are identical to those under {NMR,NCR,NCR} (See Table 2.4).
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Combination 8: {MR,CR,CR}
Under MR, the retailers set prices in stage four to clear stock according to the initial-
demand function, qˆi = 1 + τ − 2µ − 3τ2 pi + τ2pj, where i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Consequently,
their net sales are given by qi = (1− ρ)qˆi. Then in the third stage, they choose the levels of
stock to order so that net profits are maximized.
Stage 4: The retailers clear stock according the initial demand by setting the retail
prices as follows:

















Stage 3: They maximize net profits by choosing the optimal levels of stock to order:
max
s1
Π1 = (1− ρ)s1(p1 − w), and (A.73)
max
s2
Π2 = (1− ρ)s2(p2 − w), (A.74)
where pi (i = 1, 2) are given by (A.72). This means the retailers will order stock according
to:
si1,1,1 =
4(1 + τ − 2µ− τw)
7
, (A.75)
and set the retail prices at:
pi1,1,1 =
3(1 + τ − 2µ) + 4τw
7τ
. (A.76)





Regularity conditions: In this case, we need w ≤ 1+τ−2µ
τ
def
= w5 for stock to be non-
negative. In addition, w5 is also the upper bound of the wholesale price under MR as shown




This is the case when only R2 accepts consumer returns. Thus, R2’s initial- and net-





p2+τp1 and q2 = (1−ρ)qˆ2, respectively.
Meanwhile, all of R1’s sales are final and equal to q1 = 1− τ2 + 3τv + µ− 3τp1 + τ2p2.
Stage 4: The retailers set prices to clear stock according to their (initial-) demand
functions: s1 = 1−
τ
2
+ 3τv + µ− 3τp1 + τ2p2
s2 = 1 +
3τ
2












Stage 3: The retailers maximize their (net) profits by choosing the optimal levels of
stock given the retail prices, p1 and p2, defined by (A.77), i.e.,
max
s1
Π1 = s1(p1 − w), and (A.78)
max
s2
Π2 = (1− ρ)s2(p2 − w) (A.79)
The optimal stock levels are
s10,1,1 =




4[5 + 2τ(3− v)− 12µ− 4τw]
35
. (A.81)
The complete results are provided in Table 2.4.
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Regularity conditions: Stock levels, s10,1,1 and s
2











5 + 2τ(3− v)− 12
4τ
. (A.83)
We also define wM
def
= w6.
A.3.1.2 The retailers’ returns policies (Case 2, stage 2)
Under NMR:
The retailers’ decision on consumer returns are made based on the behavior of the differ-
ences in their respective profits, i.e., δ1 and δ2 (see equations 2.8 and 2.9). Recall that we are
focusing on the simple case with v = 1
2
, and µ = 0. For the sake of mathematical tractabil-
ity, we consider η = 1
4






Later, the results obtained in equilibrium will be verified to ensure that pricing according
to option B is indeed optimal for the retailers under NMR.) The remaining parameters are
τ ∈ (0,+∞) and ρ ∈ [0, 1
2
].
First, we restate the regularity conditions that ensure feasibility of each of the four com-
binations of consumer returns (see Table 2.3). Specifically, combination 1, i.e., {NMR,NCR,
NCR}, is feasible when w ≤ w1 = 12 + 12τ . Combination 2, i.e., {NMR,NCR,CR}, requires
w ≤ min{w3, w4}, where w3 = 5(1+τ)11τ + ρ44(1−ρ) , and w4 = 5(1+τ)4τ − 3ρ8(1−ρ) . (Note that η < η2
when η = 1
4
, and ρ ≤ 1
2
.) Finally, combination 4, i.e., {NMR,CR,CR}, is feasible when
w ≤ w2 = 1+ττ − ρ4(1−ρ) . (The condition on η, i.e., η < η1, can be shown to hold in this case.)
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Before investigating the behavior of δ1 and δ2, we determine the ordering of the upper
bounds of w in the four combinations. We have:
w2 ≥ w1 ⇔ w2 − w1 = 2(1 + τ)− (2 + 3τ)ρ




w1 ≥ w3 ⇔ w1 − w3 = 2(1 + τ)− (2 + 3τ)ρ




w4 ≥ w2 ⇔ w4 − w2 = 2(1 + τ)− (2 + 3τ)ρ








. Therefore, when ρ ≤ 1
2
⇒ ρ < 2(1+τ)
2+3τ
, we have w3 < w1 < w2 < w4.
Not all combinations are always feasible depending on the wholesale price, w. For instance,
if the manufacturer sets the wholesale price, w, above w3, combinations 2 and 3 exhibit
negative stock, and cease to be feasible. Figure A.4 illustrates the feasibility of the four
combinations under NMR. (Recall that w3 and w2 are relabeled as wN and wN respectively.)
-r r r rw3 = wN w1 w2 = wN w4 w
All combinations
are feasible





Figure A.4: Feasibility of the four combinations of returns policies under NMR
First, consider δ1 = Π
2
1,0,0−Π20,0,0. Given the parameters of this case, when w ≤ w3, both
combinations 1 and 2 are feasible. We have:
Π20,0,0 =




12[5(1 + τ)(1− ρ)− 3
2
τρ− 4τ(1− ρ)w]2






{−8τ(17 + 8ρ)w2 + 8[5(1 + τ) + 2(10 + 13τ)ρ]w+
+
50(1 + τ)2 − 30(1 + τ)(5 + 7τ)ρ+ (10 + 13τ)2ρ2
τ(1− ρ) }. (A.89)
Let A1 be the term in the brackets on the RHS; δ1 has the same behavior as A1. Consider
A1, which is a concave quadratic function in w ∈ [0, w3]. We have:
A1|w=w3 =25(97− 98ρ)[2(1 + τ)− (2 + 3τ)ρ]
2




A1|w=0 =(10 + 13τ)
2ρ2 − 30(1 + τ)(5 + 7τ)ρ+ 50(1 + τ)2
τ(1− ρ) . (A.91)
Notice that A1|w=0 has the same sign as its numerator, which is a convex quadratic
function in ρ ∈ [0, 1
2








. It can be shown that 0 < ρ1 <
1
2
< ρ′1. Therefore, when 0 ≤
ρ ≤ ρ1, the numerator of A1|w=0 is non-negative, which implies A1|w=0 ≥ 0. Consequently,
when 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ1, we have A1 ≥ 0 ⇒ δ1 ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ [0, w3] (since A1|w=0 ≥ 0, A1|w=w3 > 0,
and A1 is a concave quadratic function of w). Otherwise, when ρ1 < ρ ≤ 12 , we have A1|w=0 <







and A1 < 0⇒ δ1 < 0 when 0 ≤ w < w˜1 and vice versa. Figure A.5 summarizes the behavior
of δ1.
Now, consider δ2 = Π
1
1,1,0 − Π10,1,0. From Table 2.3, we have:
Π10,1,0 =
6[5(1 + τ)(1− ρ) + 1
4
τρ− 11τ(1− ρ)w]2
1225τ(1− ρ)2 , and (A.92)
Π11,1,0 =
12[(1 + τ)(1− ρ)− 1
4
τρ− τ(1− ρ)w]2
49τ(1− ρ) . (A.93)
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-r0 rρ1 r12 ρ
δ1 > 0 ∀w ∈ [0, wN ] δ1 < 0 if 0 ≤ w < w˜1
δ1 ≥ 0 if w˜1 ≤ w ≤ wN





{−2τ(71 + 50ρ)w2 + 20(1 + τ) + (180 + 241τ)ρ− 50(4 + 5τ)ρ
2
1− ρ w−
− −400(1 + τ)
2 + 40(40 + 91τ + 52τ 2)ρ− (2000 + 4840τ + 2889τ 2)ρ2 + 50(4 + 5τ)2ρ3
8τ(1− ρ)2 }.
(A.94)
Denote the term in the bracket on the RHS by A2, we can see that δ2 behaves in the
same manner as A2, which is a concave quadratic function in w ∈ [0, w3]. We have:
A2|w=w3 =
900[2(1 + τ)− (2 + 3τ)ρ]2
121τ(1− ρ) > 0 (by inspection), and (A.95)
A2|w=0 = 400(1 + τ)
2 − 40(40 + 91τ + 52τ 2)ρ+ (2000 + 4840τ + 2889τ 2)ρ2 − 50(4 + 5τ)2ρ3
8τ(1− ρ)2 .
(A.96)
Denote the numerator of A2|w=0 by N2. Notice that A2|w=0 has the same sign as N2,
which is a cubic function in ρ with a negative third-order coefficient. Furthermore, it can
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be shown that (1) N2|ρ=0 = 400(1 + τ)2 > 0, (2) N2|ρ= 1
2
= −6τ(10 + 9τ) < 0, and (3)
∂N2
∂ρ
= −150(4 + 5τ)2ρ2 + 2(20 + 27τ)(100 + 107τ)ρ− 40(1 + τ)(40 + 51τ) < 0 ∀ρ ∈ [0, 1
2
].
This implies that N2 is strictly decreasing in ρ ∈ [0, 12 ] and has one solution ρ2 ∈ [0, 12 ], whose
specification is available upon request.
In summary, when 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ2, we have: A2|w=0 ≥ 0 and A2|w=w3 > 0 ⇒ A2 ≥
0 ∀w ∈ [0, w3] ⇒ δ2 ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ [0, w3]. On the other hand, when ρ2 < ρ ≤ 12 , we have
A2|w=0 < 0 and A2|w=w3 > 0. As a result, the concave quadratic function A2 has one solution






τ(1−ρ)(71+50ρ) . In this case,
if 0 ≤ w < w˜2, then A2 < 0 ⇒ δ2 < 0; otherwise, if w˜2 ≤ w ≤ w3, then A2 ≥ 0 ⇒ δ2 ≥ 0.
The behavior of δ2 is depicted in Figure A.6.
-r0 rρ2 r12 ρ
δ2 > 0 ∀w ∈ [0, wN ] δ2 < 0 if 0 ≤ w < w˜2
δ2 ≥ 0 if w˜2 ≤ w ≤ wN
Figure A.6: Behavior of δ2
Given the behavior of δ1 and δ2, we can determine the retailers’ consumer returns policies
under NMR. First, it can be shown that ρ1 < ρ2 and w˜2 < w˜1 when ρ ≤ 12 . Therefore, when
0 ≤ ρ < ρ1, we have δ1 > 0 and δ2 > 0 ∀w ∈ [0, w3]. This implies that the equilibrium of the
consumer returns subgame is {CR,CR} under NMR when ρ ∈ [0, ρ1).
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Next, when ρ1 ≤ ρ < ρ2, we have δ2 > 0 ∀w ∈ [0, w3] while δ1 ≤ 0 if 0 ≤ w ≤ w˜1 and
δ1 > 0 if w˜1 < w ≤ w3. Consequently, when ρ ∈ [ρ1, ρ2): (a) if 0 ≤ w ≤ w˜1, then both
{CR,CR} and {NCR,NCR} can arise in equilibrium , and (b) if w˜1 < w ≤ w3, {CR,CR} is
the only equilibrium.
Finally, when ρ2 ≤ ρ ≤ 12 , we have: (a) δ1 < 0 and δ2 < 0 if 0 ≤ w < w˜2, (b) δ1 ≤ 0
and δ2 ≥ 0 if w˜2 ≤ w ≤ w˜1, and (c) δ1 > 0 and δ2 > 0 if w˜1 < w ≤ w3. Therefore, when
ρ ∈ [ρ2, 12 ], the equilibrium consumer-returns policies are (i) {NCR,NCR} when 0 ≤ w < w˜2,
(ii) {NCR,NCR} and {CR,CR} when w˜2 ≤ w ≤ w˜1, and (iii) {CR,CR} when w˜1 < w ≤ w3.
In addition, recall that since combination 4 remains feasible even when w3 < w ≤ w2,
{CR,CR} is also the equilibrium of the consumer returns subgame up to w2. Figure 2.3
summarizes the retailers’ consumer-returns policies when the manufacturer does not accept
returns.
Under MR:
-r r r rw6 = wM w1 w5 = wM w7 w
All combinations
are feasible





Figure A.7: Feasibility of the four combinations of consumer returns under MR
Here, we determine the retailers’ consumer-returns policies by considering δ3 and δ4,
defined by (2.10) and (2.11). First, recall the regularity conditions of the four combinations
under MR, which are: (a) w ≤ w1 = 1+τ2τ in combination 5 (i.e., {MR,NCR,NCR}), (b) w ≤
min{w6, w7} where w6 = 14(1+τ)31τ and w7 = 14(1+τ)11τ in combination 6 (i.e., {MR,NCR,CR}),
and (c) w ≤ w5 = 1+ττ in combination 8 (i.e., {MR,CR,CR}). By inspection, we have
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w6 < w1 < w5 < w7. Feasibility of the four combinations under MR is shown in Figure A.7.
Again, recall that w6 and w5 are relabeled as wM and wM respectively.
When w ≤ w6, all combinations are feasible. First, consider δ3. Since
Π20,0,1 =














{−4τ 2(17 + 8ρ)w2 + 20τ(1 + τ)(1 + 4ρ)w + 25(1 + τ)2(1− 2ρ)}. (A.99)
Notice that (a) δ3 is a concave quadratic function in w ∈ [0, w6], (b) δ3|w=0 = 6(1+τ)2(1−2ρ)49τ ≥
0 when ρ ≤ 1
2
, and (c) δ3|w=w6 = 6(1+τ)
2(97−98ρ)
5929τ
> 0. This implies δ3 ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ [0, w6].
Next, consider δ4. We have:
Π10,1,1 =














{−τ 2(71 + 50ρ)w2 + 10τ(1 + τ)(1 + 10ρ)w + 25(1 + τ)2(1− 2ρ)}, (A.102)




> 0, we also have δ4 ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ [0, w6].
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In summary, we have δ3 ≥ 0 and δ4 ≥ 0. Therefore, the retailers will choose {CR,CR}
when the manufacturer chooses MR. (Note that as under NMR, {CR,CR} arises in equi-
librium under MR up to w5 = wM .) Figure 2.4 summarizes the retailers’ returns policies
when the manufacturer accepts returns from the retailers. The statement of Lemma 2.2 then
follows.
A.3.1.3 The manufacturer’s distribution policy (Case 2, stage 1)
The optimal wholesale price under NMR:
Denote the profit function of the manufacturer under NMR by piM0 . The wholesale price is
set to maximize piM0 . First, we derive the manufacturer’s profit function, pi
M
0 , which depends
on the retailers’ returns policies (see Figure 2.3). Specifically, there are three possible cases:
(1) If 0 ≤ ρ < ρ1, the retailers always choose to accept returns from consumers at all
relevant wholesale prices, i.e., w ∈ [c, wN ]. Thus, piM0 = piM1,1,0 = 87 [1 + τ − (1 + 5τ4 )ρ− τ(1−
ρ)w](w − c) (given the parameters of this case: v = 1
2
, k = 0, and η = 1
4
; see Table 2.3).
(2) If ρ1 ≤ ρ < ρ2: (a) if 0 ≤ w ≤ w˜1, the retailers choose either {NCR,NCR} or
{CR,CR}, and (b) if w˜1 < w ≤ wN , they choose {CR,CR}. Consequently, if c > w˜1, the
manufacturer’s profit function is piM0 = pi
M
1,1,0 ∀w ∈ [c, wN ]. Otherwise, if 0 ≤ c ≤ w˜1, then
the manufacturer earns (i) piM1,1,0 if w ∈ (w˜1, wN ], and (ii) either piM0,0,0 or piM1,1,0 if w ∈ [c, w˜1].
In this case, we consider the best scenario for the manufacturer. Since it can be shown that
piM0,0,0 > pi
M
1,1,0 when w ∈ [0, w˜1]50, the best scenario for the manufacturer will be the case
when the retailers choose {NCR,NCR}, i.e., piM0 = piM0,0,0. In summary, the manufacturer’s











[1 + τ − (1 + 5τ
4
)ρ− τ(1− ρ)w](w − c) if w˜1 < w ≤ wN .
(A.103)
50The proof is available upon request.
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(Analogous to piM1,1,0, the expression of pi
M
0,0,0 is obtained from Table 2 given the parameters
of this case.)
(3) If ρ2 ≤ ρ ≤ 12 , the retailers’ choice of consumer returns is (a) {NCR,NCR} if 0 ≤ w <
w˜2, (b) either {NCR,NCR} or {CR,CR} if w˜2 ≤ w ≤ w˜1, and (c) {CR,CR} if w˜2 < w ≤ wN .
As in the previous case, we consider the best scenario for the manufacturer when both
{NCR,NCR} and {CR,CR} can arise. Here, we obtain an analogous structure for the
manufacturer’s profit function, i.e. (a) if w˜1 < c ≤ wN , then piM0 = piM1,1,0 ∀w ∈ [c, wN ], and




0,0,0 if c ≤ w ≤ w˜1
piM1,1,0 if w˜1 < w ≤ wN .
(A.104)
Having the manufacturer’s profit function, we can determine the optimal wholesale price
by solving the respective optimization problems.






[1 + τ − (1 + 5τ
4
)ρ− τ(1− ρ)w](w − c). (A.105)








[1 + τ − (1 + 5τ
4
)ρ− τ(1− ρ)w](w − c), (A.106)
we obtain the optimal wholesale price:
w∗0 =
4(1 + τ)− (4 + 5τ)ρ+ 4τ(1− ρ)c
8τ(1− ρ) . (A.107)
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At this wholesale price, M earns:
piM∗0 =
[4(1 + τ)− (4 + 5τ)ρ− 4τ(1− ρ)c]2
56τ(1− ρ) . (A.108)
Notice that when c ≤ wN , we always have c ≤ w∗0 ≤ wN , i.e. w∗0 is in the relevant range of
w.
Figure A.8: Manufacturer’s profit when ρ1 < ρ ≤ 12 and 0 ≤ c ≤ w˜1.
In the second case (i.e., ρ1 ≤ ρ < ρ2), we have two possibilities: (a) If c > w˜1, then the
manufacturer’s profit function is the same as in the first case, i.e., piM0 = pi
M
1,1,0. Therefore,
M will set the wholesale price at w∗0 to earn pi
M∗
0 . (b) If 0 ≤ c ≤ w˜1, the manufacturer’s











[1 + τ − (1 + 5τ
4
)ρ− τ(1− ρ)w](w − c) if w˜1 < w ≤ wN .
(A.109)
Notice that (i) both piM0,0,0 and pi
M
1,1,0 are concave quadratic functions in w, (ii) pi
M
0,0,0 obtains
maximum at wˆ∗0 =
1+τ+2τc
4τ
, (iii) piM1,1,0 is maximized at w = w
∗
0, and (iv) it can be shown that
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wˆ∗0 > w˜1 and w
∗
0 > w˜1 in this case. This implies that pi
M
0 behaves in the manner depicted in
Figure A.8.
Consequently, to determine the optimal wholesale price, the manufacturer compares piM∗0
to piM0,0,0|w=w˜1 . It can be shown that piM∗0 > piM0,0,0|w=w˜1 ∀ρ ∈ [ρ1, ρ2) and c ∈ [0, w˜1].
Therefore, the manufacturer will set the wholesale price at w∗0 to obtain the optimal profit,
piM∗0 , in this case.
In the third case, we have ρ2 ≤ ρ ≤ 12 . The manufacturer’s profit function exhibits the
same structure as in the previous case, i.e., (a) if w˜1 < c ≤ wN , then piM0 = piM1,1,0 ∀w ∈




0,0,0 if c ≤ w ≤ w˜1
piM1,1,0 if w˜1 < w ≤ wN .
(A.110)
Therefore, if w˜1 < c ≤ wN , the manufacturer sets the wholesale price at w∗0 to obtain
profit equal to piM∗0 (see equations A.107 and A.108).
Otherwise, if 0 ≤ c ≤ w˜1, the manufacturer’s choice of wholesale price is determined by
comparing piM∗0 to pi
M
0,0,0|w=w˜151. Consider δM = piM∗0 −piM0,0,0|w=w˜1 , which is a convex quadratic
function in c with two solutions c1 and c
′
1 (c1 > c
′
1)
52. Furthermore, it can be shown that (1)







= τ1, then c1 < 0 ∀ρ ∈ [ρ2, 12 ],
and (b) if τ ≥ τ1, then ∃ ρˆ ∈ [ρ2, 12 ] such that when ρ2 ≤ ρ < ρˆ, we have c1 < 0 and otherwise,
when ρˆ ≤ ρ ≤ 1
2
, we have c1 ≥ 0.
This implies: (1) if τ < τ1, then c
′
1 < c1 < 0 ∀ρ ∈ [ρ2, 12 ]; therefore, δM > 0 ∀c ∈
[0, w˜1], i.e., the manufacturer chooses w
∗
0 and earns profit equal pi
M∗
0 . (2) If τ ≥ τ1, then (a)
when ρ ∈ [ρ2, ρˆ), we have c′1 < c1 < 0, which implies, again, δM > 0 ∀c ∈ [0, w˜1] and the
optimal wholesale price is w∗0, and (b) when ρ ∈ [ρˆ, 12 ], we have 0 ≤ c1; in this case, (i) if
51Again, it can be shown that wˆ∗0 > w˜1 and w
∗
0 > w˜1 in this case.
52The detailed analysis, along with specifications of δM , c1, and c′1, is available upon request.
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0 ≤ c < c1, then δM < 0 and (ii) if c1 ≤ c ≤ w˜1, then δM ≥ 0. Therefore, the manufacturer’s
optimal wholesale price is w˜1 if 0 ≤ c < c1 and w∗0 if c1 ≤ c ≤ w˜1. See Figure 2.5 for a
summary of the manufacturer’s choice of wholesale price under NMR.
The optimal wholesale price under MR:





(1 + τ −







(1 + τ − τw)[(1− ρ)w − c]. (A.111)






2(1− ρ) . (A.112)
At this wholesale price, the manufacturer earns profit equal to:
piM∗1 =
2[(1 + τ)(1− ρ)− τc]2
7τ(1− ρ) . (A.113)
To ensure w∗1 being in the relevant range of w (i.e., c ≤ w∗1 ≤ wM), we need:
w∗1 ≤ wM ⇔ c ≤
(1 + τ)(1− ρ)
τ
def
= c2, and (A.114)
c ≤ w∗1 ⇔ c ≤




Notice that c2 ≤ wM ≤ c3. This means (1) if 0 ≤ c < c2, which implies c < w∗1 < wM ,
then the manufacturer sets the wholesale price at w∗1 and earns profits equal pi
M∗
1 , and (2) if
c2 ≤ c ≤ wM , which implies w∗1 ≥ wM , then the best M can do is to set the wholesale price
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at wM . In this case, the manufacturer earns zero profits: pi
M
1,1,1|w=wM = 0. (Note that when
w = wM , the retailers order zero stock.) In other words, the manufacturer is out of business
when c ≥ c2. In summary, under MR, the manufacturer sets its wholesale price at w∗1 and
earns piM∗1 if 0 ≤ c < c2. (See Figure 2.5.)
The manufacturer’s returns policy:
Knowing the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale prices and profits under NMR and MR,
we investigate her returns policy by comparing the profits under the two regimes. First,
consider the case when τ < τ1. In this case, the manufacturer earns pi
M∗
0 for all c ∈ [0, wN ]
under NMR; in contrast, under MR, she earns piM∗1 if 0 ≤ c < c2 and zero profit if c ≥ c2.
Notice that c2 < wN . There are two possibilities
53: (1) 0 ≤ c < c2, and (2) c2 ≤ c ≤ wN .
(1) When 0 ≤ c < c2, the manufacturer decides whether to accept returns from the
retailers by comparing piM∗0 to pi
M∗
1 . We have:
piM∗1 − piM∗0 =
(1− 4c)[8(1− ρ) + τ(8− 9ρ)− 4τ(2− ρ)c]ρ
56(1− ρ) (A.116)
Since the second term of the numerator can be shown to be positive when c < c2, we have: (a)
if 0 ≤ c < 1
4
, then piM∗1 > pi
M∗
0 , i.e., the manufacturer will choose MR, and (b) if
1
4
≤ c < c2,
then piM∗1 ≤ piM∗0 , i.e. the manufacturer will choose NMR. (Note that c2 > 14 .)
(2) When c2 ≤ c ≤ wN , the manufacturer gets zero profit under MR while she earns
piM∗0 ≥ 0 under NMR. Therefore, she will not accept returns from the retailers.
In summary, when τ < τ1, the manufacturer chooses MR and sets the wholesale price at
w∗1 if 0 ≤ c < 14 . Otherwise, if 14 ≤ c ≤ wN , she chooses NMR and sets the wholesale price
at w∗0. In both cases, the retailers always choose to offer consumer returns.
Next, we consider the case when τ ≥ τ1. If 0 ≤ ρ < ρˆ, the manufacturer’s profits are the
same as when τ < τ1. Therefore, the previous results hold if 0 ≤ ρ < ρˆ.
53If c > wN , the manufacturer is out of business under both NMR and MR.
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In contrast, if ρˆ ≤ ρ ≤ 1
2
, then under NMR, the manufacturer earns piM0,0,0|w=w˜1 when
0 ≤ c < c1 and piM∗0 when c1 ≤ c ≤ wN . Meanwhile, under MR, M gets piM∗1 if 0 ≤ c < c2
and zero profit if c ≥ c2. Since it can be shown that c1 < c254, we have three possibilities:
(a) 0 ≤ c < c1, (b) c1 ≤ c < c2, and (c) c2 ≤ c ≤ wN .
(a) When 0 ≤ c < c1, the manufacturer earns piM0,0,0|w=w˜1 under NMR and piM∗1 under
MR. Since it can be shown that piM∗1 > pi
M
0,0,0|w=w˜1 ∀ c ∈ [0, c1), the manufacturer will choose
to offer MR and earns the optimal profit, piM∗1 , by setting the wholesale price at w
∗
1.
(b) When c1 ≤ c < c2, if choosing NMR, the manufacturer’s profit is piM∗0 . On the other
hand, M earns piM∗1 when offering MR. From the previous analysis, we have (i) if c1 ≤ c < 14 ,
the manufacturer is better off by choosing MR and setting the wholesale price at w∗1, and
(ii) if 1
4
≤ c < c2, M will choose NMR and set the wholesale price at w∗0 to earn piM∗0 .
(c) When c2 ≤ c ≤ wN , we have the same results as under τ < τ1, i.e. the manufacturer’s
profit is zero under MR and piM∗0 under NMR. This implies that NMR is chosen and the
manufacturer earns profit equal piM∗0 at the wholesale price of w
∗
0.
Figure 2.6 summarizes the game’s equilibrium.
Verifying that option B is optimal when {NMR,CR,CR} arises in the equilibrium:
Consider the general linear demand functions: qˆi = α − βpi + γpj (i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j)








54In addition, it can also be shown that c1 < 14 .
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Here, the retailers incur the cost of unsold inventory because no returns are accepted by the
manufacturer. Hence, their profits are equal to:
Πi,A1,1,0 = (1− ρ)sipi − siw, (A.118)
where i = 1, 2 and pi is defined by (A.117).
In contrast, if the retailers choose option B, their prices will be set as follows:








and their profit functions are given by:
Πi,B1,1,0 = si(pi − w)−
ρsi
1− ρη, (A.120)
where i = 1, 2 and pi is defined by (A.119).
If {NMR,CR,CR} arises in equilibrium, then by symmetry, each retailer orders the same
level of stock; i.e., s1 = s2
def
= s. Then, option B is better than option A whenever:
Πi,B1,1,0 − Πi,B1,1,0 ≥ 0
⇔ sρ[α(1− ρ)− (β − γ)η − (2− ρ)s]
(β − γ)(1− ρ) ≥ 0
⇔ α(1− ρ)− (β − γ)η − (2− ρ)s ≥ 0. (A.121)
To ensure that the retailers will choose option B when {NMR,CR,CR} arises in equi-
librium, we need to show that the levels of stock satisfy condition (A.121). From the pre-




8τ(1−ρ) . At this wholesale price, the levels of stock ordered by the retail-
ers are:
s = s11,1,0 = s
2
1,1,0 =




4(1 + τ − τc)(1− ρ)− ρτ
14
(A.123)
(Recall that η = 1
4
and µ = 0.) Substituting this stock level and the parameters of the
demand function under {CR,CR} from Table 2.1 into (A.121), we have:
(A.121) ⇔ 2[(4c− 5)τ − 4]ρ
2 − 4(1 + 6τc)ρ+ 12 + (5 + 16c)τ
28
≥ 0 (A.124)
Denote the expression in the numerator by A3. We have: (1) A3 is a concave quadratic
function in ρ ∈ [0, 1
2
] since c ≤ wN = 1+ττ − ρ4(1−ρ) ⇒ (4c − 5)τ − 4 ≤ − τ1−ρ < 0, (2)
A3|ρ=0 = 12+(5+16c)τ28 > 0, and (3) A3|ρ= 12 =
16+(5+12c)τ
56
> 0. This implies A3 > 0 ∀ρ ∈ [0, 12 ],
i.e., condition (A.121) is satisfied when {NMR,CR,CR} arises in equilibrium. The statement
of Proposition 2.2 follows. 
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Here, we derive the solution of Case 1 (i.e., when η = 0), which is a special instance of Case
2. When the cost of stock-outs is negligible, based on the results from Tables 2.3 and 2.4,
we obtain the differences in the retailers’ profits (see equations 2.8-2.11) as follows:
δ1 = −24τ(17 + 8ρ)
1225
w2 +
24(1 + τ)(1 + 4ρ)
245
w +
6(1− 2ρ)(1 + τ)2
49τ
, (A.125)
δ2 = −6τ(71 + 50ρ)
1225
w2 +
12(1 + τ)(1 + 10ρ)
245
w +
6(1− 2ρ)(1 + τ)2
49τ
, (A.126)
δ3 = −24τ(17 + 8ρ)
1225
w2 +
24(1 + τ)(1 + 4ρ)
245
w +




δ4 = −6τ(71 + 50ρ)
1225
w2 +
12(1 + τ)(1 + 10ρ)
245
w +
6(1− 2ρ)(1 + τ)2
49τ
. (A.128)
To determine the retailers’ choice of consumer-returns policy under NMR, we consider
δ1 and δ2. Notice that δ1 and δ2 are concave quadratic functions in w. Recall that under
NMR, the range of the wholesale price is [c,min{w1, w2, w3, w4}] (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4).
Since δ1|w=0 = 6(1−2ρ)(1+τ)249τ ≥ 0 (when ρ ≤ 12) and δ1|w=w1 = 108(1−ρ)(1+τ)
2
1225τ
> 0, we have
δ1 ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ [0, w1], which implies δ1 ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ [c,min{w1, w2, w3, w4}]. Analogously,
we have δ2|w=0 = 6(1−2ρ)(1+τ)249τ ≥ 0 and δ2|w=w3 = 432(1−ρ)(1+τ)
2
5929τ
> 0, which implies δ2 ≥
0 ∀w ∈ [c,min{w1, w2, w3, w4}]. As a result, under NMR, the retailers will choose to accept
consumer returns at all relevant wholesale prices.
Under MR, too, the retailers will accept returns at all relevant wholesale prices. (Notice
that δ3 = δ1 and δ4 = δ2.)
In the first stage, the manufacturer makes the decision on its distribution policy, including
the returns policy and the wholesale price. Knowing that the retailers will always accept
returns from consumers, the manufacturer compares profits under NMR and MR, which
equal to piM1,1,0 and pi
M
1,1,1 respectively, when making the decision whether to accept returns.
Since piM1,1,0−piM1,1,1 = 8ρ(1+τ−τw)c7 ≥ 0 when w ≤ 1+ττ = w2, M is better off by choosing NMR.
The statement of Proposition 2.1 follows. 
A.3.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3:
In this setting, η is so high that the retailers avoid stock-outs by pricing according to option
A when accepting consumer returns under NMR. Specifically, under combinations 2 (i.e.,
{NMR,NCR,CR}), 3 (i.e., {NMR,CR,NCR}), and 4 (i.e., {NMR,CR,CR}), they price to
clear stock according to the initial-demand function in stage four (instead of the net-demand
function as in the case of low stock-out cost). Then, in the third stage, they aim at maximiz-
ing profits by choosing the optimal levels of stock. Note that under option A, the retailers
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do not incur stock-out cost but instead bear the cost of unsold inventory due to consumer
returns. Under the remaining combinations, the retailers’ pricing strategies are identical
to those in Case 2. Consequently, the results under the remaining combinations, including
combination 1 (i.e., {NMR,NCR,NCR}), combination 5 (i.e., {MR,NCR,NCR}), combina-
tion 6 (i.e., {MR,NCR,CR}), combination 7 (i.e., {MR,CR,NCR}), and combination 8 (i.e.,
{MR,CR,CR}), remain identical to those of Case 2.
A.3.3.1 The retailers’ pricing and stocking strategies (Case 3, stages 4 and 3)
As noted above, the retailers set prices in stage four according to option A under three
combinations 2, 3 and 4 when stock-out cost is high. Note that by symmetry, the results of
combination 3 are similar to those of combination 2.
Combination 4: {NMR,CR,CR}
In stage four, the retailers set the retail prices as follow:

















Then, they choose the optimal levels of stock by solving the following optimization problems:
max
s1






= s1[(1− ρ)p1 − w] (by (A.129)), and (A.130)
max
s2






= s2[(1− ρ)p2 − w]. (A.131)
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Solving the first-order conditions simultaneously, we obtain the optimal stock levels:
sˆi1,1,0 =
4[(1 + τ − 2µ)(1− ρ)− τw]
7(1− ρ) (A.132)
The optimal prices, pˆi1,1,0, profits of the retailers, Πˆ
i
1,1,0, and that of the manufacturer, pˆi
M
1,1,0,






Here, only retailer R2 accepts consumer returns. Therefore, in stage four, R2 sets the






p2 + τp1. On the other hand, R1 chooses the retail price to clear stock according to
the demand function, q1 = 1− τ2 + 3τv + µ− 3τp1 + τ2p2. This means s1 = 1−
τ
2
+ 3τv + µ− 3τp1 + τ2p2
s2 = 1 +
3τ
2
















Π1 = s1(p1 − w), and (A.134)
max
s2
Π2 = s2(1− ρ)p2 − s2w. (A.135)
The solution to this problem is provided in Table 2.5 along with the conditions of regu-
larity.
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A.3.3.2 The retailers’ returns policies (Case 3, stage 2)
The retailers’ pricing and stocking decisions as well as their profits under MR are identical
to those in the setting where η is low. Therefore, the optimal consumer returns policies




1,0,0 − Π20,0,0, (A.136)
δˆ2 = Πˆ
1
1,1,0 − Πˆ10,1,0, (A.137)
Again, recall that our focus is on the case of risk-neutral consumers (i.e., v = 1
2
), and
zero transaction cost for returning the product (i.e., µ = 0). The other relevant parameters
are: τ ∈ (0,+∞) and ρ ∈ [0, 1
2
]. Here, the regularity conditions under NMR require (a)




, under combination 2, and (c) w ≤ wˆ2 = (1+τ)(1−ρ)τ under combination 4.
Again, it can be shown that wˆ3 ≤ w1 ≤ wˆ2 ≤ wˆ4 when ρ ≤ 12 . See Figure A.4 for feasibility
of the four combinations under NMR, which shows that all four combinations are feasible
only when w ≤ wˆ3. (Note that to distinguish the analysis of Cases 2 and 3, we use the
notation wˆ2, wˆ3, and wˆ4 in place of w2, w3, and w4 respectively.)
First, consider δˆ1. We have
δˆ1 = −24(17 + ρ)(1− 2ρ)τ
1225(1− ρ) w
2 +
24(1− 2ρ)(1 + τ)
245
w +
6(1− 2ρ)(1 + τ)2
49τ
, (A.138)
which is a concave quadratic function in w ∈ [0, wˆ3]. It can be shown that (i) δˆ1|w=0 =
6(1−2ρ)(1+τ)2
49τ
≥ 0 and (ii) δˆ1|w=wˆ3 = 6(97−98ρ)(1−2ρ)
2(1+τ)2
49(11−12ρ)2τ ≥ 0. Therefore, δˆ1 ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ [0, wˆ3].
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Next, consider δˆ2. Similarly, we have: (i) δˆ2 is a concave quadratic function in w as
δˆ2 = −6(1− 2ρ)(71− 72ρ)τ
1225(1− ρ)2 w
2 +
12(1− 2ρ)(1 + τ)
245(1− ρ) w +
6(1− 2ρ)(1 + τ)2
49τ
, (A.139)
(ii) δˆ2|w=0 = 6(1−2ρ)(1+τ)249τ ≥ 0, and (iii) δˆ2|w=wˆ3 = 432(1−ρ)(1−2ρ)
2(1+τ)2
49(11−12ρ)2τ ≥ 0. This implies that
δˆ2 ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ [0, wˆ3].
Since δˆ1 ≥ 0 and δˆ2 ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ [0, wˆ3], the retailers always choose to accept consumer
returns under NMR. In summary, the retailers accept consumer returns when stock-out cost
is high, no matter of the returns policy of the manufacturer.
A.3.3.3 The manufacturer’s distribution policy (Case 3, stage 1)
If the manufacturer does not accept returns from the retailers, its profit function is defined










to earn pˆiM∗0 =
2[(1−ρ)(1+τ)−τc]2
7(1−ρ)τ . Notice that wˆ
∗
0 ∈ [c, wˆ2] as long as the
cost of production satisfies c ≤ wˆ2.
In contrast, if the manufacturer chooses MR, then the profit function is given by pˆiM1 =
piM1,1,1 (see (A.111)). As shown in (A.111), here, the optimal wholesale price is w
∗
1 (see
equation A.112). At this wholesale price, M ’s profit is equal to piM∗1 (see equation A.113 for
the expression of piM∗1 ).
Comparing pˆiM∗0 with pi
M∗
1 , it follows that the manufacturer is indifferent between accept-
ing and not accepting returns from the retailers when stock-out cost is high. The statement
of Proposition 2.3 follows. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.1
B.1 Equilibrium prices and profits under the GB strategy
B.1.1 Option A
The retailer solves the constrained optimization problem, defined by (3.15) and (3.16), i.e.,
max
pP , ph
ΠG = φ (1 + v0 − pP ) pP + (1− φ)(1− ph − κL) ph (B.1)
s.t. pP ≥ ph + κL. (B.2)
The Lagrangian function associated with this problem is given by:
L = ΠG + λ (pP − ph − κL), (B.3)
which has the following first-order conditions:
LpP = φ (1 + v0 − 2pP ) + λ = 0, (B.4)
Lph = (1− φ)(1− 2ph − κL)− λ = 0, (B.5)
Lλ = p
P − ph − κL ≥ 0, and (B.6)
λLλ = 0. (B.7)











Note that the constraint is non-binding in this case; this requires:
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pP
∗∗ − p∗∗h − κL ≥ 0 ⇔
1
2
(vo − κL) ≥ 0 ⇔ κL ≤ v0. (B.10)
If λ > 0, then the constraint is binding. We solve the following system:





to obtain the corner solution to the problem:
p̂P =




1 + φ v0 − (1 + φ)κL
2
, and (B.13)
λ̂ = φ (1− φ)(κL − v0). (B.14)
This case arises when λ̂ > 0 ⇔ κL > v0.
B.1.2 Option B
When choosing Option B, the retailer solves the problem defined by (3.21) and (3.22):
max
pP , pl
ΠG = φ (1 + v0 − pP ) pP + (1− φ)(1− pl − κL) pl (B.15)
s.t. pP > pl + κL. (B.16)
The Lagrangian function and the first-order conditions are as follows:
L = ΠG + λ (pP − pl − κL), (B.17)
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LpP = φ (1 + v0 − 2pP ) + λ = 0, (B.18)
Lpl = (1− φ)(1− 2pl − κL)− λ = 0, (B.19)
Lλ = p
P − pl − κL > 0, and (B.20)
λLλ = 0. (B.21)












Finally, (B.20) requires pP
∗∗ − p∗∗l − κL > 0 ⇔ κL < v0.
B.1.3 Option C
Here, we solve the optimization problem defined by (3.26) and (3.27):
max
pP , pl
ΠG = φ (1 + v0 − pP ) pP + (1− φ)(1− pl − κL) pl (B.24)
s.t. pP ≥ pl + κL. (B.25)
Notice that this problem would be identical to the optimization problem in Option A upon
replacing ph for pl; therefore, the solution (see (3.28) and (3.29)) could be derived analogously.
160
B.2 The retailer’s pricing strategy in equilibrium
Here, we compare the profitability of the PP to that of the GB strategy (see Lemma 3.1).




upon the employment of the GB strategy. We have:
ΠG
∗∗ − ΠP∗ = 1
4
(1− φ)[κL2 − 2κL + φ v20] ≥ 0 ⇔ κL ≤ 1−
√
1− φ v20 def= κ∗. (B.26)
(It can be seen that κ∗ ∈ [0, v0]∀ v0 ∈ [0, 1].) Therefore, the retailer will choose the GB
strategy if κL ≤ κ∗, and vice versa.
Next, if κL > v0, then the profitability of the GB strategy is Π̂






∗ − Π̂G = 1
4
κL (1− φ)[2(1− φ v0)− (1− φ)κL]. (B.27)
Recall that the group-buying price in this setting is p̂GB = 1+φ v0−(1+φ)κL
2
; at this price,
demand via group-buying is non-negative if:
DG,L = (1− φ)(1− p̂GB − κL) ≥ 0 ⇒ (1− φ)κL ≤ 1− φ v0, (B.28)
which implies ΠP
∗ − Π̂G ≥ 0. Therefore, the retailer always chooses the PP strategy when
κL > v0. The statement of Proposition 3.1 follows. 
161
APPENDIX C: PROOFS OF RESULTS IN CHAPTER 4
162
C.1 Derivation of the effective group-buying price
Upon the employment of the G contract, the retailer offers to consumers the following pricing
schedule: 
pP targets at H consumers ,
pGB =
{
p2 if q < q¯,
p1 if q ≥ q¯
targets at L consumers .
(C.1)
Regarding the group-buying schedule, either p1 or p2 could realize, i.e., becomes effective.
To implement its targeting strategy, the retailer must set the prices to ensure the following
incentive compatibility constraints for consumers:
(1) H consumers always purchase the product using the traditional posted-pricing mech-
anism, paying pP , when:
pP ≤ p2 + κH if q < q¯, and (C.2)
pP ≤ p1 + κH if q ≥ q¯. (C.3)
(2) For L consumers to join the group-buying mechanism, we need:
p2 + κL ≤ pP if q < q¯, and (C.4)
p1 + κL ≤ pP if q ≥ q¯. (C.5)
Given these constraints being satisfied, the demand functions upon the employment of
the G contract are given by:
DH,G(pP ; .) = η α− β pP , and (C.6)
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DL,G(pGB; .) = (1− η)α− γ(pGB + κL). (C.7)
Upon the employment of the G contract, i.e., {G,wG, FG}, the cost of retailing includes
the wholesale price, wG, and the fixed fee, FG; therefore, the retailer’s optimization problem
is as follows:
max
pP , p2, p1, q¯
ΠG(.) = DH,G(pP ; .)(pP − wG) +DL,G(pGB; .)(pGB − wG)− FG
=

(η α− β pP )(pP − wG) + [(1− η)α− γ(p2 + κL)](p2 − wG)− FG if q < q¯,
(η α− β pP )(pP − wG) + [(1− η)α− γ(p1 + κL)](p1 − wG)− FG if q ≥ q¯.
(C.8)
Investigating the behavior of ΠG, we notice that: (1) either p2 or p1 enters this profit
function, (2) q¯ affects the realization of pGB, i.e., whether p1 or p2 arises as the effective
group-buying price. In other words, assuming that consumers’ utility is non-stochastic and
their behavior is rational, the retailer can determine which price (i.e., p1 or p2) will become
the effective group-buying price (at least, on average) by setting q¯ at the appropriate level.
Abstracting away from the stochastic aspect of the group-buying mechanism, R has two
options to set the optimal group-buying prices: (a) R can choose p1 as the effective group-
buying price and sets it at the optimal level, p∗1, to maximize its profit, Π
G, given the two
incentive compatibility constraints defined by (C.3) and (C.5) being satisfied, and (b) R
chooses p2 to be the effective price, which is set at the optimal level, p
∗
2, taking (C.2) and
(C.4) into consideration. The other parameters of the group-buying schedule (i.e., {p2, q¯} in
the former option and {p1, q¯} in the latter) are set to support the realization of the chosen
effective price in each of the two options. Specifically, in the first option, p2 > p
∗
1 and
q¯ ≤ DL,G(p∗1; .), and in the second option, pP + κH ≤ p1 < p∗2 and q¯ > DL,G(p1; .).
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Notice that in equilibrium, the optimal effective group-buying prices, p∗1 and p
∗
2, are identi-
cal (i.e., p∗1 = p
∗
2), and so are the profits of the retailer in the two options: Π
G(pP , p∗1, w
G, FG; .) =
ΠG(pP , p∗2, w
G, FG; .). Therefore, the retailer is indifferent between the two options. Conse-
quently, in the analysis of this paper, we simplify the treatment of the group-buying pric-
ing with multiple price tiers to be one of a single effective price, pGB; the non-effective
group-buying price(s) and the cut-off level(s) of quantity are assumed to be set suitably as
mentioned above.
In summary, upon the employment of the G contract, i.e., when both a posted price, pP ,
and a group-buying pricing schedule, pGB, are offered to target at consumers in the high and
low segments respectively, the retailer’s optimization problem can be simplified to:
max
pP , pGB
ΠG(.) = DH,G(pP ; .)(pP − wG) +DL,G(pGB; .)(pGB − wG)− FG
= (η α− β pP )(pP − wG) + [(1− η)α− γ(pGB + κL)](pGB − wG)− FG (C.9)
s.t.
 p
P ≤ pGB + κH,
pGB + κL ≤ pP .
(C.10)
C.2 The solution of the retailer’s optimization problem
upon the employment of the G contract
Consider the retailer’s optimization problem when employing of the G contract, {G,wG, FG}:
max
pP , pGB
ΠG(.) = DH,G(pP ; .)(pP − wG) +DL,G(pGB; .)(pGB − wG)− FG
= (η α− β pP )(pP − wG) + [(1− η)α− γ(pGB + κL)](pGB − wG)− FG (C.11)
s.t.
 p
GB + κH − pP ≥ 0, (ICH )
pP − pGB − κL ≥ 0. (ICL)
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This constrained optimization problem has the following Lagrangian function:
L = ΠG(.) + λH(p
GB − pP + κH) + λL(pP − pGB − κL), (C.12)
and the first-order conditions are:
LpP = ηi α− 2βi pP + βiwGB − λH + λL = 0, (C.13)
LpGB = (1− ηi)α− 2γi pGB − γi κL + γiwGB + λH − λL = 0, (C.14)
LλH = p
GB − pP + κH ≥ 0, (C.15)
LλL = p
P − pGB − κL ≥ 0, (C.16)
λH (p
GB − pP + κH) = 0, (C.17)
λL (p
P − pGB − κL) = 0, (C.18)
λH ≥ 0, (C.19)
λL ≥ 0. (C.20)
To solve this constrained optimization problem, we consider three cases: (a) λH = λL = 0,
(b) λH = 0 and λL > 0, and (c) λH > 0 and λL = 0. (Notice that the case of λH > 0 and
λL > 0 does not arise since κH > κL.)






















GB∗ − pP∗ + κH ≥ 0
pP














κL ≤ η αβ − (1−η)αγ .
(C.23)
Next, if λH = 0 and λL > 0, which implies that (ICL) is binding, we solve the following
system:


































β γ κL + α[(1− η)β − η γ]
β + γ
. (C.27)
This means that the ICL-binding case arises when





Finally, if λH > 0 and λL = 0, i.e., (ICH ) is binding, the first-order conditions become:



































β γ (κL − 2κH)− α[(1− η)β − η γ]
β + γ
. (C.32)
The binding-ICH case arises when:















ΠG(.) = DH,G(pP ; .)(pP − wG) +DL,G(pGB; .)(pGB − wG)− FG (C.34)



































In this paper, we focus on the first setting, when κH and κL satisfy (C.35).
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C.3 The optimal full-information contracts in the η-case
(Proofs of Lemmas 4.1-4.3 and Propositions 4.1)
C.3.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1:
Notice that the manufacturer needs to ensure the retailer just minimal incentive for partic-
ipation; therefore, it will set the fixed fee, FG, so that ΠG∗ = 0. Therefore, the constrained




piG(·) = {(η α− β p˚P ) + [(1− η)α− γ(p˚GB + κL)]}wG + FG (C.38)
s.t.

{p˚P , p˚GB} = argmax
pP , pGB


















= (1− η)α− γ(2p˚GB − wG + κL) = 0
ΠG∗ = ΠG(p˚P , p˚GB, wG, FG; ·) = 0,
(C.41)
which has the following Lagrangian function:











Solving the first-order conditions of this Lagrangian function:
LwG =
[
α− β p˚P − γ(p˚GB + κL)](1− δ) + γ λ+ β µ = 0, (C.43)
LFG = 1− δ = 0, (C.44)
Lp˚P = −
[




(1− η)α− γ(2p˚GB − wG + κL)]δ − γ(2µ+ wG) = 0, (C.46)
Lλ = η α− β(2p˚P − wG) = 0, (C.47)
Lµ = (1− η)α− γ(2p˚GB − wG + κL) = 0, (C.48)
Lδ = (η α− β p˚P ) +
[
(1− η)α− γ(p˚GB − wG)]− FG = 0, (C.49)
we obtain the results given in Lemma 4.1. Here, the G contract, by nature, requires both
the high and low segments to be served, i.e., DH,G(pP ∗; ·) ≥ 0 and DL,G(pGB∗; ·) ≥ 0. Notice
that DH,G(pP ∗; ·) = η α
2
> 0 and
DL,G(pGB∗; ·) = (1− η)α− γ κ
L
2
≥ 0 ⇔ (1− η)α− γ κL ≥ 0. (C.50)
The statement of Lemma 4.1 then follows. 
C.3.2 Proof of Lemma 4.2:
Consider the P contract, {P,wP , F P}, under which consumers in both segments are served.
This contract solves the constrained optimization problem, defined by (4.18)-(4.19). As
under the G contract, here, too, the constraint regarding the retailer’s profit is binding, i.e.,
ΠP ∗ = 0. Consequently, this constrained optimization problem is rewritten as:
max
wP , FP , p˚









= α− (β + γ)(2p˚− wP ) = 0,
ΠP ∗ = ΠP (p˚, wP , F P ; ·) = 0.
(C.52)
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Solving the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian function associated with this problem,
i.e.,





+ µΠP ∗, (C.53)
we obtain the optimal full-information P contract as characterized by Lemma 4.2.
Here, to ensure both segments being served upon the employment of this contract, we
need:
DH,P (p∗; ·) ≥ 0 ⇔ 2(β + γ)η − β ≥ 0, and (C.54)
DL,P (p∗ : ·) ≥ 0 ⇔ 2β + γ − 2(β + γ)η ≥ 0. (C.55)
Note that these are just the necessary conditions for the two segments being served under
the P contract. Since the retailer may choose to serve only one of the two segments under
some conditions, we derive the sufficient conditions for both segments being served.
First, consider the case when only the high segment is served. Denote the full-information
P contract under which only consumers in the high segment are served by {PH, wPH, F PH} and
the profit functions of the manufacturer and the retailer by piPH(·) and ΠPH(·), respectively.









H , p˚H; η, β) = D









H ; η, β) = D
H,P (p; ·)(p− wPH)− F PH
ΠPH




H ; ·) ≥ 0.
(C.57)
Here, too, the retailer’s participation constraint is binding and the Lagrangian function is
given by:
171





















This contract would provide the manufacturer with a profit equal to piPH





Therefore, it is dominated by the {P,wP , F P} contract if
piP ∗ − piPH∗ ≥ 0 ⇔ (1− η2)β ≥ η2 γ. (C.60)
Now, consider the case when only consumers in the low segment are served. The full-
information P contract serving only the low segment, denoted {P L, wPL , F PL }, is determined









L , p˚L; η, γ) = D
L,P (p˚L; ·)wPL + F PL =
[













L ; η, β) = D
L,P (p; ·)(p− wPL )− F PL
ΠPL




L ; ·) ≥ 0.
(C.62)
Given that the retailer’s participation constraint is binding, we solve the first-order con-
ditions of the Lagrangian function associated with this problem:





















Under this contract, the manufacturer earns piPL




. As a result, this
contract will not be chosen if:
piP ∗ − piPL ∗ ≥ 0 ⇔ η(2η − 1)γ ≥ (1− η)2 β. (C.65)
Notice that (C.54) and (C.55) are satisfied whenever (C.65) and (C.60) hold, respectively.
In summary, the full-information P contract, under which consumers in both segments are
served, could be employed under the conditions characterized by (C.60) and (C.65). The
statement of Lemma 4.2 then follows. 
C.3.3 Proof of Lemma 4.3:
When κL = 0, from Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, the manufacturer’s profits upon the employment



















< 0, the manufacturer chooses the G contract in
equilibrium.
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From Lemma 4.2, the {P,wP , F P} contract is feasible when:





= β¯, and (C.68)







































Finally, if κH ≥ α2β , then (C.71) always holds. The statement of Lemma 4.3 follows.
C.3.4. Proof of Proposition 4.1:
Now, consider the case of non-trivial κL (i.e., κL > 0). From (C.68)-(C.69), the {P,wP , F P}
contract arises as a candidate for the optimal contract when η ∈ [η, η¯]. Meanwhile, the
feasibility of the {G,wG, FG} contract requires the following conditions (see Lemma 4.1):
(4.10)&(4.17) ⇔ η1 def= β(α + γ κL)
α(β + γ)




Note that (C.72) requires κL ≤ α2β+γ
def
= κ1. Further, analogous to the benchmark case,
without loss of qualitative insights, we focus on the setting with significantly large κH (i.e.,
κH ≥ κL2 + α2β ), which warrants (4.11) to hold for all η ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, it can be shown








that κ2 ∈ [0, κ1].) Together, the conditions in η that are required for the {P,wP , F P} and
{G,wG, FG} contracts being feasible are summarized in Figure 4.1.
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When both contracts are feasible (i.e., η ∈ [η1,min{η2, η¯}]), the manufacturer compares
its profit earned under the {P,wP , F P} contract to that under the {G,wG, FG} contract:

























= −ακL ≤ 0, i.e., ∆ is decreasing in η ∈ [η1,min{η2, η¯}].













≤ 0. This implies that ∆ = 0 has one solution η∗ ∈ [η1, η¯],
whose specification is given by:
η∗ def=
αβ + γ[−β κL +
√
β κL(2α− γ κL)]
αβ + γ
. (C.74)
In this case (i.e., κL ∈ (0, κ2]), if η ∈ [η1, η∗], then ∆ ≥ 0 ⇒ piP ∗ ≥ piG∗, i.e., M chooses
the {P,wP , F P} contract. Otherwise, if η ∈ (η∗, η¯], then ∆ < 0 ⇒ piP ∗ < piG∗ and the
{G,wG, FG} contract arises.
If κL ∈ (κ2, κ1], then (a) min{η2, η¯} = η2, (b) ∆
∣∣
η=η1






> 056. Therefore, ∆ ≥ 0 ⇒ piP ∗ ≥ piG∗ ∀ η ∈ [η1, η2],
i.e., M always chooses the {P,wP , F P} contract in equilibrium. The statement of Proposition
4.1 then follows. 
55since 2α− (4β + γ)κL > 2α− (4β + γ)κ1 = αγ2β+γ > 0.
56It can be seen that α2− 2α(β+ γ)κL + γ(β+ γ)κ2L < 0 ∀κL ∈ (κ2, κ1] since (i) it is a convex, quadratic
function in κL ∈ (κ2, κ1], (ii) α2− 2α(β+ γ)κL + γ(β+ γ)κ2L
∣∣
κL=κ2




= − α2 β γ(2β+γ)2 < 0.
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C.4 The menu of contracts under asymmetric information
regarding η (Proof of Proposition 4.2)
The optimal menu of contracts, under asymmetric information and uncertainty in η, solves






wP , FP , p
l|l
pi = φpiGh|h + (1− φ) piPl|l
= φpiG(wG, FG, pPh|h, p
GB
h|h ; ηh, ·) + (1− φ) piP (wP , F P , pl|l; ηl, ·)
= φ
{[






α− (β + γ)pl|l
]




(FOC-G) : {pPh|h, pGBh|h} = argmax
pP , pGB
ΠGh|h = Π
G(pP , pGB, wG, FG; ηh, ·), (C.76)
(FOC-P) : pl|l = argmax
p
ΠPl|l = Π








ΠPl|l ≥ 0, (C.79)
(IC-h) : ΠGh|h
∗ ≥ ΠPl|h∗ = max
p
ΠPl|h = Π
P (p, wP , F P ; ηh, ·), and (C.80)
(IC-l) : ΠPl|l
∗ ≥ ΠGh|l∗ = max
pP , pGB
ΠGh|l = Π
G(pP , pGB, wG, FG; ηl, ·). (C.81)

































Analogously, by optimizing ΠG(pP , pGB, , wG, FG; ηl, ·) = (ηl α − β pP )(pP − wG) +
[
(1 −
ηl)α− γ(pGB + κL)
]



























Next, we solve for pl|l = argmax
p
ΠPl|l = Π
P (p, wP , F P ; ηl, ·) and pl|h = argmax
p
ΠPl|h =
ΠP (p, wP , F P ; ηh, ·)57, and obtain:











α− (β + γ)wP]2
4(β + γ)
− F P . (C.89)
Further, since ΠPl|l
∗ = ΠPl|h
∗, by (C.79) and (C.80), we have ΠGh|h
∗ ≥ ΠPl|h∗ = ΠPl|l∗ ≥ 0; this













α− (β + γ)pl|l
]




57Notice that ΠPl|l = Π
P
l|h = Π











whose Lagrangian function is given by:
L = pi + λΠPl|l
∗ + µ (ΠGh|h
∗ − ΠPl|h∗) + δ (ΠPl|l∗ − ΠGh|l∗). (C.92)
The KKT first-order conditions of this problem are as follows:





α− γ κL − (β + γ)wG
]
(δ − µ) + 1
2
[
α− γ κL − (β + γ)(2wG − c)
]
φ = 0 (C.94)





α− (β + γ)wP](µ− δ − λ) + 1
2
[
α− (β + γ)(2wP − c)](1− φ) = 0, (C.96)




∗ ≥ 0 (C.98)
λΠPl|l




∗ − ΠPl|h∗ ≥ 0 (C.100)
µ (ΠGh|h




∗ − ΠGh|l∗ ≥ 0 (C.102)
δ (ΠPl|l
∗ − ΠGh|l∗) = 0 (C.103)
By investigating the first-order conditions, we show that (a) λ > 0, (b) µ > 0, and (c)
δ = 0. First, by (C.95) and (C.97), we have λ = 1 > 0 ⇒ ΠPl|l∗ = 0. Next, if µ = 0, then
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(C.95) ⇒ δ = −φ < 0, which contradicts (C.93); therefore,
µ > 0
by (C.101)⇒ ΠGh|h∗ − ΠPl|h∗ = 0. (C.104)
Finally, suppose that δ > 0, then by (C.103), we have ΠPl|l
∗ − ΠGh|l∗ = 0. Together with
(C.104), this implies:
(ΠGh|h
∗ − ΠPl|h∗) + (ΠPl|l∗ − ΠGh|l∗) = 0, (C.105)
⇔ α(ηh − ηl)
[



























∗ − ΠPl|h∗ = 0,
(C.107)
to obtain the optimal menu of contracts:
wG∗ = c, (C.108)
FG∗ =








58The prices upon the employment of the G contract in the low state of the market, pPh|l and p
GB
h|l , must
be such that pPh|l > p
GB
h|l ⇔ pPh|l − pGBh|l = β γ κL+α[−β+ηl(β+γ)]2β γ > 0 ⇒ α(β + γ)ηl > β(α − γ κL) ⇒
α(β + γ)(ηh + ηl) > 2α(β + γ)ηl > 2β(α− γ κL) ⇒
[




wP ∗ = c, (C.110)
F P ∗ =
[
α− (β + γ)c]2
4(β + γ)
. (C.111)
By substituting for c = 0, the statement of Proposition 4.2 then follows.
C.5 The optimal full-information contracts in the β-case
(Proof of Proposition 4.3)
Here, we investigate the manufacturer’s choice of full-information contracts (i.e., {G,wG, FG}
vs. {P,wP , F P}) in equilibrium when the market is uncertain in β. Recall (from Lemma
4.1) the conditions that supports the {G,wG, FG} contract59:
(1− η)α− γ κL ≥ 0 ⇔ κL ≤ (1− η)α
γ
def
= κ3, and (C.112)




⇔ β ≤ η α γ
(1− η)α + γ κL
def
= β1. (C.113)
Meanwhile, the {P,wP , F P} contract could be employed (see Lemma 4.2) when:




= β, and (C.114)




First, comparing β1 to γ, we have: β1 − γ = −γ[(1−2η)α+γ κL](1−η)α+γ κL . Therefore, if η ≤ 12 , then
β1 ≤ γ ∀κL ∈ [0, κ3]. Otherwise, if η > 12 , then β1 ≤ γ ⇔ κL ≥ (2η−1)αγ
def
= κ4. Notice
that κ4 ≤ κ3 ⇔ η ≤ 23 .





and (c) β ≥ γ ⇔ η ≥ 1√
2
.
59Here, we assume κH being significantly large so that κH ≥ κL2 + 12 [η αβ − (1−η)αγ ] is satisfied.
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Given β < γ and the above relationships, we can determine the feasibility of the two
contracts, {G,wG, FG} and {P,wP , F P}, with respect to β. This result is summarized in
Figure C.1.
-q q q q(1) η ∈ [0, 2−√22 ] ∧ κL ∈ [0, κ3] : β β1 β¯ γ β
{P,wP , FP } feasible -ff
{G,wG, FG} feasible -





2 ] ∧ κL ∈ [0, κ3];
or η ∈ ( 12 , 23 ] ∧ κL ∈ (κ4, κ3] : β β1 γ
β
{P,wP , FP } feasible -ff
{G,wG, FG} feasible -
-q q(3) η ∈ ( 12 , 23 ] ∧ κL ∈ [0, κ4];or η ∈ ( 23 , 1√2 ] ∧ κL ∈ [0, κ3] : β γ β
{P,wP , FP } feasible -ff
{G,wG, FG} feasible -
Figure C.1: Feasibility of the full-information contracts when the market is un-
certain in β
Analogous to the setting of market uncertainty in η, we compare the profitability of the
two contracts when both are feasible. Recall ∆ = piP ∗ − piG∗, which can be rewritten as
follows:
∆ =
−[(1− η)α− γ κL]2 β2 − γ[γ2 κ2L − 2(1− η)α γ κL − 2(1− η)η α2]β − η2 α2 γ2
4β γ (β + γ)
. (C.116)
Notice that ∆ has the same sign as the numerator of the RHS in (C.116), which is:
N1
def
= −[(1− η)α− γ κL]2 β2 − γ[γ2 κ2L − 2(1− η)α γ κL − 2(1− η)η α2]β − η2 α2 γ2. (C.117)
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Consider the following cases: (a) η ∈ [0, 1
2
] and κL ∈ [0, κ3], and (b) η ∈ (12 , 23 ] and
κL ∈ [κ4, κ3]. In these cases, both contracts are feasible when β ∈ [β, β1]. Notice that
∂N1
∂β
= −2[(1 − η)α − γ κL]2 β − γ[γ2 κ2L − 2(1 − η)α γ κL − 2(1 − η)η α2] is decreasing in








γ2 κL[−γ2 κ2L + (1− 3η)α γ κL + 2(1− η)(1 + 2η)α2]
(1− η)α + γ κL ≥ 0 (C.118)
(since the second term in the numerator of (C.118) is positive; it is a concave, quadratic
function in κL ∈ [0, κ3], whose values, evaluated at κL = 0 and κL = κ3, are 2(1 − η)(1 +
2η)α2 > 0 and 2(1 − η2)α2 > 0, respectively). This implies that N1 is increasing in β ∈
[β, β1].
Since (a) N1 is increasing in β ∈ [β, β1], (b) N1
∣∣
β=β
= −γ2[(1−η)α−γ κL]2 η2




= −η α γ3 κL[γ2 κ2L−(1−3η)αγ κL−2(1−η)α2]
[(1−η)α+γ κL]2 > 0
60, there exists β∗ ∈ [β, β1], such that if
β < β∗, then N1 < 0, i.e., the {G,wG, FG} contract is chosen. Otherwise, if β ≥ β∗, then
N1 ≥ 0, i.e., the {P,wP , F P} contract arises in equilibrium. The specification of β∗ is given
by:
β∗ =
2η(1− η)α2 + 2(1− η)α γ κL − γ2 κ2L
2
[




γ κL(2α− γ κL)
[




(1− η)α− γ κL
]2 (C.119)




] and κL ∈ [0, κ4], and (b) η ∈ (23 , 1√2 ]
and κL ∈ [0, κ3]. (Note that κ4 < κ3 in the former case and vice versa in the latter.) In
these two cases, the two contracts are feasible simultaneously when β ∈ [β, γ]. Analogous




60since the second term in the numerator of N1
∣∣
β=β1
is negative; it is a convex, quadratic function in
κL ∈ [0, κ3], whose values, evaluated at κL = 0 and κL = κ3, are −2(1− η)α2 < 0 and −2(1− η)2α2 < 0,
respectively.
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= γ2[−2γ2 κ2L + 4(1− η)α γ κL − (1− 2η)2 α2] ≥ 0






Notice that κ5 ∈ [0,min{κ3, κ4}].
Therefore, if κL < κ5, then (a) N1
∣∣
β=γ
< 0, and (b) N1
∣∣
β=β
< 0 as shown above;
this implies N1 < 0 ∀ β ∈ [β, γ], and as a result, the {G,wG, FG} contract is chosen in
equilibrium. Otherwise, if κL ≥ κ5, then (a) N1
∣∣
β=γ




the previous results are applicable, i.e., if β < β∗, then the {G,wG, FG} contract is chosen;
in contrast, if β ≥ β∗, then the {P,wP , F P} contract arises in equilibrium. The overall result
is graphically summarized in Figure 4.3. The statement of Proposition 4.3 then follows. 
C.6 The menu of contracts under asymmetric information
regarding β (Proof of Proposition 4.4)
C.6.1 The menu of P contracts under asymmetric information regarding β
Consider the menu of P contracts (i.e., {P,wPh , F Ph } and {P,wPl , F Pl }). This menu solves the








p˚iP = φpiP (wPh , F
P
h , p˚h|h; βh, ·) + (1− φ) piP (wPl , F Pl , p˚l|l; βl, ·)
= φ
{[
α− (βh + γ)p˚h|h
]




α− (βl + γ)p˚l|l
]
(wPl − c) + F Pl
}
, (C.121)
61since the second term is positive for all κL ∈ [0, κ3]; it is a concave, quadratic function in κL ∈ [0, κ3],
whose values evaluated at κL = 0 and κL = κ3 are 2(1− η)(2η − 1) > 0 and (1− η2)α2 > 0, respectively.






P (p, wPh , F
P
h ; βh, ·) =
[
α− (βh + γ)p
]




P (p, wPl , F
P
l ; βl, ·) =
[
α− (βl + γ)p
]


















P (p, wPl , F
P
l ; βh, ·) =
[
α− (βh + γ)p
]








P (p, wPh , F
P
h ; βl, ·) =
[
α− (βl + γ)p
]
(p− wPh )− F Ph . (C.127)




















[α− (βh + γ)wPh ]2
4(βh + γ)











[α− (βl + γ)wPl ]2
4(βl + γ)




[α− (βh + γ)wPl ]2
4(βh + γ)




[α− (βl + γ)wPh ]2
4(βl + γ)
− F Ph . (C.133)
Further, since Π˚P
∗












and (C.127), we have: Π˚P
∗
l|l ≥ Π˚P∗h|l > Π˚P∗h|h ≥ 0, i.e., (C.125) is redundant.
63Upon the employment of the {P,wPh , F Ph }, the retail price must be such that p˚h|h ≥ wPh ⇒ wPh ≤
α
βh+γ
< αβl+γ ⇒ α2 − (βh + γ)(βl + γ)wPh
2 > 0.
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α− (βh + γ)p˚h|h
]




α− (βl + γ)p˚l|l
]






α− (βh + γ)wPh
]






α− (βl + γ)wPl
]










h|h ≥ Π˚P∗l|h , and
Π˚P
∗
l|l ≥ Π˚P∗h|l .
(C.135)
The Lagrangian function is then given by:
L = p˚iP + λ Π˚P
∗









The KKT first-order conditions of this problem are as follows:





α− (βl + γ)wPh
]
µ− [α− (βh + γ)wPh ](δ + λ)+
+
[










− [α− (βl + γ)wPl ]µ+ [α− (βh + γ)wPl ]δ+
+
[





LFPl = 1− φ+ δ − µ = 0, (C.141)
Lλ = Π˚
P∗
h|h ≥ 0, (C.142)
λ Π˚P
∗





















h|l ) = 0 (C.147)
Now, we show that (a) λ > 0, (b) µ > 0, and (c) δ = 0. First, from (C.139) and (C.141),
we get: λ = 1 > 0. Next, if µ = 0, then by (C.141), δ = −(1 − φ) < 0, which contradicts
(C.137); therefore,
µ > 0
by (C.147)⇒ Π˚P∗l|l − Π˚P
∗
h|l = 0. (C.148)
Finally, suppose that δ > 0, then by (C.145), we have: Π˚P
∗










h|l ) = 0 ⇔
(βh − βl)(wPh 2 − wPl 2)
4
= 0 ⇒ wPh = wPl . (C.149)
Let wPh = w
P











for {δ, λ, µ} and get δ = − (1−φ)(βl+γ)(w−c)
w(βh−βl) < 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, δ = 0.




















l|l − Π˚P∗h|l = 0,
(C.151)





















































C.6.2 The menu of G contracts under asymmetric information regarding β























h|h ; βh, ·) + (1− φ) piG(wGl , FGl , p˚Pl|l, p˚GBl|l ; βl, ·)
= φ
{[
α− βh p˚Ph|h − γ(p˚GBh|h + κL)
]





α− βlp˚Pl|l − γ(p˚GBl|l + κL)
]





(FOC-h) : {p˚Ph|h, p˚GBh|h} = argmax
pP , pGB
Π˚Gh|h = Π
G(pP , pGB, wGh , F
G
h ; βh, ·), (C.157)
(FOC-l) : {p˚Pl|l, p˚GBl|l } = argmax
pP , pGB
Π˚Gl|l = Π
G(pP , pGB, wGl , F
G


















G(pP , pGB, wGl , F
G








G(pP , pGB, wPh , F
P
h ; βl, ·). (C.162)













l|h , and Π˚
G∗
h|l , by optimizing the respective profit functions. The
























(1− η)α− γ(wGj + κL)
]2
4γ
− FGj , where j, i ∈ {h, l}. (C.165)
Here, too, the individual rationality condition given by (C.160) is redundant, given (C.159)
and (C.162)64.
64We have: Π˚G∗h|l − Π˚G∗h|h = (βh−βl)(η
2 α2−βh βl wGh 2)
4βh βl
> 0 ⇒ Π˚G∗h|l > Π˚G∗h|h. Then, by (C.159) and (C.162), it
can be seen that Π˚G∗l|l ≥ Π˚G∗h|l > Π˚G∗h|h ≥ 0.
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α− βh p˚Ph|h − γ(p˚GBh|h + κL)
]





α− βlp˚Pl|l − γ(p˚GBl|l + κL)
]






α− γ κL − (βh + γ)wGh
]







α− γ κL − (βl + γ)wGl
]










h|h ≥ Π˚G∗l|h , and
Π˚G
∗
l|l ≥ Π˚G∗h|l ,
(C.167)
whose Lagrangian function is given by:
L = p˚iG + λ Π˚G
∗









The KKT first-order conditions of this problem are as follows:





α− γ κL − (βl + γ)wGh
]
µ − [α− γ κL − (βh + γ)wGh ](δ + λ) +
+
[










− [α− γ κL − (βl + γ)wGl ]µ + [α− γ κL − (βh + γ)wGl ]δ+
+
[





LFGl = 1− φ+ δ − µ = 0, (C.173)
Lλ = Π˚
G∗
























h|l ) = 0. (C.179)
By (C.171) and (C.173), we have λ = 1 > 0. Further, if µ = 0, then by (C.173),
δ = −(1− φ) < 0, which contradicts (C.169). Thus,
µ > 0
by (C.179)
=⇒ Π˚G∗l|l − Π˚G
∗
h|l = 0. (C.180)
Suppose δ > 0; by (C.177), we must have Π˚G
∗










h|l ) = 0 ⇔
(βh − βl)(wGh 2 − wGl 2)
4
= 0 ⇒ wGh = wGl . (C.181)
If wGh = w
G











for {δ, λ, µ}, we get δ = − (1−φ)(βl+γ)(w−c)
w(βh−βl) < 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, δ = 0.
Given λ = 1, µ > 0, and δ = 0, the optimal menu of G contracts is the solution to the




















l|l − Π˚G∗h|l = 0.
(C.183)













































C.6.3 The menu of P and G contracts under asymmetric information
regarding β
Recall the optimization problem that defines the optimal menu of P and G contracts (i.e.,
{P,wP , F P} and {G,wG, FG}) under asymmetric information regarding β:
max





pi = φpiPh|h + (1− φ) piGl|l = φpiP (wP , F P , ph|h; βh, ·) + (1− φ) piG(wG, FG, pPl|l, pGBl|l ; βl, ·)
= φ
{[
α− (βh + γ)ph|h
]




α− βl pPl|l + γ(pGBl|l + κL)
]





(FOC-P) : ph|h = argmax
p
ΠPh|h = Π
P (p, wP , F P ; βh, ·), (C.189)
(FOC-G) : {pPl|l, pGBl|l } = argmax
pP , pGB
ΠGl|l = Π








ΠGl|l ≥ 0, (C.192)
(IC-h) : ΠPh|h
∗ ≥ ΠGl|h∗ = max
pP , pGB
ΠGl|h = Π
G(pP , pGB, wG, FG; βh, ·), and (C.193)
(IC-l) : ΠGl|l
∗ ≥ ΠPh|l∗ = max
p
ΠPh|l = Π
P (p, wP , F P ; βl, ·). (C.194)








∗ (i ∈ {h, l}), by opti-











α− (βi + γ)wP
]2
4(βi + γ)



























Next, it can be seen that (C.192) is redundant, given (C.191) and (C.194)65. Therefore, the
above optimization problem simplifies to:
65Specifically, since ΠPh|l






> 0 ⇒ ΠPh|l∗ > ΠPh|h∗, then by (C.191)
and (C.194), we have: ΠGl|l
∗ ≥ ΠPh|l∗ > ΠPh|h∗ ≥ 0.
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α− (βh + γ)ph|h
]




α− βl pPl|l + γ(pGBl|l + κL)
]






α− (βh + γ)wP
]






α− γ κL − (βl + γ)wG
]












The Lagrangian function of this problem is:
L = pi + λΠPh|h
∗ + δ (ΠPh|h
∗ − ΠGl|h∗) + µ (ΠGl|l∗ − ΠPh|l∗), (C.202)
which has the following KKT first-order conditions:





α− (βl + γ)wP
]
µ− [α− (βh + γ)wP](δ + λ)+
+
[










− [α− γ κL − (βl + γ)wG]µ+ [α− γ κL − (βh + γ)wG]δ+
+
[










∗ ≥ 0, (C.208)
λΠPh|h




∗ − ΠGl|h∗ ≥ 0, (C.210)
δ (ΠPh|h




∗ − ΠPh|l∗ ≥ 0, and (C.212)
µ (ΠGl|l
∗ − ΠPh|l∗) = 0. (C.213)
First, from (C.205) and (C.207), we get: λ = 1 > 0. Next, if µ = 0, then (C.207) implies
that δ = −(1− φ) < 0, which contradicts (C.203); hence,
µ > 0
by (C.213)
=⇒ ΠGl|l∗ − ΠPh|l∗ = 0. (C.214)
Analogous to the previous analysis, we show that δ = 0 by contradiction. Specifically, assume
that δ > 0, then by (C.211), we have:
ΠPh|h
∗ − ΠGl|h∗ = 0. (C.215)
Together, (C.214) and (C.215) imply that:
(ΠGl|l
∗ − ΠPh|l∗) + (ΠPh|h∗ − ΠGl|h∗) = 0 ⇒ wP 2 − wG2 =
α2





Recall one of the conditions, required upon the employment of the G contract (Lemma 1):




⇔ β ≤ η α γ
(1− η)α + γ κL ⇒ β <
η γ















< 0 ⇒ wP < wG. (C.218)
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for {wP , wG, µ} and obtain
wP =
φ(βh + γ)c
φ γ − βh(1 + δ − 2φ) + βl(1 + δ − φ) , and (C.220)
wG =
(1− φ)(βl + γ)c
(1− φ)γ + βh δ + βl(1− φ− δ) . (C.221)
This implies wP − wG = c(βh−βl)
[





] > 0 (by inspection),
which contradicts (C.218). Therefore, δ = 0.

















∗ − ΠPh|l∗ = 0,
(C.222)
whose solution characterizes the optimal menu of P and G contracts:
wG∗ = c, (C.223)
FG∗ =











(βh + γ)(βl + γ)









F P ∗ =
[




Given c = 0, the characteristics of the three menus, i.e., the menu of P contracts, the
menu of G contracts, and the menu of P and G contracts, are summarized in Table 4.1. The
statement of Proposition 4.4 then follows.
C.7 The optimal full-information contracts in the γ-case
(Proof of Proposition 4.5)
Consider the setting of market uncertainty in γ. Further, recall that for analytical simplicity,
we focus on the case of η = 1
2
. In this setting, the conditions that support the {P,wP , F P}
contract (Lemma 4.2), include: (a) (1− η2)β ≥ η2 γ ⇔ γ ≤ 3β def= γ¯, and (b) η(2− η)γ ≥
(1− η)2β, which is true for all γ > β, given η = 1
2
. Regarding the {G,wG, FG} contract, we
assume that κH is significantly high so that (4.11) is satisfied. The other two conditions, i.e.
(4.10) and (4.17), imply that the {G,wG, FG} contract arises as a candidate for the optimal













Notice that (a) γ1 > β, and (b) γ2 ≤ γ¯ ⇔ κL ≤ α6β . Together, we can determine the
feasibility of the two contracts in γ; this result is provided in the upper portion of Figure
4.5.
Now, we compare the profitability of these two contracts when both are feasible, i.e., (a)
γ ∈ {γ1, γ¯} if κL ≤ α6β , and (b) γ ∈ {γ1, γ2} if α6β < κL ≤ α4β . Recall that ∆ = piP ∗−piG∗ has
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the same sign as N1 (see equations C.116 and C.117), which can be rewritten as a function
in γ as follows:
N1 = −β κ2L γ3 −
1
4
(α− 2β κL)2 γ2 + 1
2




Consider the first case, i.e., when κL ∈ [0, α6β ] and γ ∈ [γ1, γ¯]. Notice that N1 is a
cubic function in γ ∈ [γ1, γ¯] with a negative third-order coefficient. Further, it can be




























= −β2(α − 6β κL)2 < 0. Therefore, there exists a solution66, γ∗, of N1 in
[γ1, γ¯] such that (a) if γ ≤ γ∗, then N1 ≥ 0, i.e., M will choose the {P,wP , F P} contract,
and (b) if γ > γ∗, then N1 < 0, i.e., the {G,wG, FG} contract will be chosen.
Next, consider the other case, when κL ∈ ( α6β , α4β ] and γ ∈ [γ1, γ2]. Notice that (a)













= −α2(4β3−12β2 γ+β γ2+γ3)
16β
>
0 ∀γ ∈ [β, γ¯]. This implies that N1 > 0 ∀κL ∈ ( α6β , α4β ], i.e., M always chooses the
{P,wP , F P} contract when κL ∈ ( α6β , α4β ].
A summary of this result is provided in Figure 4.5. The statement Proposition 4.5 then
follow. 
66The complex specification of the cubic function does not allow for a closed-form solution of γ∗.
67N1 = −β γ2 (β + γ)κ2L + αβ γ(β + γ)κL − α2(γ2 − β2 )2.
68Note that in this case, we have γ2 < γ¯.
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C.8 The menu of contracts under asymmetric information
regarding γ (Proof of Proposition 4.6)
C.8.1 The menu of P contracts under asymmetric information regarding γ
Consider the menu of P contracts (i.e., {P,wPh , F Ph } and {P,wPl , F Pl }), which is the solution








p˘iP = φpiP (wPh , F
P
h , p˘h|h; γh, ·) + (1− φ) piP (wPl , F Pl , p˘l|l; γl, ·)
= φ
{[



















P (p, wPh , F
P
h ; γh, ·) =
[
α− (β + γh)p
]




P (p, wPl , F
P
l ; γ, ·) =
[
α− (βl + γ)p
]


















P (p, wPl , F
P
l ; γh, ·) =
[
α− (β + γh)p
]









P (p, wPl , F
P
l ; γl, ·) =
[
α− (β + γl)p
]
(p− wPh )− F Ph . (C.236)






















[α− (β + γi)wPj ]2
4(β + γi)
− F Pj . (C.238)
Here, since Π˘P
∗







> 069 ⇒ Π˘P∗h|l > Π˘P∗h|h, by (C.233)
and (C.236), we have: Π˘P
∗
l|l ≥ Π˘P∗h|l > Π˘P∗h|h ≥ 0, i.e., (C.234) is redundant.










α− (β + γh)p˘h|h
]




α− (β + γlp˘l|l
]






α− (β + γh)wPh
]






α− (β + γl)wPl
]










h|h ≥ Π˘P∗l|h , and
Π˘P
∗
l|l ≥ Π˘P∗h|l .
(C.240)
The Lagrangian function of this problem is as follows:
L = p˘iP + λ Π˘P
∗









Next, we derive the KKT first-order conditions of this Lagrangian function:
λ ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0, δ ≥ 0, (C.242)








α− (β + γl)wPh
]
µ− [α− (β + γh)wPh ](δ + λ)+
+
[










− [α− (β + γl)wPl ]µ+ [α− (β + γh)wPl ]δ+
+
[





LFPl = 1− φ+ δ − µ = 0, (C.246)
Lλ = Π˘
P∗
h|h ≥ 0, (C.247)
λ Π˘P
∗




















h|l ) = 0 (C.252)
In the following, we show that (a) λ > 0, (b) µ > 0, and (c) δ = 0. First, we have
λ = 1 > 0 based on (C.244) and (C.246). Next, if µ = 0, then by (C.246), δ = −(1−φ) < 0,
which contradicts (C.242); therefore,
µ > 0
by (C.252)⇒ Π˘P∗l|l − Π˘P
∗
h|l = 0. (C.253)
Finally, suppose that δ > 0, then by (C.250), we have: Π˘P
∗










h|l ) = 0 ⇔
(γh − γl)(wPh 2 − wPl 2)
4
= 0 ⇒ wPh = wPl . (C.254)
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Let wPh = w
P











for {δ, λ, µ}, we get δ = − (1−φ)(β+γl)(w−c)
w(γh−γl) < 0, which contradicts the assumption that δ > 0.
Therefore, δ = 0.



















l|l − Π˘P∗h|l = 0.
(C.256)































C.8.2 The menu of G contracts under asymmetric information regarding γ
Consider the menu of G contracts under market uncertainty in γ; this menu solves the






















h|h ; γh, ·) + (1− φ) piG(wGl , FGl , p˘Pl|l, p˘GBl|l ; γl, ·)
= φ
{[

















(FOC-h) : {p˘Ph|h, p˘GBh|h} = argmax
pP , pGB
Π˘Gh|h = Π
G(pP , pGB, wGh , F
G
h ; γh, ·), (C.262)
(FOC-l) : {p˘Pl|l, p˘GBl|l } = argmax
pP , pGB
Π˘Gl|l = Π
G(pP , pGB, wGl , F
G


















G(pP , pGB, wGl , F
G








G(pP , pGB, wPh , F
P
h ; γl, ·). (C.267)
First, we derive the specification of p˘Pj|i, p˘
GB
j|i , and Π˘
G∗


























(1− η)α− γi(wGj + κL)
]2
4γi
− FGj . (C.270)
Next, given (C.264) and (C.267), it can be seen that condition (C.265) is redundant70.










α− β p˘Ph|h − γh(p˘GBh|h + κL)
]





α− βp˘Pl|l − γl(p˘GBl|l + κL)
]






α− γh κL − (β + γh)wGh
]







α− γl κL − (β + γl)wGl
]










h|h ≥ Π˘G∗l|h , and
Π˘G
∗
l|l ≥ Π˘G∗h|l ,
(C.272)
whose Lagrangian function is given by:
L = p˘iG + λ Π˘G
∗









The KKT first-order conditions of this problem are as follows:





α− γl κL − (β + γl)wGh
]
µ − [α− γh κL − (β + γh)wGh ](δ + λ) +
+
[





70Notice that Π˘G∗h|l − Π˘G∗h|h =
(γh−γl)
[
(1−η)2 α2−γh γl (wGh +κL)2
]
4γh γl
> 0 ⇒ Π˘G∗h|l > Π˘G∗h|h. Therefore, by (C.264)
and (C.267), we have: Π˘G∗l|l ≥ Π˘G∗h|l > Π˘G∗h|h ≥ 0.
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− [α− γl κL − (β + γl)wGl ]µ + [α− γh κL − (β + γh)wGl ]δ+
+
[





LFGl = 1− φ+ δ − µ = 0, (C.278)
Lλ = Π˘
G∗
h|h ≥ 0, (C.279)
λ Π˘G
∗




















h|l ) = 0. (C.284)
By (C.276) and (C.278), we have λ = 1 > 0. Further, if µ = 0, then by (C.278),
δ = −(1− φ) < 0, which contradicts (C.274). Thus,
µ > 0
by (C.284)
=⇒ Π˚G∗l|l − Π˚G
∗
h|l = 0. (C.285)
Now, we show that δ = 0 by contradiction. Suppose δ > 0; by (C.282), we must have
Π˘G
∗









h|l ) = 0 ⇔
(γh − γl)(wGh − wGl )(wGh + wGl + 2κL)
4
= 0 ⇒ wGh = wGl .
(C.286)
Given wGh = w
G













for {δ, λ, µ}, we get δ = − (1−φ)(β+γl)(w−c)
(γh−γ)(w+κL) < 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, δ = 0.
In summary, we have λ = 1, µ > 0, and δ = 0. By solving the following system of



















l|l − Π˘G∗h|l = 0,
(C.288)












































C.8.3 The menu of P and G contracts under asymmetric information
regarding γ
Here, we solve the optimization problem that defines the optimal menu of P and G contracts
under asymmetric information and uncertainty in γ (i.e., {P,wP , F P} and {G,wG, FG}, de-
signed for the low and high state respectively):
max






pi = φpiGh|h + (1− φ)piPl|l
= φpiG(wG, FG, pPh|h, p
GB
h|h ; γh, ·) + (1− φ) piP (wP , F P , pl|l, ; γl, ·)
= φ
{[






α− (β + γl)pl|l
]




(FOC-P) : pl|l = argmax
p
ΠPl|l = Π
P (p, wP , F P ; γl, ·), (C.294)
(FOC-G) : {pPh|h, pGBh|h} = argmax
pP , pGB
ΠGh|h = Π








ΠPl|l ≥ 0, (C.297)
(IC-h) : ΠGh|h
∗ ≥ ΠPl|h∗ = max
p
ΠPl|h = Π
P (p, wP , F P ; γh, ·), and (C.298)
(IC-l) : ΠPl|l
∗ ≥ ΠGh|l∗ = max
pP , pGB
ΠGh|l = Π
G(pP , pGB, wG, FG; γl, ·). (C.299)





















α− (β + γi)wP
]2
4(β + γi)



























Here, too, it can be seen that (C.297) is redundant, given (C.296) and (C.299)71. This
result, together with (C.308)-(C.310), allows for a simplification of the above optimization
problem as follows:
max










α− (β + γl)pl|l
]






α− γh κL − (β + γh)wG
]






α− (β + γl)wP
]



















> 0 ⇒ ΠGh|l∗ > ΠGh|h∗, by (C.296) and (C.299),
we have: ΠPl|l
∗ ≥ ΠGh|l∗ > ΠGh|h∗ ≥ 0.
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The Lagrangian function of this problem is:
L = pi + λΠGh|h
∗ + δ (ΠGh|h
∗ − ΠPl|h∗) + µ (ΠPl|l∗ − ΠGh|l∗), (C.307)
which has the following KKT first-order conditions:





− [α− (β + γl)wP]µ+ [α− (β + γh)wP]δ+
+
[










α− γl κL − (β + γl)wG
]
µ− [α− γh κL − (β + γh)wG](δ + λ)+
+
[









∗ ≥ 0, (C.313)
λΠGh|h




∗ − ΠPl|h∗ ≥ 0, (C.315)
δ (ΠGh|h




∗ − ΠGh|l∗ ≥ 0, and (C.317)
µ (ΠPl|l
∗ − ΠGh|l∗) = 0. (C.318)
First, from (C.310) and (C.312), we get: λ = 1 > 0. Next, if µ = 0, then (C.310) implies
that δ = −(1− φ) < 0, which contradicts (C.308); hence,
µ > 0
by (C.318)
=⇒ ΠPl|l∗ − ΠGh|l∗ = 0. (C.319)
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Now, we show that δ = 0, also by contradiction. Assume that δ > 0, then by (C.316), we
have:
ΠGh|h
∗ − ΠPl|h∗ = 0. (C.320)
Together, (C.319) and (C.320) give us the following relationship:
(ΠPl|l
∗ − ΠGh|l∗) + (ΠGh|h∗ − ΠPl|h∗) = 0 ⇒ wP 2 − (wG + κL)2 =
α2






Recall one of the conditions, required upon the employment of the G contract (Lemma 1):








> 0( since κL > 0) ⇔ 1− η < γ
β + γ
(C.322)












⇒ wP > wG + κL. (C.323)









for {wP , wG, µ} and obtain
wP =
(1− φ)(β + γl)c
(1− φ) β + γh δ + γl(1− φ− δ) , and (C.325)
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wG =
(1− φ+ δ)(γh − γl)κL + φ(β + γh)c
φ β + γh(2φ− 1 + δ) + γl(1− φ+ δ) . (C.326)
Denote the denominators in the RHS of (C.325) and (C.326) by D1 and D2 respectively and
notice that these terms must be positive for the prices to be positive. From (C.325) and




(by inspection), which contradicts (C.323). Therefore, δ = 0.

















∗ − ΠGh|l∗ = 0,
(C.327)
and obtain the optimal menu of P and G contracts as follows:
wP ∗ = c, (C.328)
F P ∗ =
[




























We summarize the characteristics of the three menus, i.e., the menu of P contracts, the
menu of G contracts, and the menu of P and G contracts, when c = 0 in Table 4.2. The
statement of Proposition 4.6 then follows.
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